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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Benazir Bhutto
for twenty

months

attention both at

— former Prime Minister of Pakistan who had held
she was ousted
August 1990 — had

until

in

home and

minister of Pakistan in

Party (PPP) in the 1988

She was the

abroad.

more than

attracted

The

a decade.

November

first

dawn of new democratic

Muslim
groups

nation in

victory of her Pakistan People’s

elections and her subsequent appointment as

Pakistan.

history, a fact resented

all

first

woman

to lead a

by conservatives and

religious

the daughter of the late

charismatic leader

was

the fact that she

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

— a legendary

other reasons, what distinguished her most

who was much

figure in Pakistani politics

coup

She was also the

hailed as

in the country.

Among
was

modem

much

democratically elected prime

Prime Minister coincided with the global march of democracy and was
a

office

who had

loved and

much

ruled Pakistan from 1971 until 1977

Haq

d’etat of General Zia-ul

ousted him.

His

He was

hated.

when

socialist policies

a

a military

had a strong

appeal to the underprivileged masses and the Pakistan People’s Party he had

founded received tremendous popular support.

However,

his left-wing populism,

including nationalization of industries, antagonized conservatives and industrialists

of middle- and upper-classes.

Moreover,

his strong leadership gradually

be viewed by many as authoritarian and repressive.
led to social unrest fueled

Haq

intervened in the

Bhutto was hanged

election in

to

March 1977

by the opposition and the army under General Zia-ul

name of

in April

The legacy of

The

came

restoring order.

After two years of imprisonment,

1979 for alleged complicity

in a political

murder.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Pakistani politics had remained very

powerful for more than a decade after

his death

1

and had a considerable impact,

both positively and negatively, on the political actions of his daughter.
support for the

of injustice.
her father.

PPP

When

be the victim

to

people gave Benazir Bhutto their support, they were recalling

His appeal was

father’s legacy also

clear:

“Bhutto did good things for the poor.”

became apparent when she confronted

Her

the opposition groups

formed the government. Being a woman and a Bhutto, she was destined

after she
to face

continued partly because he was considered

Popular

antagonism of the conservative elements and religious fundamentalists

At the same time, she abandoned the left-wing populism

country.

her father to power, and

moved toward

that

in the

had brought

the center, claiming herself as a social

democrat. This reflected both the changes

in the social conditions of Pakistan

from

her father’s time and her concerns not to alienate the vested interests which would
resent socialist policies like her father’s.

Benazir Bhutto’s political

began practically

life

after her father’s execution.

Since then, she underwent a series of house arrests, detention, and imprisonment

beginning of 1984 when she

until the

left for

London

in exile.

During

period

this

she tried, along with her mother, Nusrat Bhutto, to maintain the PPP.
crucial to give an impression that, although Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

was

Owing

not.

managed

to a

number of

was dead,

It

his party

seriously committed party workers, the

to survive while both of its

two leaders remained

in jail

was

PPP

most of the time.

In February 1981, leaders of nine opposition parties gathered and agreed to

be united against the government as the Movement for Restoration of Democracy

The process of forming

(MRD).
leaders
the

were even former enemies.

MRD

largest

was

the

the alliance faced difficulties

One

PPP’s “dominance”

—

some of

source of constant disagreement within

in the alliance.

and post powerful component party

in the

The PPP was by

MRD,

far the

whose other members

were mostly small and regional groups with hardly any supporters. Naturally,

PPP

leader, Benazir Bhutto, intended to exercise

strength.
this

However,

power

the

relative to her party’s

the leaders of the other smaller parties in the

MRD

tendency of Bhutto, leading to inner squabbles within the alliance.

2

the

resented

Despite

such difficulties, however, the

MRD remained united as the country’s only capable

opposition force with an objective of unseating Zia-ul Haq.
In January

1984, Benazir Bhutto went in exile to London where she

continued to put pressure on the military regime to secure the release of
prisoners
activists.

who numbered some

forty thousand and

many of whom were PPP

She met frequently with other PPP leaders who were

London, but

political

their interests often conflicted with each other.

also in exile in

During

this period,

ethnic conflicts, particularly in the province of Sindh, intensified and bursted into
riots in

which hundreds of people were

killed

and injured.

Such violence was,

to

a large extent, a result of Zia’s repressive policy.
In February 1985, general elections

other
basis.

MRD

parties, boycotted

them because they were conducted on a non-party

All candidates had to contest the elections as independents, and the use of

party symbols

was

prohibited,

making

identify the parties they supported.
it

wanted

to

make

national party,
elections

of

were held, but the PPP, along with

were

held.

Mohammad Khan

and the formation of

martial law

The

impossible for largely

The

illiterate

intention of the Zia regime

certain that Benazir Bhutto’s

would not win on

to Junejo’s civilian

it

the strength of

its

PPP,

voters to

was obvious;

the largest and the only

leader’s popularity, even

the

party-less elections of 1985 resulted in the appointment

Junejo, the Pakistan
his quasi-democratic

Muslim League

leader, as

prime minister

government. After giving part of power

government, on December 30, 1985, General Zia-ul Haq

which had

if

lasted for

more than

3

eight years.

lifted

CHAPTER

2

RETURN TO PAKISTAN
Campaign

On

against the

Government

April 10, 1986, after two years of self-imposed exile in London, Benazir

A

Bhutto returned to Pakistan.

massive welcoming crowd was waiting

the leader of the largest political party in the country.
that

it

They were

took nine and a half hours for the Bhutto motorcade

from the airport
went

attracted

to the site of the rally in Lahore.

beyond

far

expectations;

all

entire history of Pakistan.

It

was a

it

to receive

so tightly packed

to travel the eight miles

The

size of the

crowd she

was simply unprecedented

surprise for those

who had

in

the

doubted that

Benazir could enjoy the kind of support for which her father was famous.
It

would be

that greeted her

fair to note,

that, at that point, the

were inspired more by the memory of her

This was observed

herself.

however,

in

father than by Benazir

every procession throughout the campaign that

followed her return where the slogan most heard and hailed was

former prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

The campaign

in

her speech

to create violent situations.

Her main demand

in

her speech

elections, restoration of the

consequently peaceful transfer of power to the people.
.

how

enough

broad popular support into a

to translate
to force

new

processions, in spite

Bhutto was careful

was holding of party-based

.

in respect of the

initially quite peaceful.

of the huge crowds, were

and attitude so as not

immense crowds

elections;

and

how

to

1973 constitution and

“Bhutto’s dilemma was

political

.

movement powerful

do so without triggering violence,

thereby risking the re-imposition of martial law.’T

begun

As

the anti-government campaign proceeded, however, mass rallies had

to

spark so-called “street politics.”

electoral transfer of

power remained

valid, the

4

Although Bhutto’s emphasis on

campaign processions had

led to

anti-government marches and agitation.

measures would force General Zia

government was becoming
against

it

mounted.

martial law.

It

After

all, it

was predicted

leaders hoped that such

to call early elections.

and

less

Some PPP

tolerant as

less

It

proved wrong.

the opposition’s criticism

had been only a few months since the

that in case the

PPP

along with other

could mobilize their resources to launch agitation and protests

demand, the government would be

left

government had decided on the

mass

14,

1986 when the

rally despite the

to

MRD

parties

favor of their

One would be

the

impose yet another martial law. The

the regime

PPP and

in

of

lifting

path.

first

The heavy-handed blow of
August

with only two options.

The other would be

severe confrontation.

The

other

came down on

MRD parties

the opposition on

held an Independence

Day

warning given by the government. Both the government and

the opposition had planned on a rally for the holiday, but the Junejo government

canceled

its

plan and ordered Bhutto and other opposition leaders to do the same.

They ignored

the order and held the public meeting, which invited

government and resulted

the

in

thousands of political arrests of party workers and

the major opposition leaders including Bhutto herself.
political unrest in Pakistan since the

one

had

had waged since her return

and

political situation

government.

“We

to

pace them out

at

another time

when

manner

said to

be the worst

realized the limitation of agitational

in April,

Bhutto conceded that her party

that she

made

a serious error in

to

push things so fast,” she explained, “but

that will permit us to exercise our popular support

the tension

Another cause for the

was

launching a premature movement against the

in

have decided not

in a

It

1983 which was brutally repressed by

She admitted

to reconsider its strategy.

judging the

in

Having

the military regime of Zia-ul Haq.
politics she

crackdown by

.

.

failure

criticized that Bhutto launched her

.

has gone down.’’2

was

the lack of coherent organization.

was

“holy war” against Zia with more zeal than

organizational strength of her party. Before the crackdown, “she honestly
all

It

felt that

she had to do was to say the word and the same crowd that greeted her would

come

out on the streets and die for her.’ ’3

5

Now

she realized that attracting huge

crowds was one thing and transforming her personal popularity

power was another.

Although her

into strong political

arrest lasted just over three

weeks, the whole

incident raised doubts about her ability to effectively challenge the powerful

government and forced her
instead, adopt a slower and

to

renounce the policy of direct confrontation and,

more moderate course of

action.

Disintegration and Reorganization of the

While forced
to

cope with the

to the sideline

internal

decision to take a

for fear of inviting another

interests

country.

PPP

stance against the government

crackdown or martial law.

to realize that she

She renounced socialism
left

It

was brought about

was

also argued that

had to win the confidence of the vested

which had controlled the government

democrat on the

Benazir Bhutto also had

politics,

problems of her Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Bhutto’s

more moderate

Bhutto finally came

of the nation’s

PPP

if

she truly wanted to govern the

as the party principle, claiming herself a social

of center of political spectrum. Bhutto explained that what the

had strived for was socio-economic justice and

Marxist nor communist but simply wanted

to bring

country’s political and socio-economic set-up.

that her father

was

neither a

about democratic changes

in the

Another important reason

for

Bhutto’s renouncement of social radicalism was the change in socio-economic
conditions of Pakistan from her father’s days.

was much

less than that in early 1970s.

Such a

shift

on the party’s stand and moderation

those devoted and militant party
society.

Economic discontent among people

members who wanted a

They had “suffered (under

is

program

real structural

frustrated

change

in

martial law) for a certain dream, vague but

compelling: the vision of a better society which Bhutto.
his daughter

in its

from a distance embodied. (Now they

.

.

symbolized and which

feel that) at close quarters she

another confused politician. ’’4 Softening of Bhutto’s attitude toward the United

States

was

also disturbing to

many of

the

6

PPP

supporters.

“There

is

a dispute in

the party over Benazir’s position,” one

are very anti-American. ”5

PPP

leader said.

‘‘Our political workers

Benazir could not bridge the gap between her party’s

extreme segments with more moderate components and, therefore, had
a divided and weaker party.
it

was never made

clear

The slogan of Bhuttoism was

what the term

still

being chanted but

The lack of

really meant.

to settle for

clarity

on issues

and absence of clear-cut program were hurting the morale of the party workers
badly.

Another challenge Bhutto had
non-existent in her party.

It

was

to face

was

criticized that the

As a response

holding of intra-party elections.

It

PPP

Some

to a dictatorial style of decision-making.

autocratic tendencies.

the complaint that

was ‘‘addicted”

leadership

party leaders accused her of

to this charge, discussions

was hoped

democracy was

that such elections

were made

would

for

activate the

party members, give them a sense of satisfaction and hopefully bring the in-fighting
to

However, such

an end.

organization in which

all

elections never materialized.

major decisions were made by Bhutto and the

her and elder party leaders kept growing.

Hazar Khan

The PPP remained an

Bijrani resigned

from

rift

Makhdoom Khaliquzzaman

between
and Mir

their leadership positions in Sindh, protesting

against the personalized style of decision-making at the top which were carried out

without consultation with other party leaders. Khaliquzzaman argued
did not belong to any one family and there were

who were

many

that the party

others besides the Bhuttos

also political heirs of the founder of the party.

Some went

as far as

saying that the political legacy of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had degenerated, under
Benazir’s leadership, into a modified theory of ‘‘divine rights of kings” in which
the concept of

power and

authority of elected leaders

is

the

same

as that of absolute

monarch s.
It

all

the

must be noted

PPP

that

when Bhutto

returned to Pakistan in April 1986, not

leaders were happy to see her back.

In exile she depended on the old

guard to sustain the party. After her return, however, she began
instinct

and rely on younger

many of the

aides.

to follow her

own

This was a sensitive issue given the fact that

old-timers were friends of her father and they expected her to address

7

7

and

them

treat

daughter”

as

“uncles.” Moreover they used the Urdu word for

speaking to her.

in

“The

independent leadership.

Mustafa

Jatoi,

who was

fired

Bhutto refused
acting chairman

from

this

and

tried

“little

exercise her

to

knows everything,” complained
“She

his post as party leader in Sindh.

her infinite wisdom that she has no need to consult with others like

feels in

me who

claim

and experience and have sacrificed for the party. ”6

seniority

Criticism mounted not only of the autocratic decision-making

at the top

but

also of the enforcement of these decisions without active involvement of the party

Since the contact between the

cadres.

PPP and

the masses, the source of the

was maintained through a highly motivated cadre, a two-way

party’s strength,

communication between the top and the cadre was

Aware of

popular support.

weakness of the party

the lack of this communication and the resulting

structure,

Not having had

one analyst argued:

the need to actually build popular support to

people, she has not apparently
for

it.

crucial in maintaining the

That must

explain

much thought about

why

and equipped

it

she has been so oblivious to the

signs of erosion that are obvious to almost everyone else and

she cannot see that the course she had adopted
that direction.

to

it

and

.

.

.

Her party has not had a long

to her personality

explained,

brutality of the state, they
bullets for

“When

must do

it

did

causing strain in

history, and loyalty

be a matter of

people

come

for something.

into the streets to face the

People are not going

to face

Bhuttoism.”8

more weight than members’

not

why

number of people.

There was another accusation against Bhutto
carried

is

and the family cannot

habit or blind devotion for a very large

As one PPP member

woo

care

for

dissent

and

that personal loyalty to her

contribution to the party principles and that she

surrounded

her

with

“yes-men.”

personalized politics was a necessity during martial law,
8

’

“Perhaps

one observer noted.

“But now with comparative freedom of operation
imperative.

be the sole
of

for parties, a

Acceptance of subservient role and personal loyalty should no more
criteria for

appointment

to central

and provincial offices. Continuation

keep internal differences boiling and erode

this policy will

Bhutto denied her “dominance” over the party and claimed

want
that

to

its

popular base. “9

that she

be a “rubber stamp” for the party elders. However,

was

it

simply did not
quite apparent

Bhutto intentionally replaced those “uncles” and dissenters with younger and

more obedient ones
was her own.

in

order to consolidate her grip on the party which she believed

After

PPP was

the

all,

a party built around the Bhutto family,

around Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s personal charisma and

Weakening of the

The Movement
its

change has become

for Restoration of

components ranged from Marxist

and large

parties,

martyrdom.

MRP

Democracy (MRD),

left to religious right

despite the fact that

and included both small

had remained united under martial law as the only capable

opposition group to put pressure on the Zia regime.

December 1985 and

martial law in

his

MRD’s

considerable extent, the

However,

after the lifting of

the following restoration of civil liberties to a

demand and slogans

original

lost

some of

their

urgency; the restoration of the 1973 constitution and fresh elections on a party
basis

were not

live

unable to adjust

enough

issues around

itself to the

new

which people could

rally.

political climate, continued to

But the
speak

MRD,

in its old

idiom.

By

this

as vertically.
it

time the

It

MRD

“As

to express

government

to unite

on the whole

set

of major issues confronting the

a result of this scattering of focus in the

informed
at

issues horizontally as well

could no longer stand up and fight against the government because

was almost impossible

country.

was divided on various

critical

MRD,

the alliance failed

opinion about the policies pursued by the Junejo

home and abroad,” one

observer noted.

9

“In the absence of

this

ability to express the grievances of the masses, the

martial law period has lost

appeal for the

its

bring about the Movement’s victory. ”10
specific terms, the

become

MRD

appeared

Being unable

to redefine its

to

aims

in

with no goal in sight and had

the huge gap in size between the

demanded

that her

process because of

PPP
its

and that

majority, the

PPP

component

the other

all

MRD

parties in the

was

in

parties.

Bhutto had

the decision-making

alliance.

were equal members with equal

They

felt that,

despite

should not be given super political power status

which, they feared, would lead

to its

its

its

for the

numerical

in the alliance

dominance over the remaining

Bhutto argued that the PPP, with

The

that of others.

view should be accommodated accordingly

working of the

inner

its

derived from

critical issue

mass popularity distinguished from

their points of

over-all democratic

PPP and

The most

should be given “weightage”

smaller parties argued that

MRD.

MRD

other factor that furthered the weakening of the

squabbles, just as was the case with the PPP.

the

left

supposed

is

increasingly out of touch with reality.

The

rights

agitational style of the

common man who

have been

to

mere

parties within

strong popular support on the

national level, could not be equated with small regional parties with hardly any

follower.

when
style

the

The

MRD

leader of the smaller parties accused Bhutto of arrogance.

was united against

Now

angered her alliance partners.

from the front scene, the reason
animosities that had been
to crop

common enemy,

the

embedded

in the

Zia, Bhutto’s high-handed

that the dictatorship

for their unity

was

MRD since

Even

was gone,

also weakened.

its

at least

The

old

formation were beginning

up again.

There was another point on which the PPP and
disagreed: the strategy of the

MRD

the

smaller parties

campaign against the government.

seen in the PPP’s change of course in

game had

its

As was

struggle for democracy, Benazir Bhutto

be played only within the framework

set

had realized that the

political

up by the regime.

Since the political parties had been unable to overthrow the

to

existing system, they had to learn to live with
to

democracy.

it

and work toward a gradual

Bhutto’s pragmatic approach had a

10

lot

of logic

in

it

shift

and appeared

quite hopeful, but the rest of the

simply rejected the whole idea.
are in

no position

make

the best of this

to play a

“They

showed reluctance

either

to accept

or

it

are small, lack a popular base and hence

worthwhile electoral role,” one analyst noted.

drawback by favoring

which make for impressive but

MRD

MRD

“They

the adoption of ultra-puristic positions

unrealistic politics.’ ’ll

As a

result,

whenever

the

leaders met, they gave an impression of purposeless drifting and final

decisions were always postponed.

Meanwhile

the public

was

getting frustrated with inability of the

MRD

to

take concrete actions and disillusioned with the promise of democratic freedom

within the foreseeable future.

seemed

have given up the

to

was

It

criticized that

battle against

the

perpetuation of the status quo. Frustration with the
critic

MRD

“If the

say,

...

to other

more

If the

MRD

cannot

move

trying to iron out these differences, the

people

still

commanded

still

meaningful

felt for

it.

martial law,

it

MRD.

MRD’s

incompetence made one

critic

MRD

let

it

hand over the torch

argued, “Instead of earnestly

leaders have engaged themselves in
trivial

points of prestige.

’
’
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The

public attention because of the “automatic goodwill’’ that
In fact, for a

political activities that

achieved by the

leaders

government and favored the

further forward,

meaningless problems and petty squabbles over

MRD

MRD

them say so frankly and abdicate

let

Another

willing hands. ’’12

the

on account of physical tiredness or mental

leaders,

sluggishness, wish to abandon their role,
publicly.

some of

However,

really deserved

few years

took place
if

little

after

its

formation, almost

in Pakistan

judged solely on

its

were

all

the

either initiated or

record since the

lifting

of

public sympathy.

Local Bodies Election

As a means

to consolidate his Pakistan

nation-wide support base for

bodies elections

it,

the Junejo

on November 30,

government had decided

1987.

11

Muslim League (PML) and

Although

political

build a

to hold local

parties

were

technically banned from participation, the polls were treated in practice as a crucial

“dress-rehearsal” for the next general election.

PPP

decided against participation

MRD

would mean

in the polls,

The

MRD

parties except for the

arguing that such an action by the

recognition of the illegitimate Junejo government.

its

Despite the opposition of the
part in the party-less polls

MRD partners,

Benazir Bhutto decided to take

by supporting individual PPP candidates.

She

justified

her decision by arguing that her party workers needed election experience after

momentum

eight years in the wilderness and that elections would add

democratic process

in the country.

elections being

vivid in her

same mistake

still

“During

again.

had taken place

body

in the

course of events.

It

The

failure of the

MRD

the

to

boycott of the 1985

memory, Bhutto was determined

not to

make

the

the long wait in the sidelines, significant changes

politics threatening to render the

was therefore necessary

for the party to

PPP

irrelevant to the

come down from

its

‘ivory tower’ and bridge the gap between the ‘desirable’ and the ‘available.’ ”14

The defiance of
reflection

the

PPP

MRD

MRD.

It

was

decision on boycott was both a

also argued that the

partners in order to emphasize

The campaign
style.

MRD’s

of Bhutto’s pragmatic politics and an indication of the continuous

inner-tussle within the

the

against the

strategy of the

The PPP supported

its

PPP

deliberately defied

separate identity.

PPP showed

significant changes

the candidacies of those influential

who had

from

its

old

the potential

of winning elections on the strength of personal or family connections.

Their

were not the important

criteria

democratic credentials and contribution

to the party

for the selection process. Bhutto also tried to persuade the vested interests that she

and her party did not pose any threat

abandoned her

to

them. As discussed earlier, she practically

father’s socialism and projected herself as a social democrat.

The

alteration of policy indicated Bhutto’s effort to create a national consensus for her

party through a political style with moderation in ideology and accommodation of

diverse

vested

interests

including

landowners,

conservatives.
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industrialists

and

religious

The weakness of the PPP’s
local elections.

guard of the

It

had

organizational structure

failed to establish strong grass-roots organization.

PPP conceded

thinking of the masses.

that they

found themselves

a poor showing in the elections;

home

of the party was

totally out

old

of touch with the

it

As

was badly defeated

PPP made

a result, the

Even

Punjab.

in the

province, the party achieved only mixed results.

at its

The

the

Since the elections were party-less, Bhutto herself could

not be put on “display” to attract fragmented voters.

Sindh, Bhutto’s

was exposed during

in

The morale

low.

Dismissal of the .Tunejo Government

While Benazir Bhutto was struggling
its

to consolidate the

PPP and

support base, the regime was beginning to show a widening

President Zia-ul

Haq and Prime

Minister

Mohammad Khan

hand-picked Junejo as prime minister, he had made

it

strengthen

rift

between

When

Junejo.

Zia

clear that Junejo must

unconditionally obey him in three areas: defense, foreign relations, and internal
security.
his

But Junejo had begun gradually exercising

his

had martial law withdrawn and restored

annoyed by
and

He showed

authority.

independence by disagreeing with Zia over such issues as Afghan policy and

appointment of a foreign minister. Junejo also claimed
that

own

it

this

claim and

was he who

Junejo’s

assurance

lifted

for

made

it.

it

clear that

it

civil

that

it

rights.

was

his

government

Zia was extremely

was he who imposed

martial law

Zia’s repeated reference to an Islamic system and

restoration

of democracy

also

suggested

the

uneasy

relationship between the two.

On May

29, 1988, without any prior notice, Zia-ul

Haq removed Prime

Minister Junejo and dissolved both national and provincial assemblies.

move was

within the framework of the constitution,

“Zia’s constitutional coup.”
failure to control corruption

The

some observers termed

official reasons for Junejo’s

removal was

and carry on the Islamization program.
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Since this
it

his

What was

behind

this official explanation

position on

and

Afghan settlement

was Zia’s increasing
negotiations.

Politicians’ criticism of the military

their attempt to cut the defense allocation

Zia

generals.

felt that

role too seriously.

and not

to

hand

all,

what Zia expected was

over to them.

the activities of political leaders.
isolation

in

frustrating to Zia and other

to share

power with

civilians

Junejo had considerably relaxed restrictions on

Zia was said to have become apprehensive of his

face of growing

the

were also

Junejo and his colleagues were taking their constitutional

After

it

dissatisfaction with Junejo’s

consensus between Junejo’s

opposition parties for rapid progress toward party-based politics.

PML
In

and the

more general

terms, dismissal of the Junejo government was a result of the fundamental and

growing difference between the
running the country.

And

politicians

and the military over the

Zia decided, “Politics

is

priorities in

too important to be

left to

politicians. ’’15

General Zia-ul Haq’s announcement of his decision on
surprise to everyone.

people’s minds.

29 came as a

Despite his effort to avoid the impression that he intended

back martial law

to bring

May

to the country,

the suspicion

was running deep

Opposition leaders were divided in their response.

in

Most of them

could not directly oppose the dissolution of the assemblies and plans for fresh
elections because that

was what they had demanded

a civilian government, even though

it

was not a

for the past three years.

truly representative one,

was

Yet

better

than direct rule by Zia for the latter could gradually go back to something similar
to martial law.

Meanwhile

were supposed

to

The
rule

July

20,

for the elections

which

after the dissolution of the assemblies.

anxiety of the opposition leaders over the possibility of Zia’s one-man
their

mind but was considerably reduced on

1988 when Zia announced the date of the next general
16, 1988.

that the elections

biggest

began preparing

be held within ninety days

was never shed completely off

November

the

political leaders

Despite the good news, however,

still

concerned

might be held with the condition of non-party basis again.

damage of such

PPP, was

many were

elections:

The

a rule to political parties, particularly to the large ones like

that they

would be denied
14

the use of a

common symbol

through

which the country’s largely
Banning a

common symbol on

ballot paper

not be able to take advantage of
to organize itself better

parties

its

identify

would mean

their

candidates.

that a political party

national leadership’s popularity and

on the constituency

most of which were not

would

voters

illiterate

level,

The

tightly run.

their violent rejection of Zia’s proposal

making

would

it

hard for

would have

many

political

dilemma was

opposition’s

invite a

would

crackdown.

that

They had

to

play carefully.

Bhutto along with her

MRD

partners challenged in the

Supreme Court

the

legitimacy of Zia’s Political Parties Act, whose clause required prior registration

of

political parties

which practically excluded the PPP and other opposition

The Supreme Court

from elections.

parties

ruled in late June 1988 that the registration

clause of the Political Parties Act was unconstitutional and that political parties

were a “necessary

was a

part of a democratic government.’’

PPP and

great encouragement for Bhutto’s

was no guarantee

MRD

other

members, but there

common

cause of elections to fight

for, the

MRD

a good sign of unity after Zia’s sacking of the Junejo government.

,

1988

Bhutto and other

,

MRD

had shown

brought back

It

At a mass

and cohesion.

to the alliance a greater sense of realism

on July 12

rally in

almost two years and jointly criticized the Zia regime.

first

The PPP

had plans for cooperation with other parties outside the

time

in

Bhutto abandoned the idea and decided

symbolic value

MRD

rally in

in

remain

in the alliance

The MRD’s

still

accepted

strategy this time

Zia while avoiding direct confrontation

that

MRD

but

because of

its

In fact, the massive turn-out at the

MRD

Lahore was explained not so much by what the

achieved but by the fact that the people

regime.

to

mobilizing public support.

to authoritarianism.

Lahore

leaders stood together on a public

platform for the
earlier

ruling

Zia would allow party-based elections.

that

Given a new

The Supreme Court

it

was

could result

had actually

as a symbol of resistance
to put
in

moral pressure on

harsh measures by his

Nevertheless, apprehensions had persisted that the elections would be

either postponed with

some convenient excuses or used

constitutional proposals.

15

for a

referendum on new

Despite the indication of cooperation between the
parties, the
all

the

problem of

component

PPP and

internal conflicts persisted.

parties

was

PPP and

The question of

other
parity

MRD
among

raised over and over, leading to frustration of the

Bhutto’s accusation that the smaller parties were trying to dilute the PPP’s

influence.

MRD was whether was an electoral
sight, the MRD parties began to drift apart.

Another sensitive issue for the

alliance or not.

“With

the elections in

it

Narrow-based and mostly one-man organizations, these
the

MRD

the

PPP and

into an electoral alliance to enable

get

more of

their

Bhutto had insisted that the

MRD

election date, but the

and the

by Bhutto

its

on the mass support of

it

was never meant
to field

rest

of the

after the

MRD

PPP

its

to

be

candidates

There

announcement of

the

never reached a complete

Bhutto had occasionally considered these alliance partners

as a burden but she had remained reluctant to take the

alienating

to convert

elected than they could on their own.’’i6

was a movement and

this position

PPP

issue.

alliance because of

wanted

leaders but refused to contest the election together.

was some softening on

agreement on the

MRD

to ride

She expressed her willingness not

an electoral alliance.
against the other

members

them

parties

PPP

out of this long-time

earlier-discussed symbolic value, and for fear of totally

other component parties in the future political scene.
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CHAPTER

3

DEATH OF ZIA AND THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS
Death of Zia. August 1988

On August

17, 1988, General Zia-ul

Haq, who had ruled Pakistan

for over

eleven years, was killed in an airplane crash along with several other generals and
the U.S. ambassador.
called

in

as a shock to the

one of those “moments

it

difficult to
staff

came

It

whole nation; Benazir Bhutto

in life so stunning, so

unexpected, that they are

General Mirza Aslam Beg succeeded as the chief of army

absorb.” l

and requested Senate Chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan

The most

accordance with the constitution.

after Zia’s death

was

significant

that the positions of the president

were now occupied by two

to take

different individuals. Ishaq

over as president

change

that took place

and the chief of army

Khan took

staff

charge, declared

a state of emergency, and formed an emergency council which consisted mostly of
civilians.

He was known

as a highly-skilled technocrat and

had no

political

constituency.

Although he had cordial relations with many of the army generals,

he was said

be without

to

The most notable

new head of

political ambition.

in this period

domain of

politicians.

it

The

the role that the military played.

the army, General Beg, assured the nation that the

intention to intervene and that

the sole

was

would keep aloof from

army had no

politics, saying that

it

was

Skeptics doubted the sincerity of such a statement:

a reaction well-justified in a country where the generals had ruled for two-thirds

of the period since
military chose.
military takeover
military

had

to

down

its

independence. There were reasons for

“In the eyes

of.

.

.

this position that the

General Beg, an immediate and unplanned

would have been counter-productive.

in confronting unpredictable politicians

It

when

would have bogged
the

command

the

structure

be recognized and the defence of the country strengthened. ”2 Moreover,
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by

this time, the

to

perform.

army resented

The

generals

the police duties

felt that

it

had been repeatedly called upon

the prolonged military rule had

professionalism and wanted to restore their prestige.

have been relieved of a
It is

of

lot

liabilities

made

and burdens.

the military’s retreat

from

commanders

remembered

that the

same was

been regarded as a martyr ever since
the

army and

To be

had decided

that the military

commended

the military on

obstacle to free elections,

demanded

should

it

who had
that

the judiciary had created the conditions for fair elections and asked

Opposition leaders welcomed

Bhutto

that

Beg announced

In October

the politicians to “rid the country of the prevailing crisis.’’

everyone

fair,

the case with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

his hanging.

same

in the

Some argued

politics easier.

death gave Zia an “honorable exit’’ from the political scene.
also be

their

With the death of Zia, they

also to be noted that the death of Zia’s key

accident also

damaged

to see peaceful

It

became known

conduct of the elections.

this constitutional transition
its

was out of

to

Now

peaceful role.

of authority and

that Zia, the biggest

the scene, Bhutto and other political leaders

the removal of the caretaker governments which

were formed under

his

regime, arguing that neutral ministers were necessary to reduce the advantage of
the incumbent politicians and thereby ensure fair elections.

Ishaq

new

Khan dismissed

focus for attack.

military for guidance,

this

demand

as an attempt

by opposition leaders

Meanwhile, anti-PPP groups continued

“though none seemed ready

preferred a military government to the return of the

to

admit publicly that they

to

PPP.”3

willingness to allow free elections, Bhutto had to remain cautious.
its

position

if politicians failed to

order situation deteriorated.

It

recognize

its

had already made clear

continuation of the defense and foreign policies.

because of the

latter’s corrupt

The

military

The

military

law and

commitment

to

a

Bhutto admitted that no one

in

viewed

and inefficient manners

19

apparent

its

priorities or if
its

Pakistan was naive enough to believe that an opposition party could

without the army’s tolerance.

to find a

look toward the

Despite the assurance of the army for non-intervention and

could change

Ghulam

President

come

politicians with
in

to

power

contempt

handling political affairs.

Politicians in Pakistan are traditionally considered to be less
interested in national

unity than in advancing their

one

critic

argued,

own

individual interests.

“Pakistan stumbles on,”

because politicians have never put

down

give their parties a degree of stability and coherence and,

them

to

govern effectively. ’’4

stability derives

from “the

have flourished

in

It

which would

would allow

in turn,

should be noted, however, that such lack of

political clientelism or patron-client relationship that

highly

the

roots,

personalized

character

of Pakistan’s

politics,

perpetuated in large part by the lack of an appropriate institutionalization of
politics.

”5

Deeply skeptical of

politicians’

ability,

the military stayed in the

backstage for the moment.

Election

Campaign Strategy of

the

PPP

The momentum toward
of Zia-ul Haq, and

campaigns.

Campaign

political

the elections
parties

The PPP presented

grew over

started

the

weeks

after the death

serious preparations

for election

a manifesto that included various economic

programs: implementation of previous land reforms, no more nationalization and

encouragement of private

sector, reorganization of tax system,

education, reorganization of trade unions and so on.

no revolutionary element and aimed

at

more budget

The PPP manifesto possessed

bringing about basic and moderate reforms.

Bhutto had already abandoned her father’s slogan of “food, clothing, and
calling
is

our

it

too radical.

faith;

Her own slogan concentrated on

democracy

is

our polity;

all

power

shelter,’’

the following points: Islam

to the people.

As she had been

doing so for the previous two years, Bhutto had steadily moved from the

toward center

in

for

left

an effort to convince the establishment that she would pose no

threat to them.
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Despite Bhutto’s effort to accommodate the conservatives by offering
a

more moderate
the

PPP

many of them remained uneasy about

line of policies,

ruling the country again.

upsetting to those

frightening

who had

memories of

The prospect of

a

PPP

the idea of

was extremely

victory

suffered under the authoritarianism of her father.

were hard

his period

for

them

The

Businessmen

to erase.

associated the party with socialist policies which led to nationalization of industry,

PPP

while the religious groups saw the

The big landowners were

also

as a threat to traditional Islamic values.

wary of the

possibility of large-scale, radical land

reforms despite Bhutto’s assurance that there would be no such reforms.

Many

people also believed that Bhutto would seek revenge of her father, which she
repeatedly denied.

The legacy of her

father,

which gave her strong popular

support, once again appeared to be an obstacle to her coming to power.

Not only

the

PPP

but almost

all

other parties except for the fundamentalist

religious parties had shifted toward the political center.

or right had

little

fundamentalist group, put

state

1970s

is

left

appeal and political parties sensibly responded to this trend by

refraining from any drastic policy.

late

Radicalism on either

no longer

it,

As Ghafoor Ahmed of

“The polarization between

here.’ ’6

What was

left as

the Jamaat-e-Islami, a

the right and the left of the

a campaign tool in this subdued

of ideological confrontation was the invocation of the shaheed, or martyr.

Zia has been declared a shaheed by his followers and the army and so was Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto by his daughter Benazir.

Some

said that the real political battle

be fought between the ghosts of these two men.
however,

did

not last

so

long

for

Zia

would

This “ shaheed syndrome’’,

Over

supporters.

the

weeks,

the

establishment ceased to turn to Zia’s legacy, which proved to be far from
vote-catching.

He was

better

remembered

for negative

manipulated non-party elections and one-man

from campaign scenes. The PPP campaign, on
invoke the positive

memory

and aroused sympathy over
that the appeal to his

of the

late

rule.

memories of martial law,

Soon

his

the contrary,

name disappeared

made every

effort to

Bhutto’s image as a champion of the poor

his unjustified execution under Zia.

martyrdom might be reduced because
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his

It

was speculated

hangman was now

also dead and Benazir could no longer accuse

argument had some

this

him of her

While

father’s suffering.

impact was insignificant. In the course of the

validity, its

campaign, Benazir’s personal popularity as a charismatic leader was also growing.
In the eyes of the public, she continued to appear as an

“under dog’’

fighting

against the establishment and attracted their support.

MRP

Dissolution of the

As
the

the election day neared, the issue of seat allocation

MRD squabbles.

The smaller

parties of the

of seats than what they deserved.

In the Punjab, the total

more than

added up

to

protested

that

these

the

the focus of

MRD demanded much larger share

For instance, one component party demanded

25 out of the 47 national assembly

NWFP.

became

seats in

Sindh and 50 percent of them

demand of

number of

demands by

the

MRD

parties besides the

MRD

parties

were

PPP

The PPP

seats in the entire province. 7

the

in the

and

“irrational’’

“unacceptable”, and suggested a compromise formula which did not provide a
percentage division of seats but offered only the ones that the

could secure.

more than

According

rest

stemmed from

of the

was

accused Bhutto of her arrogant behavior which

cooperation was necessary for the

PPP had been annoyed by

whose demands could be
twice as large.

to

ensure

MRD. On

satisfied only if the

number of

own.

victory and

On

the other

seats available

had been

Bhutto eventually decided that her party would be better-off
its

October 19, 1988, the

own and

MRD

leaders told the public that the objectives of the

MRD

its

its

the “subtle blackmail” of the smaller parties

contesting the forthcoming elections on

the

PPP

deserved more respect from their largest alliance partner.

hand, the

of the

also “unacceptable” to them.

the conviction that her party could win the elections on

felt that their

that they

MRD

components

formula each of the smaller parties would get no

three or four seats, which

The

They

to this

MRD

had outlived

its utility

parted from her long-time allies

was

MRD

while blaming the
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practically dissolved

when

had been achieved and

PPP

for

its

break-up.

its

that

8

Bhutto defended her decision, insisting that her party had never accepted the

MRD

as an electoral alliance and that this position of hers had always been

MRD.

clear to the rest of the

MRD

She strongly

criticized her

for their inexplicit but obvious expectation to secure

deserved on the strength of the PPP’s popular support.
to

former partners

more

even

if

MRD

won

she

against the top

She also promised

leaders.

“The

a majority.

MRD

in the

seats than they

Being aware of the need

reduce political polarization, however, Bhutto had decided not

against the top

made

to include

to field candidates

them

in

her cabinet

token gesture of not putting up candidates

PPP

leaders has enabled the

to defuse the usual bitterness of

a break-up and, by promising to share power with former allies after winning the
elections,

has kept the door open for future cooperation.”

it

The

dissolution of the

had always seen

it

quite a disappointment to the voters

it

had achieved

its

led an ideological battle for seven years,

nitty-gritty requirements of electoral alliances
its

strong mass support,

its

prospects.

MRD.
it

It

was a

Consequently

would not be able

after the elections.

was

to

may

one observer

finally fell prey to the

it

PPP

PPP might have

to ditch its

miscalculated

long-time

allies in the

stood politically isolated and put itself in a position where

it

to

it

which could not be met. ”9 Despite

also feared that the

strategic error for the

form a coalition government with the other

This was the situation

in

political forces

which Bhutto was placed when she

form her government.

Internal Tussle of the

While
from

some

who

“Saying

objectives of restoring democracy

to an ideologue’s ears but is not factually correct,”

“Having

noted.

was

as a symbol of resistance and a hope for change.

was dissolved because

make music

MRD

its

own

elections.

the

PPP

MRD

was going through

its

break-up, the

internal problems: distribution of the

Bhutto declared that the former

party and announced

its

intention to

PPP
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tickets for the

PPP members

welcome a

PPP was

large

could

suffering

up-coming

come back

number

ot

to the

provincial

ministers and
the

PPP had

members

of both national

a good chance in the forthcoming elections, a

PPP bandwagon

opportunists rushed to the

whoever looks

fickle Pakistan

one

collecting

and wealth.

was

It

who

now

is

The PPP’s

political

nomination.

its

at

securing

in

to

The

its

seats through

decision

could win largely due to their personal connections

also intended to assure the

army and

the vested interests of the

line.

policy of ticket distribution, however, caused frustration

They claimed

the party faithfuls.

“In

of converts,” said

buried by both.”

had made toward a more moderate

shift the party

number of

attracts a flood

groups of people was aimed

those influential politicians

Realizing that

dark days under President Zia had difficulty

in

money and keeping members,

to give its tickets to such

from

to benefit

doing well

like

“The PPP, which

analyst.

and provincial assemblies.

that they could not support a

among

PPP which would

ignore their sacrifices under martial law. They also argued that the socio-economic

program of the party was more important than

personalities.

Many

who

“enthusiasts” were former adversaries including some ministers

camp.

official

had

tickets also

little tie

Many

of the

rival influentials

PPP

in

June 1988

There

“He

is

is

had served

scarcely, if any, link between

running his campaign as

it

it

controlled by his relatives.
activities.

that gives

it

The case of

The

it,

is

party itself

A

local

keen not

seems.

His main election office

on Bank Road.

PPP

apparatus.

is

.

is

.

.

to

be burdened

His campaign

the pretension of belonging to a

is

completely oblivious

on the

first floor.

frayed, faded poster or
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a

to the party.

were a non-party election again,”

with any sense of obligation to

PPP

— a multi-millionaire who joined

him and

He

his vast plaza

rushed for the

— clearly indicated the absence of commitment

grumbled another PPP candidate.

of his

who

with the policy or activity of the PPP.

national assembly candidate, Raja Shahid Zafar
the

new

government of Zia-ul Haq. Some others were notorious defectors

the martial law

from the

of the

PPP

two

candidate.

It

.

.

ol

is all

was

the few banners put up in the area bearing only his name, the
party

being represented only by

By allowing

among

the

party.

First,

PPP

that

three colors,

n

the ex-employee of the old regime and rural influentials to be

candidates, Bhutto furthered the organizational weakness of the

given the fact that one of the PPP’s strongest assets was a large core

of dedicated workers
action

its

who had

stayed with the party even under martial law, any

disappointed or frustrated them would erode the morale and the

fundamental strength of the PPP.

Second, those new-comers, since they had

almost no loyalty to the PPP, could line up behind anyone

who was

Prime Minister by the president, thereby weakening

PPP’s position

the

appointed as
the

in

assembly.
Nevertheless, Bhutto did not change her belief that she could win only

had sufficient number of winning candidates no matter what

their past records

and no matter what the party workers said about her decision.

between “stability” and “electability” and she gave a

political

PPP

plan to

make

power could not be an end

One

its

co-chairperson

the

November

own

May, 1988,

internal conflicts.

the

PML’s

unity

knows?” 12

One group

PML, was

suffering

After the dismissal of the Junejo government in

was

replace Junejo as party leader
factions.

“How

elections, though not

without problems, the official party of the government, the
its

be

in itself to

IJI

While the PPP was advancing toward

from

critic

Pakistan a ‘twenty-first century nation’ with this team

of political opportunists and vested interests only

Formation of the

were

This

priority to the latter.

reached by any means. Another questioned the wisdom of Bhutto’s choice;

can the

she

She faced a choice

policy of Bhutto invited various criticism from outside the party as well.

argued that the acquisition of

if

seriously

split the

weakened and an attempt by some

PML,

leading to

consisted of Junejo loyalists.
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The

its

to

separation into two

other one comprised those

who

who

supported the caretaker chief ministers

The

Haq’s backing.

split

enjoyed the

was formalized when

late president Zia-ul

PML

the

held two separate

meetings. Junejo group re-elected him as party president while the other chose

former

NWFP

governor Fida

Mohammed Khan

force of the Fida faction, however,
minister,

Nawaz

was

for the

same

The

post.

secretary-general and the Punjab chief

its

Sharif.

At the beginning of October, the Junejo faction of the

PML and

two smaller

anti-PPP parties, Jamiat-Ulema-Pakistan and Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, agreed

Soon

Pakistan People’s Alliance (PPA).

group of the
parties,

PML

to

and the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami, along with nine other

PPA was

supposed to

from the alliance only eleven days

(IJI),

or Islamic Democratic Alliance.

last for five years, the

after

Junejo group withdrew

formation and decided to join the

its

To

providing another example of fragility of political alliances in Pakistan.
the

PML Junejo

gave up

his opposition to the caretaker ministers

agreed to accept Junejo as party leader. However,

have absolute power

was evident

reunify

in return,

he would not

that

the alliance to prevent vote-splitting

anti-PPP parties and cutting into each other.

was

it

who,

IJI,

in the party.

The UI members formed

goal

form the

PPA, Fida

after the formation of the

formed the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad

Although the

driving

among

In other words, the alliance’s main

to ensure a consolidated anti-PPP vote.

the IJI

In this sense,

was

intended to serve the role that the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) had played

1977 when

its

anti-PPP agitation had enabled General Zia-ul

PPP government

vote-splitting

the

among

want

PPP

to repeat the

overthrow the

The UI was never a coherent or

were uneasy among some of

remained as an alliance for the

elections and prevent

same mistake of 1970 when they won

but failed to secure even a third of the seats because of

themselves.

alliance; relationships
it

to

of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The anti-PPP force of conservatives and

religious parties did not

more votes than

Haq

in

it

common

from coming

into
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its

key leaders.

interest:

power

again.

strongly united

Nevertheless,

to defeat the

PPP

in

the

November

Results of the

On November
since 1970

were held

1988, the

16,

in Pakistan.

first free

The people of

rights to

choose

their

Pakistan

own

and party-based general elections

The conduct of the

of violence and, despite some reports of
minimal.

Elections

election

free

vote rigging was kept

irregularities,

who had been

was remarkably

occasionally deprived of their

leaders gave the final verdict: victory for the PPP.

One

analyst noted:

The

historic verdict of the people has repudiated the allegation that

PPP
and

and
its

its

chairman, the

late Z.

would never be allowed by

Common

to

A. Bhutto.

what

is

good

for them.

who

repressive

come

into

power.

.

.

.

The

sense

but

.

of

architect of the

kept the candle of democratic hope lighted

measures

.

.

from Begum Nusrat Bhutto and

They

around was complete darkness.

and

PPP

misruled the country and

.

.

the people to

resistance got their inspiration

Benazir Bhutto

the masses and that

have a good memory and a keen

people

judgement as

all

among

leaders had no roots

when

suffered untold miseries

undauntedly

and

fearlessly

they

championed the cause of democracy. 13

Another commented: “The people’s Party

is

led

Bhutto and Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto. The election was
Ali Bhutto.

.

.

.

on

clear:

this thesis,

a man; the late Zulfikar
after

he was

‘Bhutto did good things for poor people.’

have now paid

In National Assembly, the
to settle for 54.

won by

Eleven years after Zia deposed him and nine years

hanged, his appeal was
Pakistanis,

by two women, Miss Benazir

their debt.’’i4

PPP won 92

However, the PPP

Poor

seats out of

205 while the

failed to secure an absolute majority,

created problems for Bhutto in claiming her right to form a government.
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IJI

had

which

What was

most remarkable was the
to

most of the senior

younger candidates who were nationally

Jatoi,
all

fact that

from

politicians

known. Heavy weights

less

parties lost

all

like Junejo,

Tikka khan, Professor Ghafoor, Asghar Khan, Pir Pagara, and Noorani were

swept aside.

who had

Several candidates

hoping to benefit from the Bhutto’s popularity
otherwise did well. The people

dumped

PPP

joined the

minute

at the last

where

lost in regions

the party

the so-called old guard or opportunists in

favor of fresh leadership, reflecting their desire for change in the nation’s politics.

The

MRD

“By

parties also did very poorly in the elections.

asking for too much, they.
willing to give them.

.

.

what the people were

collectively received less than

What

.

.

.

to face the polls as a coalition.

the people really wanted
.

.

.

(But)

every party wanted to grab more than

when

was

for the

MRD alliance

the election fever hit the alliance,

proper due.’’

its

each party

15

As

a result, the

MRD

parties not only received fewer votes than they could secure but also helped the 1JI

capture

may

more

also be

seats than

it

otherwise could.

viewed as the voters’

The

defeat of the small

inclination to reduce the

MRD

number of

parties

political

parties in the country to avoid further fragmentation of society.

Things were not so smooth for the PPP

PPP

in the provincial assemblies.

failed to secure majority in all three provinces except Sindh,

of Bhutto, where the party

won 67

out of 100 seats.

most powerful province whose assembly had 204
the

UI which secured 108

seats.

The North West

Baluchistan had to be run by coalitions.
absolute majority.

The

setback for the PPP.

Nawaz

Sharif,

anti-Sindh sentiment

Bhutto’s

first

The

is

seats,

to

the largest and

be controlled by

(NWFP)

Frontier Province
in Sindh, the

PPP

and

enjoyed the

was a major

the Punjab chief minister under Zia and has been spreading

among

the Punjabi chauvinists.

It

problem was the provinces which were not

In

came

province

run by Bhutto’s most powerful opponent,

national identity card condition

had worried.

The Punjab,

control of the Punjab by the opposition

The province

who was

Only

home

The

Pakistani

electoral

had become evident
totally

worked against

the

under her control.

PPP

as

system voters are required

themselves before the elections and obtain national identity cards

28

that

in

its

to

leaders
register

order to be

eligible to vote.

A

large

number of

supporters, could not obtain their

new

national identity cards in time for the

elections, thereby being denied their right to vote.
that the

Punjab PPP, which won 94

this

might have cost

The PPP leadership maintained

seats in the provincial assembly, lost to the IJI

by a narrow margin of 14 because of
claimed that

which many were PPP

rural population, of

the identity card condition.

15 to 20 seats in the national assembly, a

it

overall result of the elections were accepted by

excuse for any force

cause social

to

all parties

as

party had the largest

there

call

upon any leader

number of

Nevertheless, an

and did not provide an

Prime Minister

Ghulam Ishaq Khan was

In the absence of an absolute majority, President

given the prerogative to

number which

strife.

A ppointment

The

also

requirement along with other similar manoeuvre by rhe caretakers

otherwise would have given an absolute majority to the party.

request.

The PPP

seats,

political climate for her

were many who did not want

to

form a government. Although her

Bhutto simply had to wait for the president’s

appointment was not entirely encouraging;
to see her

appointed as prime minister for

various reasons.

The most vocal
religious groups
state.

a

who

opposition

came from

the

male chauvinists including

could not accept the idea of having a

woman

Islamic scholars argued that a nation that would hand over

woman would

not enjoy welfare and prosperity.

governed by a woman,’’ a male worker

There are many men

in her party.

said.

Why

as head of the

its

leadership to

“Pakistan would suffer

“Women

don’t they

all

should stay

at

if it

home.

come forward?” 16

was
.

.

Such

opposition to the idea of having female head of the state was criticized as

“hypocritical” by the Punjab
fact that

many of

Women

Lawyers’ Association, which pointed out the

these conservative parties had earlier supported Miss Fatima

Jinnah in the presidential elections against

29

Ayub Khan.

The

military remained cautious as well in letting Bhutto take office
despite

her repeated assurance that she would not disrupt

where the

several areas of policy

Afghan mujahideen, a

for the

interference with the military

s

military did not
sufficient

defence concerns. There were

its

want

internal affairs, continuation of nuclear

man

Bhutto agreed

Another reason for the army’s reluctance

minister’s office

was

said to

be

its

It

wanted

these

all

Bhutto in prime

The army

which gave more power

to the constitution

prime minister.

to the

to see

on

program,

nervousness about having the daughter of the

they overthrew and executed a decade ago.

immediate changes

any change: support

budget allocation for defence, non-

and rejection of India’s regional preeminence.
conditions.

to see

to

make

sure that Ishaq

on no

insisted

to the president than

Khan would

stay as

president and head a cabinet defense committee that would oversee the domestic
security and intelligence.

Another force

that caused the delay in

Sharif.

He, along with other anti-PPP

Khan

convene the provincial assemblies

all

to

flock to

the

PPP

if

appointment was the

Nawaz

IJI chief,

forces, tried to persuade President Ishaq
first

for fear that independents

Bhutto was appointed prime minister

weakening the opposition force of the UI.

They

finally

first,

succeeded

would

thereby

in talking the

president into naming prime minister after the provincial governments were

appointed.

Bhutto had to wait until then.

However, her chance

was strengthened when Nawaz Sharif withdrew from
remain as Punjab Chief Minister

unreasonable to look beyond Bhutto

who had

be appointed

the national assembly to

in order to fight against her through controlling

the country’s most powerful province.

choose Sharif

to

After

all, it

who had 92

would have been so unfair and

seats in the national

assembly and

only 54. After the long and frustrating two weeks, Benazir

Bhutto was named prime minister of Pakistan.
history of Pakistan that the transfer of

power was

30

This was the

first

time

carried out peacefully.

in the
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CHAPTER

4

COMING TO POWER
Forming the Government and

It

was evident

in

everyone’s eyes that the new prime minister, surrounded

by harsh environment, had

time ahead.

difficult

fragile tradition of democratic rule, but an

Bhutto was aware of the need

moving very cautiously so

“We

to

those

who had made
Even

the

would

like to

that she

make an impact

would take

most optimistic had

ways

It

be able to gain more supporters
risks

or fully trust her.’’i
fear.

“We are

to

—

of vengeance although

it

certain measures of retaliation against
in prior years.

admit

that her

politically,

was hoped

in the

know

gradual way. ’’2 She also

in a

freedom

to

maneuver was

economically and structurally.

lack of a clear majority in the national assembly

was not without

know

in a policy

her and her party suffer

weakness for her government.

this

neither

and a coterie of

as not to ruffle feathers, to permit people to get to

severely curtailed in various

The

in dire straits

proceed without causing distrust or

declared that her government did not believe

was widely expected

Bhutto “inherited not only a

economy

men who

senior political figures and military

us,’’ she said.

the By-Elections

that the

was a

PPP

crucial and decisive

as the ruling party

assembly and improve

its

But even

position.

and drawbacks. “Miss Bhutto may be able

to

would

woo more

independents once she has taken office,’’ one analyst argued, “but they will want
jobs and other nice things

in return for their support.

the politics Pakistan’s politicians

know, but

it

is

That costs money.

not what

many of Miss

This

is

Bhutto’s

supporters were voting for. They voted for her because they remember her father
as a scourge of the rich.

They may not be impressed

horse-trading with the land-owners.

’’3
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to

find his daughter

17-member cabinet

Bhutto’s

Although

largely

of

the

party

faithful.

five of her advisors with ministerial rank had served in her
father’s

all

government

consisted

in the

1970s, the majority of the ministers were party stalwarts

were inexperienced

A

running a government.

in

few exceptions

who

to this

were the

Zia holdovers including a long-time foreign minister, Yaqub Khan.

He was

retained

the

in

Washington

cabinet

apparently

due

to

from the military and

pressures

to continue the past foreign policies particularly in areas

Afghanistan.

After

all, this

was one of

such as

the “conditions” under which Bhutto

allowed to assume the prime ministership

was

in the first place.

Bhutto was quick to counter anti-democratic measures taken by the previous
regime.

She

lifted

ban on trade unions and student organizations.

to abolish the National Press Trust,
to

which controls government-owned newspapers,

freedom, and she also said she would reduce control over

assure press

On

broadcasting media.

commuted

the

human

rights front,

imprisonment and pardoned

to life

convicted of murder.

prisoners, most of

all

she had

women

whom

were PPP

There were

all

death sentences

prisoners except those

Bhutto also undertook to review

prisoners convicted under martial law.

On

She promised

still

all

cases of political

hundreds of

political

activists.

January 28, 1989, by-elections were held to contest fourteen seats

national assembly and seven in the provincial assemblies.

The

in the

by-elections were

necessary because, while the Pakistani electoral system allows candidates to run for

more than one

seat in assemblies,

required to surrender

November

but one.

general elections from

and vacate the other

The

all

stakes

seats to

were high

also wished to

the

fell

who won

Therefore, those candidates

more than one

the

constituencies had to choose one
in the by-elections.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Punjab

for both

Bhutto needed to increase her strength

short of a majority in the

improve the PPP’s position

PPP won 94

successfully contested them are

be contested again

Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif.
national assembly which

who

those

seats to the Ill’s 108.

in the

elections.

the

She

Punjab provincial assembly where

Sharif s
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November

in

political future also

depended on

these by-elections.

If the

IJI

did well, Sharif’s grip on the Punjab would be

strengthened as well as his capability to create more problems for the center.
the

did not, Sharif’s

IJI

power would be

growing resentment against him within

his

by-elections were also expected to indicate
their

chief minister’s declared

government.

The

intention

IJI’s election

own Muslim League. The
how

campaign

in

to already

results of the

the people of the Punjab perceived

challenge and oppose the central

to

became

Inevitably the Punjab

undermined due

seriously

If

the focus of attention.

the Punjab had been carried out by an

Islamic fundamentalist party, Jamaat-e-Islami, whose hard-core activists led the
fight against the

PPP government. Because

of her good relations with the Indian

prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, they accused Bhutto of
emotional issue

in the

Punjab where anti-Indian feeling

borders on India and

its

Jamaat’s attack on the

PPP government

Nawaz

socialism.

who

inhabitants detest those

on

Sharif,

is

its

The

alleged secularism and

was

hand,

other

an

The Punjab

strong.

are soft on Indians.

also centered on

the

-

selling out to India

beating

the

“Punjabis-against-everybody drum,” stirring particularly anti-Sindh sentiment

among

the Punjabis.

They

are accustomed to running at least the

bureaucracy even when they concede the prime ministership

were

totally displeased with the fact that they

army and

to Sindh.

the

Punjabis

were holding none of the country’s

top positions; the prime minister was a Sindhi, the president a Pathan, and the

army chief of
thwart

its

staff a mohajir.

‘‘I

will stand like a rock in the path of the

evil designs,” Sharif declared

on election eve. ‘‘A

PPP

PPP

to

victory on the

[January] 28th will be a victory for India and the enemies of Pakistan. ”4

Bhutto

failed to effectively counter her opponents.

The

election results turned out to be less than satisfactory to the

the fourteen national assembly seats, the

went

to the

Awami

National Party

won

Punjab, the stronghold of

its

in the

a whole the

had surrendered. The disappointment was

in the

seven, the

(ANP) based

Quami Movement (MQM) of Sindh. As
it

IJI

that

it

NWFP

PPP

five,

and

Of

and one each

to the

Mohajir

got three more seats than

could not make any new gains

opponents, the
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PPP

PPP.

IJI,

and

its

leader,

Nawaz

In Pakistan the ruling party in the center

Sharif.

is

usually expected to do well and

rake up the votes in by-elections through various favors
its

advantageous position of power. Therefore,

that the

PPP which was now

The two

in

power gained

it

in

was regarded

minister for water and power, Sardar Farooq Leghari,

Punjab chief minister. As

it

became more apparent

form a government

in the

to contest the seat

he had vacated

who

that the

then hoped to be the

PPP had no chance

earlier.

NA-113

in

Okara, which had been

defeat in Okara

the loss of

prime minister.

NA-94
It

November

because

Ahmed

Wattoo, was

November

defeated earlier in the

by Wattoo.

The

in the

this seat

in

was painful

for the IJI but equally

damaging

the

PPP

was won by
elections.

the UI’s

NA-95

Omar Hayat who had

in

earlier

been defeated

Lahore also attracted particular attention

was vacated by Nawaz Sharif

after

he decided

to

remain

in the

in the IJI’s

This was the only constituency where a violent clash took place between

UI and PPP workers.

The most
in

to the

Lahore which Bhutto herself had vacated upon becoming

Punjab assembly as the province’s chief minister. The contest resulted
victory.

to

Punjab, Leghari was called back to the center and asked

won by PPP’s Muhammad Maneka who was

was

Dera

in

vacated by the federal

surrendered by the Punjab assembly speaker, Mian Manzur

elections

as a major setback

PPP won were NA-133

NA-133 had been

Okara.

can promise because of

less than the IJI.

national assembly seats that the

Ghazi Khan and NA-113

it

serious setback for the

PPP, however, was

Muzaffargarh where the UI’s Ghulam Mustafa

Gormani contested

planned

to

in his

make him an

safe seat for

home

province of Sindh

in

PPP

November.

and

candidates in

The

IJI

had

opposition leader in the national assembly and selected a

him which had been vacated by

Mustafa Khar.

NA-138

Jatoi, a Sindhi landlord

a favorite of the army and the conservatives, had lost heavily to

two constituencies

defeat in

and the PPP’s Mian Tariq

Jatoi

for a seat in the national assembly.

its

Both the

PPP and

other in this contest, but Jatoi

won

the former Punjab governor,

Ghulam

the IJI deployed their full force against each

with a margin of about 39,000 votes. The
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PPP

Minister Mukhtar

Awan

Commission

Election

however.

withhold the official

results.

The request was

not granted,

Bhutto, on the other hand, responded to the result differently from her

when

minister

to

alleged rigging in the constituency and asked the Chief

In the

she stated, “we’ll not say the grapes are sour. ”5

NWFP,

big victory over

an

ANP

Ghulam Mohammad

candidate,

Mian Mohammad of

the UI.

active role to support the candidate of the

In this campaign, the

ANP

PPP

played an

which had been the PPP’s coalition

Nawaz

partner in the provincial government there.

Bilour, enjoyed a

Sharif, as the IJI president,

personally visited the constituency in support of the alliance’s candidate but

proved to be a

NA-203

effort.

fruitless

in

Baluchistan,

surrendered by Mir Zafarullah Jamali, was contested by

it

which had been

BNA’s Abdul Haye Baluch

and PPP’s Nabi Bakhsh Khosa who defeated the former by a large margin. Jamali

was again a candidate from

this seat

but he later withdrew in favor of the

PPP

candidate.

Of

PPP and

the seven provincial seats contested in the Punjab and the

the IJI

won

PPP and

the

won by

PPP.

the

government

NWFP

a

Punjab where the UI got three and one each

an independent. Both of the two seats

so-called

in the

NWFP were

seats along with the support of IJI legislators

“forward block”

in the province, the

PPP

to

cooperate with

Sharif

now

from the

it

same time

held the

majority and that the

Though

at the

PPP

full

However,

grip of the provincial assembly with a clear
to oust

suffered a set-back in the Punjab, the

UI could not win any

PPP

the bitter fact that Punjab Chief Minister

had practically no chance

fact that the opposition

the

secured the provincial government in the

which was headed by the PPP chief minister, Aftab Sherpao.

Bhutto had to accept

Nawaz

in the

With these two

who had formed

the

three each with the remaining one going to an independent.

Five of the seven seats were

was won by

NWFP,

was an

PPP

him.
could gain some relief

effective force only in the Punjab.

The

national assembly seat in the by-elections from any province

other than the Punjab.

In contrast, the

country’s only nationally-based party.

PPP had confirmed

its

position as the

Nonetheless, the PPP’s defeat
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in the

most

populous and powerful province was taken seriously.

“Any

self-respecting

Pakistani government, once in office, expects to wipe out the opposition
by using
the promise of patronage and the threat of bureaucratic harassment,”
one analyst

argued.

“The UI

runs the Punjab government, so

provincial assembly by-elections; but
to tradition.

”6

It

was

strongly

its

it

was expected

to

do well

in the

success in the national seats runs counter

order for the

felt that in

PPP

to capitalize

on the

general mass support, better electoral strategies had to be formulated so that the
party organization could function

While Bhutto had

Nawaz

more

effectively.

to settle for disappointing results in the by-elections,

Sharif increased his self-confidence as the effective opposition leader.

even held a victory procession

in his

reassure their support for him.

He

province’s capital to impress the public and

termed the

IJI victory in the by-elections as a

verdict in favor of an Islamic order and against secularism and socialism.
failure to

power

win

in the

at the center,

country’s most powerful province, even though

marked

He

the difficult time ahead for the

still

it

The

was

infant

in

PPP

government.

Confrontation with the Provinces

Punjab

When Mian Nawaz
to

Sharif surrendered his national assembly seat and chose

be the leader of the Ul-controlled Punjab provincial assembly, the seed of the

confrontation between the center and the Punjab was sown.
in Pakistan’s history that

two

Islamabad and Lahore.

Punjab

occupy important positions

commanding

different parties
is

the

came

It

was

to control the

the

first

time

governments

in

most populous province and the Punjabis

in the country’s military,

great influence on the national politics.

bureaucracy and industry,

Now

that the

Punjab became

the opposition UI’s stronghold, conflict between Islamabad and Lahore appeared
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Nawaz

inevitable.

Sharif took a confrontational posture against the federal

government of Bhutto from the very beginning. When Bhutto came
the end of

December 1988, soon

to give her a full protocol

province. After Bhutto

“Our

resistance

is

after she

and did not hide his reluctance

that

of

my

I

Quaid,

I

If

somebody

ready to give him

am

to receive her in his

full

is

said. 8

is

norms

to

Among

live for

honors but

if his

way

is

different

from

be observed.

I

am

am

a democratic

not a military dictator,

not going to turn a blind eye to the thuggery in Punjab,” she

‘‘We could have difference with
each other, but

criticize

I

open war with him. ”7

at

leader and expect democratic

my government

own

sincere with the mission of the

Bhutto’s attitude toward Sharif was never gentle either. “I

but

at

minister, Sharif failed

for the sake of Pakistan as also our reconciliation.

am

Lahore

Lahore, Sharif told his audience in the midst of cheers:

left

Pakistan and will die for Pakistan.

Quaid-i-Azam,

was named prime

to

it

the Punjab chief minister.

We

could even

should not be allowed to damage national interests. ”9

actions of the Punjab government that annoyed the center at the beginning

was one

relating to the release of political prisoners.

ordered release of political prisoners many of

federal

whom were PPP

The PPP regarded them

under Zia regime.

The

as

government

activists arrested

heroes of the struggle for

democracy. However, the Punjab government, calling them murderers and

dacoits,

decided to keep them under surveillance on the ground that they might again

commit

the subversive and terrorist activities.

The Punjab government

criticized

Benazir Bhutto for showing friendliness to the Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi,
at the

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

Islamabad

in

discussed the Afghan issue.
unconstitutional,

Nawaz

Sharif cabinet

intrusions in the area of foreign policy, being

hostility

toward Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the

natural in light of his political and personal backgrounds.

industrialist family
socialist

Its

another occasion the

at

were resented.

Nawaz Sharif s
was only

On

December 1988.

(SAARC) Summit

who

government.

He

is

PPP

from an

suffered from expropriation under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s

He

served in the Punjab government under Zia-ul Haq’s
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regime and claimed

to

be the true inheritor of

origin of the center-Punjab conflict, however,

More

his political legacy.

was

direct

said to be found in Bhutto’s

statements during the election campaign that the collaborators of the martial law

regime would have
disgorge

all

to give full accounts of the plunder of state resources

Nawaz

the loot.

Sharif

was widely believed

to

among

be

those

and

who

benefitted most from the immunity from accountability under martial law.

Early

damaging

its

in

1989 the central government made moves which resulted

prestige.

It

has been customary for the center to appoint

officers to certain key positions in the provincial administrations.
in consultation with the provincial

its

own

this is

done

government. Without consulting Nawaz Sharif,

government appointed a

the Bhutto

But

in

certain officer to

another as the inspector general of the police,

in

be the chief secretary, and

Nawaz

the Punjab.

declined to accept these appointees and sent them back to Islamabad.

he threatened to remove scores of other federal

civil servants,

Sharif

In addition

holding positions

in

the Punjab government, and to replace them with others from the Punjab civil

After an extended exchange of angry words, the central government

service.

backed down and Nawaz Sharif prevailed.
the people as both
In

weak and

March 1989,

the

The Bhutto government was seen by

inept.

PPP was

getting prepared

no-confidence against the Punjab chief minister.

convinced that the only way to put an end
central

was

government was

clear to

the Bhutto

anyone

Nawaz

to oust

that Sharif

stage a

then, Bhutto

to the rebellion of the

motion of

was even more

Punjab against her

Sharif from the provincial government.

was determined

government would make.

By

to

to counter each significant

The PPP, which needed 30

It

move

extra votes to

unseat Sharif, was hoping to win over at least 40 legislators in the Punjab
provincial assembly.

December when a

Sharif was

total

first

elected as chief minister at the beginning of

of 151 legislators reposed confidence

in

him by show of

hands. 103 legislators, affiliated with or supporters of the PPP, opposed him.

Sharif s

position

dissatisfaction within his

appeared

own

to

have

been

weakened

Pakistan Muslin League (PML).
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somewhat

Some

by

of the old

feudal stalwarts in the

PML

were

toward the central government.

skeptical of Sharif’s confrontationist attitude

Sharif called for a jihad, a holy war, against

Bhutto and the Punjab police entered the prime minister’s office
arrest a

also

man who had

feared

One of

PML

such

too influenced by

He

chief ministership of the Punjab by Bhutto

As a

if

coalition

even more

critical

he succeeded

fundamentalist
a

mustering enough

in

minister in the Sharif cabinet in 1986, he led an

the Punjab

Food

was ousted

If Sharif

government could be formed

when

They

had reportedly been promised the

unsuccessful revolt against the chief minister.

PML-PPP

the

to

was Makhdoom Altaf Ahmed,

dissidents

feudal and spiritual leader from Multan.

votes to oust Sharif.

Rawalpindi

objectionable speech against Sharif.

Sharif was becoming

that

Jamaat-i-Islami.

made an

allegedly

in

in Punjab.

Minister, Sardar

The

this time, a

situation

became

Maqsood Ahmed Khan

Leghari, resigned from the provincial government as a sign of protest against

Sharif s policy of confrontation with the federal government.

warned the chief minister but

all his efforts to

and the Punjab government continued

make him

it

to

be his patriotic duty

anti-federal

see reason

to run the administration

Jamaat-e-Islami and other anti-democratic elements.
to dissociate himself

He

said he

had

were ignored

on the advice of the

Leghari claimed that he

felt

from the “anti-democratic and

conduct” of the Punjab chief minister.

Other leaders of the

PML

Punjab chief minister would not

However,

to

save

the

were also convinced

that Sharif’s

term as the

last long.

party

from

disgrace

in

the

of

event

no-confidence motion against the incumbent Punjab chief minister,
they have asked the

PML president,

Mr.

Muhammand Khan

to advise the chief minister to resign before the

formally tabled against him.

and the UI government

would be able
situation,

the

in the

to elect a

PPP would

Junejo,

proposed motion

is

This, they argue, will save the party

province as the

new

IJI

parliamentary party

leader of the House.

not be able to bring a
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man

In such a

of

its

own

choice to the fore. But

PPP

enticed

alliance, the

On March
blow when he

if

Mr. Nawaz Sharif stuck

more UI members
government

12,

Nawaz

will

always be

Sharif dealt the

called a special

UI expressed

Forward Bloc of

the

PPP’s mercy. 10

at the

PML dissidents and

the

PPP

a serious

session of the assembly, asked for a vote of

confidence, and received one with a large margin.
the

the

to the dissident

power and

to

their confidence in

As many

him by supporting

provincial law minister, Nasrullah Dreshak.
ministers and advisors had launched a

The

as 152

members of

moved by

a resolution

the

resolution pointed out that federal

“campaign of

vilification” against the

Punjab chief minister. Expressing grave concerns over the undemocratic practices
followed by the

PPP

Nawaz

in its drive to topple

Sharif, the resolution regretted

the growing confrontation between the center and the province which,

would be very harmful

to the larger interests

praised the leadership of
to serve the

The

Nawaz

of the country.

Sharif, expressing the

hope

The

it

said,

resolution also

he would continue

that

people with renewed confidence.
large margin of Sharif s victory stunned his opponents

who were

claiming to pick up more than the additional thirty votes they needed from dissident

PML
his

members.

personal

It

can be said, however, that the support for Sharif owed

popularity

than

it

did

conservative

to

fears

that,

The

confronting her in Punjab, Bhutto would become too strong.

were also persuaded
him.

to vote for Sharif

in the limelight in the

including

Makhdoon

campaign against

Sharif and claimed that the conduct of the

The PPP’s
not only

its

numerous

for

failure to oust

IJI dissidents

Nawaz

Ahmed, who

Maqsood

dissident, voted for

the situation created

in the country.

Sharif, despite his vulnerability,

lack of experience but also an absence of

offers of financial help to the

PPP

PPP members and

democracy

Altaf

Sharif, and Sardar

Leghari were absent from the voting. Manzoor Mohal, a

by them would be dangerous

without him

because of the continuing army support for

Some of the dissident PML members,

had been

less to

common

MNA’s. One
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sense.

It

showed

had issued

of the major reasons behind

the failure

was an unwise and premature statement by one of Bhutto’s

Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi was negotiating with
exchange for the support of 35
a team of

circles,

PPP

MPAs

leaders,

the

PPP

advisors that

for the chief ministership in

against Sharif.

According

PML

to the

including Syed Yousaf Reza Gilani, were in

constant touch with Elahi and a series of meetings were held to prepare him for the
chief ministership.

he

The

disclosure, however, embarrassed Elahi to a point

he must express unconditional and

felt

With the passage of
campaign

to topple

support to

own

to an end.

Nawaz

Nawaz

the resolution in favor of

him temporarily came

position both within his

full

Sharif.

good

will gesture of

His victory strengthened his

party and at the national level.

Nawaz

After he received

Some

circles said,

excuse and that the

chance

to

however,

PPP withdrew

Mian Manzur Ahmed Wattoo,

that the reciprocity of

good

reciprocated

the following

will

was

the no-confidence motion just because

just an

it

had no

succeed as 152 UI legislators had already expressed confidence

speaker as well as the chief minister only two days before.

PPP spokesmen
would

PPP

Sharif by withdrawing a no-confidence motion

against the Punjab assembly speaker,

day.

PPP’s

Sharif, the

Bhutto on March 14, two days after the vote of confidence, the
the

where

suggested that, even

try to dismiss Sharif

There was thus no

if

in the

Subsequently some

a no-confidence motion had failed, they

on charges of

irregularities

real easing of the tension

and corruption.

between the Punjab and the

move

central governments.

The

motion

assembly against Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The PPP

in the national

government

still

insisted

IJI leaders started

that

those

planning to

who had

a no-confidence

not paid back the loans

nationalized banks under Zia era would be exposed.

It

was

from

said that an earlier

martial-law ordinance had benefitted one industry group nearly Rs. 2.3 billion

($115.6 million). The central government said

it

was

as financial irregularities in Sharif s business affairs.
the charges are fraudulent and corruption and

government would also be exposed.
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investigating what

The

IJI

it

termed

leaders claimed that

mismanagement of

the central

The

cast the Punjab

The

problem

essential

in the center-Punjab confrontation

government as

its

Sharif

was determined

to

No

move

into

government made,

the federal

in

NWFP

arrested Lieutenant General

Fazle Haq, former governor and chief minister, on charges of involvement

murder of a Shia Muslin

cleric,

the

it.il

PPP government

In late July, the

campaign was thus carried

matter what

oppose

that the IJI

instrument of opposition to PPP’s federal rule.

bitterness of the preceding election

post-electoral governance.

was

Syed Arifal Husseini.

PML

of the national assembly and president of the

believed to have acquired a fortune estimated

involvement with narcotics trade.

It

was

Fazle

Haq was

in the province.

a

in the

member

He was

at several billion dollars

also

through

for the first time in the history of

Pakistan that a military general was arrested on ground of alleged assassination.

The UI suggested

that the arrest of Fazle

of which he was the strongest leader after
the Punjab

Mukhtar

when

Nawaz

government issued a warrant of

A wan,

The

Haq was aimed
Sharif.

at

weakening the party

Soon

after

arrest for federal

Haq’s

arrest,

Labor Minister,

on a murder charge.

tension between the center and the Punjab

was heightened

the federal government refused to provide railway

wagons

in late July

to the Ittefaq

group, an industrial house owned by Sharif and his family. The Ittefaq group had

been complaining about discriminatory duties and financial embargo on

imposed by the federal government.

wagons

it

needed

to

Ittefaq

now had been

its

ventures

denied the railway

unload 2,800 tons of scrap iron from a ship anchored off

Karachi port and transfer the iron

to its foundries near

Lahore.

The

dispatch of

another ship bringing in more scrap iron was canceled, costing Ittefaq millions of

Consequently, more than half of Ittefaq’s plants were shut down and some

rupees.

3,000 people were
In a shrewd

laid off.

move, Sharif emphasized what had caused

federal government’s refusal to provide the wagons.

on a

rail

track in protest.

As a

result, trains

Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Peshawar had
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all

the lay-offs

The workers

staged a

—

sit-in

coming from Karachi and destined

to

be re-routed.

They

first

the

for

gave the

impression that they were protesting against layoffs. But soon

whole drama had been organized by

condemning the
its

Ittefaq, the

failure to provide their

it

transpired that the

Punjab government.

the

workers raised slogans against the

Instead

of

PPP government

for

employer with the required number of wagons.

They

then gave a 48-hour ultimatum to the railway authority for wagons and threatened
that they

would repeat

government refused
a

new blockade of

the sit-in if their

to give in to the blackmail

to

The

and ordered the Rangers

two

officers

federal

to prevent

were sent from the Federal Investigation

conduct a raid on a Lahore soft-drink factory owned jointly by the

sons of Zia’s latest chairman of the joint chiefs of

Rehman, and

not met.

the rail track.

In late September,

Agency (FIA)

demand was

the Punjab education minister.

staff,

The FIA

evading excise duty by declaring only half of

General Akhtar Abdur

alleged that the owners were

The Punjab

their actual production.

police, in a challenge to the central government’s authority, immediately arrested

the

two federal

officers, accusing

them of harassing the factory’s night guards, and

confiscated the investigators’ records.
several days.

The

federal

home

The

federal officers

ministry stated that the

were bailed out

FIA had been

after

investigating

evasion of income tax, excise and custom duties as well as theft of electricity by

“one of

The

Sharif s Ittefaq group.
officials

—

the biggest industrial houses of the country’’

came

in the

official statement

wake of several

added

It

went on saying

by the Punjab government was being examined. 12

civil servants

Islamabad two senior police

to

who were

that the arrest of the

FIA

other acts aimed at subverting the constitution

and the authority of the federal government.

government recalled

widely taken to mean

that “rebellion’’

In retaliation,

officials

the federal

and two other senior

believed to be closely associated with

Nawaz

He

Sharif.

refused to release them.

One of

the

major excuses of Nawaz Sharif for defying the

government had been

to protect provincial

autonomy.

government of unconstitutional interference with
authority as the chief minister by cutting

accused the federal

the province’s

down Punjab’s
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He

federal

autonomy and

fiscal allocation

and

his

ot its

UI administration economically.

attempts to crush the

unlawful move, the Punjab government

and got the Bank of Punjab
declared

its

Bill

set

up a bank of

1989 passed

intention to establish

could provide electricity according to

its

own

Sardar Nasrullah Khan Dreshak and Shah

own,

its

in the provincial

own power

its

what alleged

In

to

be an

the Punjab Bank,

assembly.

also

It

distribution authority so that

Two

priorities.

Mehmud

it

provincial ministers,

Qureshi, argued at a news

conference that under Article 157 of the constitution, a provincial government was
entitled to distribute

power, purchased from the center’s network, according

requirements.

They

according to

own

its

alleged

after they

the

political interests.

in the villages electrified

them only

that

promised

autonomy had

Houses of

PML

by the federal government.
to vote for the

Although Sharif s opposition
provincial

PPP government

cast

him

PPP

had selected villages

supporters were ignored

Electricity

was provided

to

in the next elections.

to the central

in a role of

to its

government

in

the

champion of provincial

name of
rights,

it

should be pointed out that Sharif s strong stance on provincial autonomy was a
recent phenomenon.

During the martial law regime of Zia-ul Haq, and then

as

chief minister during the Junejo era, he never said a single word against the center.

Therefore, one can argue that Sharif and other UI leaders were engaged

in

“a

microscopic examination of the constitution with a view to discovering more
subjects falling in the province’s domain. ”13

The Bhutto government could
resorted to the

same

not overcome the Punjab’s hostility, and

sort of tactics as those of the other side.

It

it

accused the Punjab

provincial government of corruption and of employing civil servants to harass and

persecute the

PPP

legislators

and

political workers.

public against Sharif in Punjab did not succeed.

Salman Taseer and Fakhre Zaman, lowered

The

Its

leaders of the Punjab

to

lose.

Sharif,

this is

on the other hand,

His open defiance of Bhutto strengthened the general

perception that her government lacked power and did not

“All

PPP,

their voice against Sharif after various

charges were filed against them by the Punjab police.

had nothing

attempts to agitate the

adding fuel to her adversaries’ campaign
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to

command

real authority.

push the idea

that she has

an inept team bereft of political

observed one analyst. 14

initiatives

and would cling to power

In fact, even his critics

among

at

any cost,”

the IJI had to admit that

he was the most forceful politician against Bhutto and, thus, an indispensable

game of

player in this political
biggest success

"

is that

--

for a

man who was

he has become

argued one observer.
accused of pulling

and believed

accusations and counter accusations.

in the public

“His

down

“Sharif’s

regarded during the Zia era as a minor figure

eye a politician of prime ministerial stature,”

rivals in the

UI dare not oppose him

the most effective opponent of Bhutto.”

that attacking the federal

for fear of being
15

Sharif realized

government of Bhutto would provide him

with the best defense for his political survival.

An end
Nawaz

to confrontation

Sharif,

which

[he]

would mean the
would not

like

political elimination of

under any circumstances.

Similarly, if he adopts a course of peace, other provinces would

forget

him and thus he would not be able
His

elections.

hostile to the

political interests

also

governments

becoming aware

squabbles,

were

in

him

Bhutto

in the next

to continue
light

to

be

of the above,

to the confrontation. 16

that with Sharif intact in the

not be able to win the next election.

center-Punjab

require

prime minister and the PPP. In the

one can see no end

The PPP was

to face

Punjab

it

would

Totally preoccupied with the continuing

government machinery came

Islamabad and Lahore were unable

to

to

a

halt,

and

both

do the job for which they

elected.

Baluchistan

On December

15, 1988, Baluchistan

the provincial assembly less than a

was taken on

month

Governor

after

it

Mohammad Musa

had been convened. The action

the advice of the provincial chief minister,
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dissolved

Mir Zafarullah Khan

who

Jamali,

based his recommendation on the

majority in the house.

fact that

no parliamentary group had

Although Jamali was a member of the

IJI,

Bhutto was held

responsible for creating the situation because her party was in the provincial
coalition.

After the

November

elections the

PPP had made

an alliance of convenience

with Jamali to help him form the provincial government.

summoned

to elect a chief minister, each of the

When

two groups

the assembly

in the

house got an

equal

number of votes

Khan

Barozai, then cast his vote in favor of Jamali to resolve the stalemate.

situation

creating a

tie.

The speaker of the house, Sardar Mohammad

took a crucial turn when a

Mohammad

was

member

The

of Jamali’ s cabinet, Mir Dost

Hasni, defected to the other side which was preparing to pass a vote

of no-confidence against the chief minister. Since
advised the governor to dissolve the assembly,

it

was

many

later that night that Jamali

suspected that he did so to

avoid the no-confidence motion against him, hoping to improve his position

new

in a

election.

The
that the

opposition group in the assembly, led by

assembly had been dissolved

government.

It

Nawab Akbar

to prevent this

Bugti, alleged

group from forming the

alleged also, as did the UI, that the governor could not have acted

without Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s approval, and that she had, thus, been
part of the conspiracy.

She denied involvement, but the opposition

assembly preferred not

to

be convinced. Governor Musa declared

was

in

Islamabad.

at 3

It

that

he did not

Jamali’ s request

was

a.m. on December 15 from Quetta to the governor

who

consult with the prime minister and had acted on his own.

made on telephone

in the national

was not

until

9 a.m. that he informed Prime Minister Bhutto

of his action. However, he was with Bhutto until 9:30 on the previous evening and
the opposition argued that
in Baluchistan

government

it

was impossible

that the

two did not discuss the

which had been brewing ever since Jamali was asked

after

he got a fragile majority by one.

“difficult to believe that

when

a sleepy Governor
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They

Musa

to

crisis

form the

also argued that

it

was

received the dissolution

advice at three in the morning

he did was to reach for a copy of the

all

constitution, read Article 112 and order dissolution.

No

”n

matter what the circumstances were under which

it

took place, the

dissolution of the Baluchistan provincial assembly provided an ideal occasion for

the opposition to criticize Bhutto and her government.

UI and independents, ganged up
interference in the province.

PPP government

within the

was happy about such an

PPP

against the

PPP government condemning

One of them even
first

fortnight of

Opposition members, both

called

its

it

“the

office .’ ’18

opposition to undermine the

new

central government.

for

murder by the

In fact the opposition

early opportunity to embarrass the

leaders counter-charged that the crisis in Baluchistan

first

it

new prime

minister.

was a conspiracy by

Bhutto declared

the

that, despite

the opposition’s accusation to be otherwise, her government firmly believed in

provincial

autonomy and would not

She made

domain.

it

clear that she

the situation and that any group

On
on a

would not take any

was welcome

January 25, 1989, the

petition filed

interfere in matters that belonged to provincial

full

to

political

advantage out of

form a government

in Baluchistan.

bench of the Baluchistan High Court, acting

by members of the provincial assembly, ruled

that the dissolution

of the Baluchistan assembly had been unconstitutional and the assembly was
restored.

In

its

judgement, the High Court ruled

that the proceedings of the

assembly, on the day Jamali presented himself for selection, had not been regular
so

that

he could

not

be deemed

have received

to

a

vote

of confidence.

Consequently, he had not yet acquired the authority of a chief minister
the governor to dissolve the assembly.

Most

to advise

political leaders expressed

their

satisfaction at the Court’s verdict.

In fact,

it

was not so much

the dissolution itself as the improper handling

of the situation by Bhutto and her government that worsened the

The

political

damage which

have been mitigated by early

this issue

action.

has caused to the

The

federal

crisis.

PPP

could

government could

have categorically denied involvement and without mincing words
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condemned

the dissolution as undemocratic.

Bhutto along with her

justice minister and other cabinet colleagues took a
line.

Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan blocked a move

First,

in the national

more

belligerent

to discuss the issue

assembly on highly technical grounds. Then, Bhutto

defended the action as constitutional reading chapter and verse from
the

Green Book.

This brought

all

the

together in condemning the action.
to

understand the

full

members of

The

the opposition

failure of the

PPP

leaders

implications of the issue at an early stage and

quickly respond to the situation was largely responsible for uniting
all their

The

adversaries under one banner so quickly.

made more

crisis in Baluchistan

19

difficult Bhutto’s task

of convincing the

provincial opponents that they could have a cooperative relationship with her

government.

The new

chief minister of Baluchistan,

developed strong distrust of her government

Nawab Akbar

at the center.

He

Bugti,

had called a

provincial general strike soon after the dissolution, claiming that the Baluchis were

being denied their rights by the “oppressive” federal government. The Baluchistan
crisis

encouraged the Punjab chief minister, Nawaz Sharif,

to Bhutto’s federal

The new

(JUI).

mount

his opposition

government.

provincial government of Baluchistan

coalition of Bugti’s Baluchistan National Alliance

Islami

to

was formed through a

(BNA) and

the Jamiat

Ulema

Following the footsteps of Nawaz Sharif, Bugti also took a

confrontational posture against the Bhutto government and sharply criticized her
attitude

He warned

towards his province.

alliance with the Punjab in

its

that

he would be forced into a possible

defiance of Bhutto

if

her federal government delayed

or ignored the implementation of his demands concerning Baluchistan.

He

even

appealed to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to intervene and restrain the federal

government from taking “extra-constitutional, unlawful and undemocratic
which could cause turmoil and chaos leading
he failed

to pinpoint instances

to

an end of federation. ”20 However,

where the center took such measures.
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action

One of

the reasons for Bugti’s anxiety

was

the fear that Bhutto might

succeed in striking a deal with his coalition partner JUI

PPP’s support, JUI would be strong enough

at the national level.

in the Baluchistan

assembly

With

to unseat

In October 1989, the para-military Frontier Corps, run by the federal

Bugti.

government, attempted

to relieve local tribesmen of their

weapons.

Although the

attempt failed, Bugti accused Bhutto of interfering with a provincial matter and
trying to topple his government.
center, however, his opposition

province.

He

Despite his persistent confrontation with the

was confined

to the

power

own

struggle within his

did not meddle in the affairs of other provinces as

Nawaz

Sharif did.

People’s Program for Development

The center-province

confrontation was probably best illustrated

the

in

implementation of the People’s Program for Development (PPD). Benazir Bhutto’s
federal

government allocated two

billion rupees

objectives were to improve infrastructure by

sanitation, water supply

most-felt needs.

sectors as education, health,

and rural roads. The program aimed

existing development activities and letting the
In a letter to the

PPP

at

community decide

district presidents

supplementing the
for itself about

Bhutto emphasized

the ultimate beneficiary should be the poorest segments of the population.

most important part of each scheme,’’ the
received

to “fight out poverty,

depending on others

to solve their

The program was

PPP government

in

people

the

over,

“The

program as

at village level

.

’’22

finalized at a federal cabinet meeting barely a

took

that

to shoulder future responsibilities rather than

problems

administration gave to the program.

were approved by

develop confidence

its

end output of benefits

.

and restore self-respect among them

the

letter said, “is the

by village or mohalla dwellers ”21 Bhutto characterized

one designed

and

mobilizing local resources

The emphasis was given on such

generate jobs.

program whose main

for the

hinting
Its

at

the

high

priority

week
the

after

Bhutto

framework and implementation procedures

the cabinet in early February 1989.
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Bhutto, on the grounds that

the funds

were provided by the

federal government,

established the Federal

Implementation Committee (FIC) as the program’s top administrative authority.
It

was headed by

district

the minister for local government and rural development and

committees were created

Although launched with a

Program

for

at

lot

local levels

under the FIC’s supervision.

of fanfare by the prime minister, the People’s

Development was not immune from

had already been simmering for some time.

the center-Punjab squabbles which

The Punjab government

strongly

opposed the program’s implementation through these newly created
committees,

claiming

that

would not only be

it

inefficient

federal

compared with

implementation through the existing provincial institutions but would also be
violation of the provincial autonomy.

open interference

Punjab government said

in provincial matters.

The

that

in the jurisdiction

was

should have involved the Punjab government by

it

PPD was

projects envisaged under the program

were primarily
sincere

“the

in

of local councils.

.

If the federal

.

government

way of

liaison

committee representing both the federal and the provincial governments. ’’23

The Punjab government’s
Baluchistan chief minister,

objection

Nawab Akbar

Bugti.

the program, he repeated his contention that

governments because

this

was

to

it

PPD was

the

“While

PPD

in their territories

let

will not allow

The Punjab and

federal

any

Baluchistan

government carry out the

because they badly needed financial assistance from the

Because of the manner

center.

“We

their constitutional right.

nevertheless have eventually agreed to

praising the objective of

should be executed by the provincial

infringement on provincial autonomy,’’ he said. 24

may

echoed by the

in

which

it

was designed, however,

the

program

invited their strong suspicions.

The major cause of
appoint

PPP

program

was the

federal government’s decision to

leaders as chairmen of the district committees in those areas where the

party had lost elections.

workers and

friction

Some

their families.

criticized the

”25

as an attempt to provide

program

as

“a pork

The opposition was quick

money

to defeated
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PPP

barrel for party

to label the entire

candidates in order to

help them prepare for the next election campaign.

Khan, Nawaz Sharif

Under

In his letter to President Ishaq

said:

the constitution, development activities within the provinces

are the prerogative of the provincial governments and in the past
the
federal

government has always channeled

through

the

provincial

governments.

government has instead chosen

to

The

use

and

Party
for the

protests and resistance.

uncompromising posture of

government regarding People’s Program

activity

People’s

party cadres

its

program despite provincial government’s
Inflexible

development

its

the

People’s

Party

Development (PPD)

for

threatens to give an ugly twist to the already violatile relationship of
the center with the non-People’s Party governments in provinces.
.

.

The manner

in

which the

PPD

is

.

being implemented leaves

hardly any doubt that the People’s Party

is

being promoted

at the

expense of the public exchequer. 26

For Bhutto,

was not merely an easy way

it

She saw the program as
promote

PPP. Therefore,

program was implemented through

what areas needed

be given

to

it

was imperative

for her that the

PPP

without

Meanwhile, the provinces

insisted

federal institutions run by the

the existing provincial mechanism.

that the funds should

reward the party members.

central to her efforts to reach the people directly and

their support for the

involving

to

to the provincial

be developed.

In short,

governments which knew exactly
it

was a matter of who should

directly exercise political influence over the electorate.
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Fragile Provincial Coalitions

North West Frontier Province

The North West
handle either.

In the

Frontier Province was not an easy province for the

November

polls the

PPP won 20

Most of

the remaining seats

to

out of the 80 seats in the

provincial assembly, as opposed to 28 secured by the IJI and 12 by the

National Party (ANP).

PPP

went

Awami

to independents.

order to attain enough strength to form a government in the province, the

In

PPP

reached an agreement with the

ANP

PPP’s Aftab Sherpao assumed

the chief ministership but his relation with the

coalition partner, the

ANP, and

its

on forming a coalition government

leaders,

Wali Khan and

his wife,

there.

Nasim Wali

Khan, was shaky from the beginning.

One of

was

the major reasons for souring relations

provincial governor. Ever since

been demanding

that

province, but this

ANP

an

entered the coalition with the PPP, the

it

leader,

demand met

the appointment of the

Abdul Khaliq Khan, be made governor of

strong opposition from the establishment.

had traditionally been pro-Kabul and pro-Soviet. Ever since the Afghan
began,

it

had been opposed

of U.S. policy
the

in that civil

to the

American

war.

It

The

the

ANP

civil

war

role and the Pakistani role as an agent

wanted Pakistan

to quit

its

involvement.

government of Pakistan, the army and the president, had been,

Haq’s time, firmly committed

ANP had

to supporting the

But

since Zia-ul

United States and the mujahideen.

Pakistan had been getting nearly a half billion dollars’ worth of aid (mostly
military) in return for

its

mujahideen had placed

support.

The

ministers but by the governor.

ANP nominee,

NWFP

is

“tribal area”

their bases of operation against the

Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

want an

Part of the

tribal

area

is

Ghulam Ishaq Khan

did not

as governor and refused to give

Minister Bhutto an approval for his appointment.
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Kabul government and

administered not by the provincial

Therefore, President

Abdul Khaliq Khan,

where the

Prime

In addition, he probably liked

the idea of creating a

rift

between the PPP and the

ANP

because of his basically

pro-UI stance.

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was placed

NWFP

meet the demand of the PPP’s

nominee

as governor. But

in a difficult position;

seemed extremely hard

it

ANP,

coalition partner, the

to get the

to

was given
it

In the coalition agreement between the

it.

nominee was not acceptable

Wali Khan repeatedly

During her

ministries.

its

for the

NWFP’s

no mood

the former

visit in late

nominee as the provincial governor.
Washington were opposed

to the

his

party would

NWFP’s

April to Peshawar, the

ANP

Faced with the

leaders to appoint their

fact that both the

ANP’s nominee,

ANP

stated that if the

governorship,

Bhutto received persistent reminder from

capital,

its

in

ANP,

the

appoint

three months to get the president’s approval for the appointment, which

delayed for over five months.

surrender

PPP and

to

approval for the

appointment from President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who apparently was
to give

had

it

army and

she hesitated to take any

significant step.

The

ANP

eventually ran out of patience and

one

five ministers and

its

advisor tendered their resignations as a protest against the PPP’s neglect of their

demand. Although
it

would continue

moment

the

it

withdrew

to support the

UI heard of

its

ministers, the

PPP

ANP

in the provincial

the difference between the

gave a public assurance

assembly. Nevertheless, the

ANP

and the PPP,

ANP

rushed to Peshawar and offered to give everything that the
the governorship only

if it

could exploit the present
the

NWFP,

joined hands with the UI. “If the

PPP-ANP

differences to install

a

its

was sadly mistaken, ’’said Wali Khan. 27 For

it

a setback, the

ANP’s withdrawal was

that

its

leaders

wanted including
thought that

it

own government

in

IJI

although

this reason,

not perceived as a crisis by the Sherpao

government.

A real
it

surprise

came only

several

weeks

later

when

the

had entered an alliance with the UI. Wali Khan, explaining

stated that the break with the

the plight of the

ANP

PPP came

after the provincial

ministers in the Sherpao cabinet.
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ANP announced

that

his party’s decision,

working council heard

“They were.

.

.

totally

powerless,” he

said.

seemed

PPP

was

that the

called the

We

ignored.

“Official orders passed by them were not carried out.

wanted them

itself

PPP government and
have proved

that

other official positions. ”28

government was reluctant

ANP

strongholds of the
that

the fact that

we

it

was a

and

spend development funds

weaken

tried to

leave the coalition with the PPP,

it

.

the Sherpao cabinet

government was

coalition

ANP

Another complaint of the

to

.

are not in the political field for ministries or

Wali Khan also added

of the PPP.

Moreover.

to quit.

It

its

in areas

that the

Sherpao

considered as the

support base while strengthening

when

that

was

the working council decided to

ANP

directed the provincial

leaders to look into

the possibility of allying with other parliamentary groups and eventually reached

He

an agreement with the UI.
its

independent status

nor the UI

in the national

alliance in the

What was most

party’s

ANP

assembly and would not join either the PPP

is that

the

alliance

which

is

one observer.

ANP

its

is

created a

commitment

was

to

stir

among

ANP

far to the right

peace

any matter.

IJI

Such

Khan

better of

its

clarification,

political

The ANP’s

that the

down

the river and

government. ”29 Wali Khan asserted

that

their principles

on

however, did not appease the party workers and

ANP

“let

its

bitterness against the

PPP.

.

.

get the

wisdom. ”30

alliance with the IJI had not only affected the

damaged

character but also

causes

inside an alliance that

had neither merged nor compromised on

most observers agreed

“What

in the region.

on Afghanistan than the PPP,” argued

ridiculous to imagine Wali

state secrets to the Indian

and the

workers as

the possibility of change in the

accuses Ms. Bhutto of having sold the Afghan resistance

handed over

ANP

did not reflect on the consequences of joining up with an

even more
“It

NWFP

disturbing for them

Afghan policy and

disquiet

the

would maintain

at the national level.

The ANP-UI
well.

asserted, however, that the

the credibility of

its

leader,

ANP’s

radical

Wali Khan. Former

ANP

leader Abdul Latif Afridi said, “the alliance was just a marriage of convenience

and.

.

.

the only

government

aim of entering

in the frontier.

...

It

into an alliance

was strange
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was

to dismantle the

PPP

that the leaders of the stature ot

- who

Wali Khan and Begum Nasim

broke bread with Benazir Bhutto and assured

her of support even after withdrawing from the
hold talks with the

IJI

chief

within a matter of days.
inflexibility

in

”

politics,

3

1

Nawaz

of the

component

parties.

Sharif and then back out of their

commitment

its

the

ministries

PPP was
which

IJI

honorable despite
it

decision.

reacted sharply to Sharif s decision to forge an

demanded an emergency meeting of

IJI dissidents

Among them was

heads to discuss the matter.

who

its

had been openly

without prior approval or even consultation with the

The

Qazi Husain Ahmed,

should later

but allying with

IJI parties also

ANP

alliance with the

-

Breaking up with the

denouncing made many question

Some

NWFP

IJI’s

party

the chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami,

contended, “taking such a decision of far-reaching

consequences and of a fundamental nature without consultation with the authorized
bodies [of the

made

it

IJI] is

neither in the national interest nor that of the

clear that the alliance with the

approved by

all

heads of the

ANP

IJI parties.

IJI.

“32 He also

would not be acceptable unless

There was no

possibility of an IJI

PPP was

still

in

launched his campaign to oust the
install

members of
to

buy

NWFP assembly

their loyalties

ANP

was formed,

PPP government

Arbab Jehangir Khan
the

it

while

power.

After the alliance with the

and

was

breakup

for this particular reason, however, because they simply could not afford

the

it

new

as the

IJI

leader

of Aftab Sherpao

chief minister.

were given lavish

and muster enough support

Nawaz

hospitality

to carry the

in the

Sharif

NWFP

The opposition

by Sharif who

move.

tried

The PPP’s

Frontier leadership also began offering financial incentives and tried to buy
loyalties of the IJI leaders.

Eventually, Sherpao maintained enough support in the

provincial assembly and the

PPP

barely

managed

to maintain

its

hold over the

provincial government and controlled the local opposition by selectively giving

away

cabinet posts and other incentives to those
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who were

willing to oblige.

Sindh

PPP’s provincial

home

province.

The

was even more problematic

coalition

provincial assembly elections in

dominant position with 67 out of 100

seats.

The

of the seats mostly went to independents. Despite
provincial assembly, the

Movement (MQM)

PPP

its

Sindh, Bhutto’s

November gave

won

IJI

in

the

only one seat and the

assembly and partly because the

it

needed the

MQM’s

MQM’s

A

rest

Quami

support in the national

participation in Sindh

help defuse the ethnic tension in the province.

a

absolute majority in the Sindh

entered into a coalition with the Mohajir

partly because

PPP

government would

59-point agreement, called the

Karachi Accord, was signed, following the November elections, between the two
parties to achieve “united

and unstratified society” and “reunification of

urban population of Sindh. ”33 The

PPP-MQM

alliance

seemed

rural

and

essential for both

MQM needed the dominant strength of the PPP in Sindh to achieve
demands while the PPP had to keep the MQM on
side in order not to lose

parties; the

its

its

its

control over the national assembly.

Mohajirs are the Urdu-speaking immigrants
partition of the subcontinent in 1947.

They had been

Sindh such as Karachi and Hyderabad and grown
in the cities.

in society

was strongly supported by

and

levels.

urban areas of

dominate commercial

activities

their grievances

The

had accumulated.

MQM

the urban mohajirs in Sindh as a channel through which

demands could be voiced.

emerged

to

settled in

India after the

Despite their economic success, mohajirs had suffered from various

forms of obstacles

their

who came from

Since the

November

elections, the

MQM

had

as an influential political party on not only provincial but also national

With

its

13 legislators

it

became

the third largest group in the national

assembly.

The PPP’s
central

coalition with the

committee of the

MQM

MQM

was never smooth, however.

issued a statement in March, expressing their

dissatisfaction over the non-implementation of the Karachi Accord.

grievances were that the

MQM

The

Among

their

prisoners had not been released, that the joint
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committee

to oversee the

were being made behind the back of the

decisions

that

implementation of the Accord had not been

Encouraged by

PPP-MQM differences,

UI

leaders,

the

PPP. The UI leaders

failed in their mission,

MQM

and

ministers.

Choudhry Shujaat Hussain and

MQM

Sheikh Rashid rushed to Karachi to draw the

set up,

away from

however, as the

the alliance with

MQM chief, Altaf

Husain, despite his party’s differences with the PPP, reaffirmed the continuation

of the alliance.

Problems were not
of the political spectrum

just

in the

MQM. On

between the PPP and the

the right side

province were Sindhi nationalists such as the Sindh

National Front (SNF), headed by

Mumtaz

Ali Bhutto, a former chief minister of

Sindh and a cousin of the prime minister, and Jiye Sindh, led by G. M. Syed, who

was known

for his controversial speeches that had fueled ethnic resentment.

ethnic Sindhis accounted for only a

little

more than 50 percent of

the provincial

population and were fearful of dropping to a minority status in their
land.

They are already a minority

in

The

own

native

urban areas. In Karachi, less than 10 percent

of the residents were identified as Sindhis. Sindhi nationalists, whose support base

was

the interior of the province, had been resentful about the growing

mohajirs and perceived them as a threat to their

them most was the mohajirs’ demand
nationality.

that

Sindhis feared that such a

lower Sindh from the

rest

own

well-being.

What

disturbed

they be recognized as a separate

demand was

of the province.

power of the

a prelude to separation of

Bhutto’s balancing act worked for a

while but she was gradually cornered because of the pressing dilemma;

if

she was

seen too receptive to mohajir demands, she would antagonize the Sindhi nationalists

which had been her support base;

in the rural areas

demands she could
serious

economic

if

she ignored the mohajir

face their unrest in urban areas, especially Karachi, leading to

instability.

Despite their leaders’ efforts to maintain the alliance, both
militants

were fueling the antagonism between

attributable to a

much deeper

the

two

PPP and

parties,

MQM

which was

root of the problem of the province; there had been

a serious conflict between the mohajirs and the Sindhis going on for years and both
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sides had been resorting to violence.

While Bhutto was keen

to see the coalition

government survive, a large number of PPP extremists wanted

to see

They believed

and

PPP government

that with the

at the center

position in Sindh, they could govern the province on their

be ignored.

own and

it

terminated.

dominant

in a

the

MQM could

Altaf Husain was also under increasing pressure from his followers

who were growing

by the PPP’s handling of

frustrated

MQM

included release of the

With both

prisoners.

sides

any provocation, Bhutto and Husain found

retaliation to

their

it

demands which

demanding violent

even more

difficult to

arrive at a compromise.

Altaf Husain too was not without dissatisfaction with the

As a

treatment of his followers.

more problems

Biharis,

who had

for Bhutto in Sindh

presumably,
nationalists

of

this

mean

by

issue.

The

IJI

was planning

insisting that the

in

move, Husain

in

in

1947, and

Bangladesh, should be repatriated to Pakistan and,

settled in Sindh.

and put Bhutto

to

Urdu-speaking

migrated to East Pakistan following independence

who were now unwanted

its

gesture of unhappiness with the PPP’s attitude,

he decided to cooperate with the UI on Bihari
create

PPP and

The move was

strongly resented by the Sindhi

When

a difficult situation.

said that cooperation with the

asked about implications

UI on

the Bihari issue did not

accord had been affected. However, he expressed his bitterness on

that the

other matters, including the fact that he had not been consulted on formation of
provincial cabinet.

he

said.

“But

it

“If they had consulted us

it

would have been a good omen,”

only reveals the depth and understanding of those people.

As you

sow, so shall you reap. ”34

May, 1989, only

In

coalition in

provincial

the

NWFP,

cabinet.

It

house-to-house search

of the

the

MQM

ministers in Sindh resigned

followed the arrest of four

was conducted

in

Hyderabad

MQM
in

PPP-ANP
from the

workers when a

search

of convicted

Since Altaf Husain was staying in that particular neighborhood

criminals.

time, the

all

a few days after the breaking-up of the

MQM accused

PPP

the

PPP

of harassing

its

leader and activists.

provincial government failed to persuade the
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The

at that

efforts

MQM leaders to postpone

their resignations

and wait

incident.

Although

ANP

did in the

the

and

at the center

By

it

NWFP,

cooperate with the UI

in the

to

in a

made on

the Sindh cabinet, the

to continue to support the

and pledged

May,

ANP,

an investigation was

was now out of

the end of

the

until

Hyderabad

the

MQM

promised, as

PPP government

in

adhere to the Karachi Accord.

MQM

agreed to

MQM,

along with

major setback for Bhutto, the

debate on the national budget.

The

asserted that Bhutto had failed to honor the promises she had

return for their support

when she came

power. This time,

to

himself that went into negotiation with the

MQM. He

it

made

had avoided a meeting with

Karachi, namely, the Punjab-Pakhtoon Ittehad (PPI). But

earlier caution

upon arriving

in

Karachi.

He

lunch and four hours of talk with him.
the

PPP and

PPP’s

He went

IJI ally

now he overcame

straight to Altaf’ s

tried to

its

partners in the

Sharif to try to topple the

NWFP

PPP government

his

house and had

wean Altaf Husain away from

elicited his support for the IJI’s opposition to the federal budget.

difficulty with

in

was Nawaz Sharif

Altaf Husain on his two previous visits to Karachi for fear of annoying an
in

Sindh

The

and Sindh had encouraged Nawaz

The

during the budget session.

joint

press conference by the two parties also confirmed that the main topic of their

discussion

was

the strategy during the budget session.

vote on the budget independently, considering every issue
Secretary-General Imran Farooq said.
reflect the aspirations

of the people.”

“We may

MQM MNAs would
on merit,’’ the MQM

“The

vote against

“The Accord

it

if it

has nothing to do with our

“This

meeting,” Altaf Husain said when asked about the Karachi Accord.
meeting between two patriots and no one should object

Within 24 hours of
to

this

to

it.

is

a

”35

meeting, a delegation of three

Karachi to have a talk with Altaf Husain.

does not

PPP

ministers went

After prolonged negotiations, spread

over several days, a new memorandum of understanding was signed by Chief
Minister

Qaim

Ali

Shah and

MQM

Chairman Azeem Ahmed Tariq.

The

issue

which required several rounds of negotiations and Bhutto’s personal intervention
twice was the release of

been involved

in cases

MQM

prisoners.

Both mohajir and Sindhi

activists

had

of ethnic violence, including murder, arson, and other
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crimes.

The PPP government

own

gently,

its

MQM

violators

Sindh was prone

in

people involved

more

in these offenses,

MQM,

The

sternly.

treatment of the arrested activists, wanted

its

to overlooking, or treating

and

basing

it

was prone

its

to treating the

argument on

men, held on charges

more

this partial

related to ethnic

violence, released.

The two

sides agreed

on

that those held

on police complaints would be freed

immediately and those held on complaints of private individuals would be
within six months under a prescribed legal procedure.

demands were protection of non-Sindhis
giving real powers for the
in

MQM

Among

to reaffirm

MQM’s

talks the

support for their party as long as

MQM

MQM;

the

MQM

it

PPP

ministers

implemented key

unhappiness about the

non-implementation of the Karachi Accord, the UI lacked a
bargain with the

MQM

ministers and transferring out senior bureaucrats

While banking on continuing

muhajir demands.

off

in the interior, guarantee of admission,

Sindh appointed by previous regimes. By the end of the

managed

the other

let

critical

element

in its

problems concerned Sindh and the HI had

nothing to offer there.

Another crucial issue
violence in the province.

dogged Sindh

in

“The

Sindh that troubled Bhutto was the escalation of
ethnic violence,” an analyst described,

Armed

for years continues to escalate.

criminal, dominate the streets of Karachi.

.

The

.

these groups add to the violence and the daily
city the sobriquet of ‘Little Beirut.’

On

”36

toll

“which has

gangs, ethnic and purely

constantly shifting alliances of

of innocent lives has earned the

top of the ethnic rivalry, the province

had been going through rapid population increase and economic stagnation, creating
a vast

army of unemployed youth who played

abductions in the

name of political

activism.

a predominant role in robberies and
It

the brutal policies of the Zia era during which

was, to a large extent, a legacy of

more than 1,000 people were

killed

in the province.

Blaming the previous regime of
problem, however.
watching closely

the dictator

was not enough

What concerned Bhutto most was

this deterioration

to solve the

the fact that the

army was

of law and order in Sindh. After the November
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army had

elections,

the

explode.

In other words, the

to let either Bhutto

become prime

PPP’s majority

in

minister or Sindh

Sindh was one of the major

reasons that forced the army to accept Bhutto as prime minister.
she would

Therefore,

maintain law and order situation was an important

government.

was seen

If she

into further chaos,

it

to

test

how
her

for

be losing control of the province and Sindh slipped

would seriously

affect her relations with the

army on which

her government’s political stability depended.

The PPP Government and

Another problem

economy which was
described

it

said to

be

in a

worse

Policies

from the previous regime was
state than before.

There was also a

at

over 15 percent and, due

deficit of

to the officially

over one billion dollars

Foreign remittance, mostly from Pakistanis working

been a main source of hard currencies, was also

According

had fallen

enough

Bhutto herself
.

consumerism of the 1980s, savings were lowest among

deficit.

the

“horrendous” and called the government “virtually bankrupt ”37

as

was running

Inflation

that Bhutto inherited

its

to a

the developing countries.

in the
in the

balance of payments.

Gulf nations, which had

falling, further increasing the

to unofficial estimates, the nation’s foreign

mere 300 million

dollars

encouraged

when Bhutto took

exchange reserves
office: an

amount

cover only two weeks’ imports.

to

In fact,

it

was a mixed economic legacy

that

Bhutto had to cope with.

Pakistan had experienced remarkable economic growth since 1977, averaging

annually

six

disparities

percent per capita in real

incomes.

But significant economic

and a heavy burden of foreign debt remained.

been created

artificially

by the massive inflow of foreign

In fact, the

growth had

aid and loans

which were

given to the Zia regime due to the nation’s strategic location near Afghanistan.

Between December 1971 and June 1988, the debt

liability

increased fourfold,

demonstrating the previous regime’s heavy dependence on foreign loans. The debt
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placed the Bhutto government in a serious predicament in as

much

as an ever-

increasing proportion of the available resources would have to be diverted toward
servicing

it.

38

One of

the toughest

economic

was

issues Bhutto had to face

with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

A

the agreement

few weeks before the

elections,

government signed a package deal with the IMF, which offered one

the caretaker

billion dollars over a three-year period in return for stringent conditions.

included removal of government subsidies, hiking of
deficit reduction.

was apparent

It

economic turmoil. The
unrealistic for the
is

IMF

analyst. 39

would cause serious

conditionalities had been criticized as unsuitable and

shown

have suffered

Some contended

strangulate the

these measures

that

charges and budget

economies of developing countries. “While

laudable, experience has

conditionalities

utility

These

that countries

political

that the

new government.

which have

financial discipline
tried to apply

IMF

upheavals of a severe nature,” said one

IMF was

agreement with the

an attempt to

Bhutto asserted, however, that she would not

renegotiate the agreement, despite calls from leading economists to do so and

PPP

widespread belief among

leaders that the caretaker regime had signed the

agreement with object of creating
Bhutto’s

first

major

She had hard choices

to

test

difficulties for the

came during

make.

new PPP government.

the national assembly’s budget session.

There was need

to act

on her election campaign

pledges to the poor, but she would invite massive political opposition

imposed the taxes the

IMF

Hints in

had advised.

May

that the

if

she

budget would be

tough brought a “chorus of protest” from the opposition politicians and merchants

began hoarding consumer goods and

raising prices.

A

major

The opposition had

came when

relief

hoped

the

that the

IMF

relaxed

IMF

conditions would force Bhutto to present a budget of politically explosive

its

conditions for the loan.

price and tax increases.

approved budgets

On
assembly.

June

But the

riots in

in these countries
3,

Revenue

Jordan and Venezuela following the IMF-

made

the

Fund reconsider

1989, Bhutto presented the
receipts in 1990

earlier

were
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fiscal

its strict

budget

to

conditions.

the national

to total Rs. 136.8 billion ($6.5 billion)

including Rs. 9.6 billion from

new

provided

Expenditure, meanwhile, was to be Rs. 152.3

and services.

utilities

taxes and price increase of government-

Among

billion, leaving a deficit of Rs. 15.5 billion.

the

on forty-four categories of consumer goods including

new

taxes were sales tax

A

textiles.

7.5 percent tax

was imposed on dividend income of more than Rs. 15,000. The PPP government
had to look hard

to discover items that could

already burdened lower-income groups.

Despite the

increase, the impact on the average Pakistani

The

be taxed, without aggravating the

new

taxes and overall price

was milder than had been expected.

biggest price increase resulted from a value-added tax on luxury goods, which

did not affect the ordinary people.

development projects and on
consumption.

The

capital investment than

from current spending and

no major taxes were imposed on the poor blunted

fact that

opposition’s attacks on the

Budget cuts came more from spending on

new government

the

regarding fiscal issues.

Bhutto, in an effort not to alienate the military, managed to maintain

defense spending

37 percent went
in the world.

at the

to debt servicing,

making

one of the highest debt- service

it

ratios

Pakistan received 3.1 billion dollars of pledges from Western aid

consortium for 1990.
Nonetheless,

previous year’s level of 37 percent of the budget. Another

the

The

country’s total foreign debt was 14 billion dollars.

government

said

that

rescheduling of foreign debt and would
overall state expenditure

it

make

would not seek
all

moratorium

repayments on time. In

or

fact, the

was mostly non-productive; 37 percent on defense, 37

percent on debt- servicing and about 12 percent on law and order and general
administration, leaving only 14 percent or so for

all

the social and

economic

programs.

As

before, incomes in the agricultural sector, which accounted for one

fourth of the

GNP, would

not be taxed.

Such a tax had been considered

periodically to enhance the government’s revenue base, but

it

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tried to impose such a tax in 1977, but
Zia’s martial law regime.
to

abandon the

idea.

In 1986

was never adopted.
it

was discarded by

Prime Minister Junejo’s government

Bhutto’s failure to carry
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it

also had

forward disappointed many of her

party supporters because

Given the

it

had been a part of her manifesto

fact that Pakistan

in the

1988 elections.

had the most entrenched landowning aristocracy

Asia and that a majority of the legislators

in

Parliament and most of Bhutto’s

in

cabinet colleagues were from land-owning families,

it

was hardly

surprising that

introduction of such a tax failed again.

Despite

its

the time being.
the

shortcomings, Bhutto’s budget quieted

The UI had

earlier

down

the opposition for

concluded an agreement of cooperation with

MQM to combat the PPP in the budget debate in the national assembly which

lasted through

most of June.

They

anticipated the budget session to be a perfect

occasion to attack Bhutto and to accuse her of incompetence
matters.
first

It

major

was a deftly-made budget and
test in the financial

In October 1989, a few

announced her intention

the

and economic

months

to privatize

PPP came

in

handling economic

out fairly well from

its

field.

after the

budget had been passed, Bhutto

over the next four years seven large public

enterprises including Pakistan International Airlines, Pakistan Standard Oil, and

Habib Bank.

“The

is

a key plank of our economic recovery,” she said.

we

believe, will not only generate additional revenue,

“Privatization

sale of public assets,

but also effectively demonstrate our commitment to private enterprise. ”40

added

that her

government believed

in

She

an open, market-driven economy that would

allow the creative energies of the private sector to stimulate economic development.

Bhutto wanted private business

to relieve her

government of the burden of running

a substantial part of Pakistan’s industry and leave
infrastructure.

The divestment would change

it

free to develop the supporting

the government’s proprietary role to

a regulatory one, although the privately held stock in any of the seven companies

was

to

be only 49 percent. The government was also desperately short of cash

fund the social programs
that the

it

had promised

in its election

whole operation of privatization was designed

programs.

The

campaign.
to raise

Some

money

to

suspected

to fund those

opposition also alleged that Bhutto was trying to establish links

between her government and industry

in

loyalties.
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order to create a lobby of business

4

Relative success with the budget was more an exception than a
first

year of the Bhutto administration.

March 1989,

In

many

as

ministers and eight advisors were sworn into the cabinet which

Some

members.

fifty-one

reshuffle and

discussed earlier and expected.
criticism,

was

its

which Bhutto was placed

Some

her.

to

reward the

However,

largest in the country’s history

now comprised

of

PPP

target of

result of the pressure

leaders and others

of them had been supporters of her father, the

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

as twenty-six

became a

surprising, and

was mostly a

It

in the

expansion of the cabinet had been

What was

absurdly large size.

norm

the sheer size of fifty-one

who had

under

supported

Prime Minister

late

members

— and lack of experience and proper

— by

far the

qualifications

on the part of many of the newly-appointed cabinet members invited additional
criticism.

Those appointed “advisors” were those who had not

the election held in

November

or defeated politicians.

1988.

Bhutto’s critics called them her “cronies”

Commenting upon

Asghar Khan, suggested

small amendments to existing laws, but
it

it

its

part.

It

was noted and

did introduce and pass a few

brought no major policy proposals

did not appear to have developed a legislative agenda.

the assembly had

and opportunity

1

passivity in the national assembly

advertized as evidence of incompetence on

assembly and

the situation, an opposition politician,

that she should fire all of them.

The Bhutto government’s

contested, or lost,

no

real

work

to do.

As

to the

a result,

This situation gave the opposition more time

to criticize Bhutto, her father, her husband,

explanation of her legislative inactivity

may be

and her party.

that she did not

One

have a clear and

firm majority in the assembly and that the senate was controlled by the opposition.

The

fear that her proposals might be defeated, and that she

upon

to resign, kept her

By any

from introducing

standard,

the Bhutto

would then be

legislation. 42

government’s record has been a

chronicle of unfulfilled pledges. Fearful of rebuff in parliament, the

government

has

failed

to

bring

forward

reform

Although Ms. Bhutto promised the repeal of a
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legislation.

series of harsh

called

Islamic laws imposed by Gen. Zia, including one that has kept about

3,000

women

4,000

to

in

jail

for

concern

adultery,

about

fundamentalist religious protest has caused relief on that front to be

Tax laws

deferred as well.

amount

that

to a free ride for wealthy

landowners, a scandal for decades, have also been

Bhutto’s

own

untouched

supporters were not a united and cohesive group.

them belonged
interests

left

to her party, the

PPP, some did

not.

.

43

While many of

They represented

different

and put conflicting pressures on her government. Moreover, the support

of some of them was always tentative.

They could be persuaded

to defect to the

other side. 44

Bhutto and other
It

PPP

leaders also had a problem with their political style.

gave the impression of being an opposition party rather than the government.

As Asghar Khan

put

it,

ready to be martyred.

He

This

is

.

says

we

will face bullets,

we

are

not the kind of talk that people expect from their

said Bhutto should act as head of

He added

chief of her party.

.

Fazlur Rahman, a Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam leader, was also

prime minister. ’’45
critical.

“the prime minister.

that she

government and not merely

and her colleagues were acting

as the

in a partisan

fashion and did not intend to serve the people without discrimination. 46 Bhutto and

her ministers needed to adjust to their

new

oldest advisors acknowledged the point.
in the opposition,’’

been doing

is

“What I

he said.

to get

down

Some

PPP

“These people are

still

One of

her

acting like they are

should have been doing and they should have

PPP were

also surfacing and

many

party officials had

party faithfuls were frustrated because they thought

party tickets had been awarded to the

noted earlier, the

and responsibilities.

to the serious business of governing. ’’47

Conflicts within the

various grievances.

status

wrong people

in the

had chosen the candidates based on

previous elections.

their electability rather

than their past contribution or loyalty to the party, leading to discontent within
ranks.

As

its

Another was the ineptitude of some of Bhutto’s advisors who were wielding

power although they had

lost the election.
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As Bhutto put

together her government,

people loyal to her father were given important positions, for which they were

sometimes ill-equipped, while capable
disagreements with him. 48

“yes-men” and secluding

PPP

complaining

She was also

were also

to

for past

criticized for surrounding herself with

herself behind friends.

stalwarts

were dismissed

servants

civil

However, some argued

blame.

As one

that these

analyst put

it,

“By

adopting a patronizing attitude toward her because of her youth and sex, they
alienated themselves and, consequently those

assigned to them

—

apart from their loyalty

Squabbles among the top

were affecting the

Many

elections and

of the

a

PPP

the

PPP

are

now

in control

.

”49

leaders and the development of factionalism

PPP workers had been

became

Bhutto’s lack of clear direction.
is that

—

qualifications for the jobs

actual functioning of the party and a need for reorganization

being discussed.

November

PPP

who had no

should reorganize

inactive.

“The
itself

They were

was

disenchanted since the
increasingly critical of

best guarantee for the future of the party

on a

political [rather than dynastic] basis,”

leader said.50

Relations with the Military

It

was

the Pakistani military that Benazir Bhutto had to watch carefully.

the initial year of his rule, her father dealt with a defeated and demoralized

and dominated

it.

But a few years

ousted him from power.

accustomed

to

an assertive

The armed

By

later, the

army regained

the time Benazir

its

took office, the army was

forces are always there, waiting and watching.

forces are the most

modem

It is

the institution.

and organized force

It is

not

The armed

in Pakistan.

.

.

But

they have a belief that they are the guardians of the country.

Guardians they are of the

frontiers, but they also believe that they

68

army

confidence and

role.

a question of good or bad generals.

In

have a right

an opinion and see that the country

to give

the right direction politically, and

becomes

whenever our

is

going

in

internal situation

chaotic, they feel impelled to step in .51

After three decades of military intervention, the reality in Pakistani politics was

no government, not even a popularly-elected one, could expect

that

power without

to stay in

the army’s backing.

After Bhutto was chosen to form a government, the chief of army

General Aslam Beg, declared that the army would not interfere

and

that its interest in facilitating a peaceful election

fact,

many

politics

staff,

in political matters,

had been accomplished.

In

believed that the military was relieved to be able to stay away from

because

“The army

is

its

prestige had been

back where

Akram, and added

that

it

it

wants

would

damaged by

the long years of martial law.

to be,’’ said retired lieutenant-general

A. I.

interfere in politics unless the political process

collapsed again. 52 Rasul B. Rais, a political scientist at Quaid-i-Azam University,

was of
its

the

same view; “The army

using this [opportunity] for the restoration of

is

Following Zia’s death, the

prestige in the eyes of civilians,” he argued.

generals had been relieved of

opportunity “to

start

many

liabilities

again with a clean

state.

”53

Bhutto’s relations with the military received their

when she
General

They now wanted an

and burdens.

first jolt in

May

1989

replaced the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant-

Hamid

Gul.

He was

the

most senior military ideologue remaining from

the Zia era and wielded significant influence in the army.

Being a committed

proponent of Islam, he had monopolized Afghan policy and favored the most
fundamentalist factions

among

withdrawal, however, their role
unclear.

the

mujahideen.

in the future

In

the

communist government

wake of

in

to

Soviet

encourage a negotiated

Kabul while the mujahideen,

supported by General Gul, wanted to defeat the Kabul regime

But the mujahideen’s attempt

the

Afghanistan politics had become

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto wanted

settlement with

the

in the battlefield.

to capture Jalalabad, a provincial capital in eastern

69

Afghanistan, failed in the spring of 1989.

Hamid

Gul.

.

was believed

.

sacking of Lieutenant-General

directly related to the failure to

Thousands of mujahideen were reported
and the defeat was traced directly
the 1ST ”54

“The

to

have been

occupy Jalalabad.

lost in the ill-fated action,

to Pakistani military strategy, a responsibility of

Gul was held responsible and blamed

for pushing the mujahideen to

attack the well-defended town.

Dismissal of Gul as head of the ISI enabled Bhutto to consider a different

For the

course of action.

first

time she expressed,

to play a greater role in shaping

Afghan

Moving General Gul gave her
Afghan policy of

an interview, her intention

in

policy.

the chance to break free

the late President Zia-ul Haq.

.

.

.

from the

[He] believed

mujahideen and Pakistan could together win a great victory

that the

for Islam

by establishing an Islamic regime

an “Islamic block” on Russia’s border.

.

in

.

.

Kabul and building

Miss Bhutto

concerned with Islamic triumphs than with an early end

Afghan war.

She

is

is

the

firmly opposed to any

would drag Pakistan even deeper

that

to

eager for the repatriation of the three million

or so Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and she

move

is less

into

the

Afghan

quagmire. 55

Although conflicts over Afghan policy were
Gul’s dismissal,

power

that

the ISI’s domestic intelligence role even after she

was

it

had particularly incensed Bhutto. Since

its

been used by a succession of Pakistani rulers for

During the Zia

era,

cited as the direct reason for

it

became a

‘‘state

came

to

creation in 1948, the ISI had

their

own

political purposes.

within a state,” acting more as an

instrument for maintaining his personal power than as an agency for counterintelligence. 56

It

had long run surveillance on the domestic opposition, and Gul

was widely believed

to

have played a major role

election campaign.

70

in creating

and directing the

IJI’s

In January 1989, Bhutto formed an intelligence organization committee,

comprising of four members and headed by a retired

air

marshal, Zulfikar Ali

The committee was

Khan,

to

look into and possibly curb the ISI directorate.

known

to

have the intention

to deprive the ISI

of

They

One

role in domestic politics.

“We

of Bhutto’s cabinet ministers told a reporter:
people.

its

have no control over these

are like a government unto themselves. ’’57

PPP

Other

ministers

alleged that the ISI had been financing the UI’s efforts to unseat Bhutto and that

Gul’s support for the UI had allowed

leader,

its

Nawaz

There were also rumors

confrontational stand against the center.

on a

Sharif, to take

that the ISI

had

fueled the ethnic violence in Sindh to destabilize the Bhutto government.

Gul was replaced by Shamsul Rehman Kallu, a

who had headed

He was

staff.

promotion.

army should be aloof from

when he assumed

was believed

military officers

to

the presidency.

at his

this

view cost him

same time appeasing

The manner
army.

in

When

Since Kallu,

it

staff.

which

just an

would lead

to a

army and

its

his angry generals. 58

army

was handled fueled controversy and

tension

General Aslam Beg, was informed of

staff,

list

of serving

whom

she might choose a successor. But she ignored Beg’s

instead.

Bhutto was said to have signed Gul’s release order

generals from amongst

and picked Kallu

senior

having to go along with the prime minister

this affair

chief of

some

a

The appointment of Kallu placed General

Bhutto’s intention to transfer Gul, he agreed and submitted a

list

his

who was now

to Bhutto’s wishes,

appointment, thinking that

in the delicate position of

at the

in the

and

Traditionally the ISI had been part of the

head reported to the chief of army

while

politics

be more receptive

were furious

civilianization of the ISI.

Aslam Beg

He

the military for his professionalism.

in

Zia retired him when he suggested that Zia should resign as the army

chief of staff
civilian,

an armored corps and was once tipped to become chief of army

widely respected

believed that the

retired lieutenant-general

hour before she

left for

an official

visit to

Turkey and did not immediately

inform either President Ishaq Khan or General Beg.
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Although

was seen
It

it

caused some friction with the military, the

move

against Gul

as a major victory for Bhutto in her struggle to
consolidate her power.

seemed she had canceled an understanding with

the army,

made before

the

army

accepted her appointment as prime minister, which provided
that she would not
interfere in military affairs.

caused the impression

Her success

in ousting a

in certain circles that she

powerful figure

in the

army

had successfully asserted the

authority of her office.

After six months in power, Bhutto’s image remained that of a

woman

weak

trapped between the generals, a hostile president and Islamic

fundamentalists ready to overthrow her.

In a single dramatic

sweep

she has radically altered the public perception of her government

and has emerged as a decisive leader who can make changes

in the

army. 59

Despite

this

incident,

the

intention to stay out of politics.

military leadership

continued to express

In his frequent speeches and interviews,

its

Beg

reiterated his support for the democratic process and declared that he and the

military

were subordinate

to the civilian

government.

He made

been the collective decision of the army high command

it

clear that

it

to support the country’s

democratic process despite pressures from various quarters for intervention.

In this year of trial,
in support

forces.

no Pakistani

institution

appeared more firmly

of Bhutto’s tenure than that represented by the armed

General Aslam Beg.

.

.

publicly and repeatedly declared his

confidence in the civilian government. Whatever the motives of the
Pakistani military, this determined action in support of Bhutto’s

administration nullified substantial threats from other circles. Thus,
despite the “mini insurgency” in Sindh, the perpetuation of the war
in Afghanistan, the inability to displace the Islami

72

had

Jamhoori Ittehad

6

(UI) government in the Punjab, and soaring inflation and increasing

unemployment, Benazir Bhutto managed

to hold

on

to the reins of

government. 60

But the prime minister’s relations with the army would soon deteriorate, which

be discussed

will

later.

Hostility of the President

President

became

Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s

increasingly hostile.

An

dangerous antagonist.
Zia-ul

Haq

toward Bhutto and her government

observers even said that he was her most

able career bureaucrat of wide experience, he had served

with zeal, and upon retirement from the

with a seat in the senate and,
death,

Some

attitude

Ghulam

constitution.

Ishaq

He

Khan became

with

its

he was rewarded

Upon

chairmanship.

to

Zia-ul Haq’s

the “caretaker” president as required by the

held an election that was perceived as reasonably

was generally thought
toward the PPP.

later,

civil service

be more formally disposed toward the

Yet he

fair.

IJI

than he was

Nevertheless, Bhutto and her party tried to conciliate him and

supported his election as president for a

full

term.

The

decision to support him

may

also have been influenced by the fact that he

was favored by

was

also favored by the UI, a disposition that he

was

the army.

Bhutto wanted to have the authority and power

normally has

in a parliamentary system.

ceremonial head of

state.

He

inclined to reciprocate.

Friction between Bhutto and the president soon developed over a

of issues.

1

that a

number

prime minister

She expected the president

to

be only a

But under the constitution of Pakistan, amended

in

1985

under Zia-ul Haq’s pressure (called the eighth amendment), the president retained
“discretionary” authority in a number of matters, including the appointment of
military service chiefs, high court and supreme court judges,

He

fully

intended

to

exercise

the

authority

73

that

was

among

his

other things.

under the eighth

amendment. Under
elected

member

amendment

this

the president had the authority to appoint any

of the national assembly as prime minister.

He

national assembly at his discretion and call for a fresh election
to the electorate

cabinet

had

was necessary. Every decision made by
conveyed

be

to

consideration of any decision

to

made

the

if

he

felt

an appeal

the prime minister or the

who

could

demand

cabinet

by the prime minister. The president’s

solely

decision in matters, which the eighth
final

president

could dissolve the

amendment placed

in his

“discretion”, were

and could not be questioned on constitutional grounds. Ishaq Khan, thus, had

inherited the

power of

During the
political parties

virtually a presidential constitution.

last

years of Zia-ul Haq’s regime, the

had vowed

to repeal the eighth

Benazir Bhutto began to speak against

Her supporters argued

that the

still

and several other

amendment. Fairly

early in 1989

amendment and advocated

this

its

repeal.

prime minister could not implement the formation

of her office while the amendment remained

because there was

PPP

in force.

This was not quite true

plenty for the prime minister to do.

Moreover, some

mutually satisfactory arrangement could have been worked out with the president.

But Bhutto’s campaign against the amendment was seen as an attack on the

was

president’s office and he

had now become

critics,

displeased.

Her

critics,

and former associates who

took the position that the amendment created a “balance”

between the power of the president and

that of the

prime minister, and

absence the prime minister could become a “dictator” as indeed the
Ali Bhutto had become.

that in

its

late Zulfikar

This much-praised division of powers between the

president and the prime minister was, however, open to question given the fact that

President Zia-ul

Minister

Haq had

Mohammad Khan

Thus one could argue
eighth

to

Junejo

in

PPP was

be passed by a two-third majority
in

1988 without any apparent good reason.

presidential high-handedness, if not dictatorship.

great frustration for the

simple majority

May

also that the president’s discretionary powers under the

amendment allowed

A

dissolved the national assembly and dismissed Prime

the national

in

that

any constitutional amendment had

both houses of Parliament.

assembly,

74

With barely a

and the senate controlled by Zia

appointees, the

PPP was

that fresh elections

among

in

no position

would not solve

the voters, the

undo the amendment. Bhutto knew

to

also

problem because, given the polarization

the

outcome would not be much

different

from the 1988 election

results.

A

major controversy surfaced

Admiral Iftikhar
staff

Ahmad

in

August 1989 when Bhutto wanted

Sirohi from the post of chairman of the joint chiefs of

committee. Sirohi had assumed

this post a

year earlier

died in an air crash along with Zia-ul Haq.

complete his normal term of three years
should then

retire.

She hoped

to

in the

was

“promote” General Aslam Beg

head of the army had much more power

“promoted.” Moreover, he

intervention

in

the

military

internal

his predecessor

rank of admiral on August 14 and
to Sirohi’s post

Although the joint chiefs

was

largely ceremonial and the

in real terms.

Thus, General Beg had no

technically the highest in the military,

desire to be

when

Bhutto argued that Sirohi would

and appoint an officer of her choice as Beg’s successor.
post

to retire

it

was another instance of Bhutto’s

felt this

affairs

and,

a

thus,

violation

understanding she had reached with the president and the army

at the

of

the

time of her

appointment.
President

Ghulam Ishaq Khan responded

to Bhutto’s

move by

issuing a

“clarification” in which he maintained that Sirohi’s term as chairman of the joint
chiefs should be counted not from the date

time he assumed his current position.

He

when he was made admiral

also asserted that only the president had

the authority to appoint or retire chairman of the joint chiefs.

position on the eighth

but from the

amendment which gave him

He

based his

discretionary authority to

appoint the three service chiefs and chairman of the joint chiefs.

There was some

scope for arguing that while the president had the authority to appoint the chiefs,

he had no authority to decide when they would
follow the established rule.

retire; their

retirement date had to

However, Bhutto relented and Sirohi remained

at his

post.

A

second major incident of straining relations between Bhutto on the one

hand, and the military and the president on the other, had happened. Confrontation

75

surrounding the president’s appointing authority and
again

when Ishaq Khan

vacancies.

months.

The

constitutionality surfaced

refused to endorse Bhutto’s nominees for Supreme Court

relations

The UI

its

between them were so bad

that they did not

meet for

leaders, following their frequent meetings with the president,

issued statements which suggested that the president

was

fed up with the

PPP.

That he neither confirmed nor denied those statements strengthened the impression
that

he was siding with the UI.

which, despite

its

Behind the president was the Pakistani army

assurances to the contrary, might not remain in the barracks

forever.
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CHAPTER

5

DETERIORATION OF CONTROL
Vote of No-Confidence

A

more than

little

ten

challenge by the opposition

November

in the

the support of 14

of the

when

The PPP, having

government.
assembly

months

PPP

polls,

members of

after

coming

power, Bhutto faced a serious

to

a motion of no-confidence was tabled against her
failed to obtain a clear majority in the national

had managed

the

to retain parliamentary control with

MQM and several independents.

before the no-confidence motion was

majority in the 237-seat assembly, while that of the

1989, the opposition parties, led by the
Parties

(COP)

their votes

parties

had learned a

among themselves

and the

Awami

enabled the

to

PPP

By mid-

to 91.

formed the Combined Opposition

IJI,

Jatoi as

to take the largest

its

when

left

goal: getting the

leader.

splitting

number of

parties, with the Jamaat-e-Islami

National Party on the

members shared one common

The

amounted

bitter lesson in the last elections

Although comprising various kinds of
right

IJI

eight short of a

seats,

assembly with Ghulam Mustafa

in the national

The opposition

111

Basic strength

on the

of the political spectrum, the

PPP

tabling of no-confidence motion itself

seats.

far

COP

out of power.

was not so much of

a surprise

Bhutto and the PPP; the opposition had been threatening to take such an action

What shook

for months.

other side.

On

the

PPP, however, was

October 23, 1989

they would join the opposition.

PPP

because

its

afford to break

The

fourteen legislators of the

MQM’s move

came

its ties

as a total surprise for the

with the dominant party in that province.

Imran Farooq,

UI which had no

MQM
Trying

could not
to justify

representation in Sindh, an

said that Bhutto had reneged

80

MQM to the

MQM declared that

leaders had long believed that the Sindh-based

his party’s alliance with the

leader,

all

the defection of the

on her promises made

MQM
to the

party and adopted an unreasonable behavior toward

decision to withdraw

PPP and

relationship between the

PPP was

support to the

its

the

MQM

He

it.

said the

a principled one.

was never a

Uneasy

MQM

the

secret;

MQM’s

had

been complaining about the PPP’s non-implementation of the Karachi Accord, and
it

had supported the UI

MQM’s

at the

budget session earlier

official defection to the other

heavy blow

said to

have been secretly signed as

to the

MQM’s

leaders that the time

COP

far

Nonetheless, the

just before the vote of no-confidence

PPP. An agreement between

dealt a

The

camp

in June.

the IJI and the

defection greatly encouraged the opposition and convinced

was

right to take action against Bhutto.

Bhutto cabinet signed by 86 of

moved

all

was

back as mid September.

On

same day,

the

submitted to the parliament secretariat notice of a no-confidence

Sharif

MQM

its

members.

members

the opposition

resort in the Punjab, about 25 miles

move

The next day, October

to a well-guarded hotel in

from Islamabad. The

legislators

24,

its

the

against

Nawaz

Muree

Hill

were heavily

guarded by Punjab police and were isolated from outside world including the press
so that the ruling party would not be able to contact them and try to lure them

COP.

away from

the

buying.

was alleged

1

It

million) if they

In addition, the opposition launched a

PPP

that

would vote

being offered had

were offered up

legislators

for the no-confidence motion.

come from

the

trade

illicit

in

campaign of vote-

to Rs.

20 million

($

Bhutto said the money

drugs.

To dramatize

her

accusation, she dismissed Tariq Magsi, a minister in her government, saying that

he had demanded Rs. 20 million
staying with the PPP.

Magsi denied the charges and claimed

because Bhutto had given too much powers
ministers.

The opposition

defection of the

for minorities,

two days

until

Fr

he had resigned

and ignored the elected

campaign of disinformation claiming

more

was abducted one

drastic methods.

from the PPP arrived

at the airport in

81

The

minister of state

night in Islamabad and held captive for

he was freed by armed federal officers.

potential defector

that

his price for

to its side.

resorted to even

Julius,

to her advisors

also launched a

PPP members

The opposition

and other privileges as

in cash

In another incident, a

Islamabad

to find

himself

2

being pulled in opposite directions by both the
the

PPP had become

members
Mingora
to

that

By October

the UI.

26,

so concerned about the possible abduction or defection of

transferred

it

PPP and

them

in the PPP-controlled

all

from the

NWFP.

capital first to

its

Peshawar and then

to

Although the press was allowed free access

them, the opposition alleged that the

PPP had

virtually imprisoned

own

its

supporters.

Finally on

November

1,

the no-confidence motion

was put

to a vote.

Under

the rules of the national assembly, only the supporters of the motion were required
to

The army was deployed

vote.

in

Islamabad

to

ensure that members of

Parliament could safely reach the national assembly building.

was

said to

have been requested by the opposition leaders,

Khan responded by

to

The arrangement

which President Ishaq

assuring peace in the capital on the day of the vote.

In the

assembly of 237 members, no-confidence motion received 107 votes, 12 short of
119 required

to

bring

down

the Bhutto

government.

supporters of the motion stayed away, including 10

had been dissatisfied with Bhutto’s policy towards

At

least

30 potential

PPP members from

Sindh

who

their province as well as a half-

dozen opposition members who eventually defected

to Bhutto’s side.

After she won, Bhutto thanked the House for providing her with the

opportunity to continue her program of national renewal.

“It will be the solemn

duty of myself and the democratic government to live up to the expectations and
aspirations of the people,’’ she said.i

She also called upon the opposition

with her administration for the benefit of the country.

to

work

Opposition, she noted, was

healthy and proper in a democratic society, but opposition for opposition’s sake

only was

counter-productive and

“I have no rancor nor any

democracy.

undermine Pakistan’s experiment

could

will against those

ill

who have moved

in

that

no-trust motion against me,’’ Bhutto said, and expressed the hope that “saner

elements’’ in the

democracy

House and throughout

in Pakistan

PPP

would join hands

to

make

work.

At a press conference following
that the

the country

the vote, Bhutto

had made earlier and promised
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to

acknowledged the mistakes

improve the performance of her

We

government.
rethinking and

are no angels,

come up

with some

“We’ve

she said.

new

policy steps. ”3

got to do

One

some major

of the changes that

she promised was a reshuffle of her cabinet to clear out some of the unpopular
ministers and advisors surrounding her.

Bhutto

s

major disadvantage

One

analyst

commented before

her reliance on advisors

is

who seem

the vote:
to ignore

Pakistan’s social conditions and allow the creation of grievances which can be

On

exploited by the opposition. ”4

Bhuto repeated her position
elections within one year

The

COP

the opposition

leader,

that she

the possibility of mid-term polls, however,

would not

Ghulam Mustafa

would respect

Jatoi,

two

conceded defeat and declared

that

the decision of the House.

Nawaz

is

it

to

last for long.

Bhutto survived the vote only because the

and some independents allegedly sold

competed with the opposition

government jobs and

MPs

in the

PPP

“The

They

”6

battle is on.

”5

in the history

of

also claimed that

ranks mostly stayed with the party

their votes to her.

The PPP was

said to

have

campaign of vote-buying by offering cash,
Jatoi noted the

plots of land to legislators.

including powerful figures such as the

in favor

was a

again in the near future.

try

out of power,’’ said Sharif.

“cannot

sign that they

little

Referring to the government as “the most inefficient and weak

Pakistan,” he asserted that

to the press

that the closeness of the vote

moral victory for the opposition and vowed
once she

Speaking

Sharif showed

might reconcile with Bhutto. They contended

will stabilize

election, claiming that

would not serve any purpose.

following the vote, however, he and

“Things

new

call

ANP

leader,

absence of five

Wali Khan, whose vote

of the no-confidence motion would have influenced others

to vote against

the government.

As
first

the speaker of the

House commented

after the proceedings,

it

was

the

time in the history of Pakistan that a government had faced a serious

possibility of being ousted

democratic process.
in Pakistan, the

on a

legislative vote

and many cited the success of the

Although hailed by both sides as a watershed

for

democracy

no-confidence motion also revealed the weakness of democratic

institutions in Pakistan.

The

political tensions that led to the vote, as well as the
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vote-buying by both sides, were casting shadows over the survival of democratic

government.

In the political tussle leading up to the no-confidence motion,
each

side accused the other of bribery and kidnapping allegedly committed to
get the

Trading of

votes.

legislators’ votes

had never been done on such a scale involving

millions of rupees spent to purchase or retain their royalties.

“We

saw a kind of

never so freely and

politics
in

never witnessed before.

As one

analyst noted:

Individual consciences were

such broad daylight bought and sold. “7

After ten days of

intense maneuvering, the swing votes were influenced less by the social issues such
as crime, drugs and poverty invoked in a two-hour debate preceding the ballot than

by financial and

political gains

by individual

legislators.

Although she defeated the opposition, Bhutto

The margin of

victory

still

was very narrow: only 12

had

votes.

to

remain cautious.

Moreover, she had

practically received 25 fewer votes supporting her than she did in the vote of

confidence upon assuming office
office, Bhutto

had

lost support

of

months

six

During her

earlier.

many independents and

had grown disaffected with her administration.

autocratic bent

and caused some disaffected

allies

While the motion

were

weakness of the PPP

criticized for

political allies.

having driven away many

to flirt with the opposition.

was unlikely

— the lack of a simple majority

from which the motion stemmed had not changed,
the

in

Besides reshuffling the cabinet,

PPP members

failed the instability

months

the minor parties which

Bhutto also had to improve her dealings with party members and

Her haughtiness and

11

to disappear.
in the national

The

basic

assembly

—

inviting the opposition to repeat

move, which could paralyze her government. Many saw

the narrow vote for

Bhutto only as a temporary reprieve for her troubled administration.

Jatoi called

the result of the vote “the beginning of the end’’ for Bhutto government, which
later

proved

The
that

it

to

be the case.

military had distanced itself from these political squabbles and insisted

had ceased meddling

in politics.

The army

chief,

General Aslam Beg, had

reiterated his support for the “democratic process’’ and refused to be associated

with either of the contenders.

For

instance,
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when Nawaz

Sharif asked for a

meeting with the army chief just before the no-confidence vote, Beg declined the
request to claim his political neutrality.
that despite its

outcome and

Many

appearance of impartiality,

that

it

had chosen

it

observers held the view, however,

was

the

army

that really controlled the

to let the political process take

its

course

time

this

around.

More

notable was the fact that the no-confidence motion

of highly-publicized incidents hinting

at

Minister Benazir Bhutto and President

Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

the uneasy

came

relations

after a series

between Prime

They had

serious

disagreement as to which one of them had the authority, under the constitution,

to

appoint certain high government officials, supreme court judges, and the military
service chiefs. These conflicts convinced Bhutto’s supporters that the president had

been conspiring with the UI, had given

his acquiescence to the no-confidence

motion, and therefore was hardly a neutral party. Winning the no-confidence vote
left

Bhutto’s authority intact, but the political situation surrounding the vote clearly

indicated the growing differences between Bhutto and the president.

February By-Election

A

major

political event that

marked

NA-99,

election for a national assembly seat in

February 18.
Ali of the UI.

It

the 1988 election and had to prove

Ghulam Mustafa Khar,
retain the seat.

said at rallies. 8

the

its

because

popularity

PPP’s chief campaigner,

“I have put

The

PPP

my

it

the
it

PPP and Mehr

had earlier won the

among

seat in

the electorate.

was imperative

was no

less

important for the

contesting the seat in the capital of the province which
It

Zulfiqar

For

that the party

26-year-political-career on stake,” he repeatedly

by-election

stronghold, the Punjab.

the by-

a rural constituency in Lahore, on

was contested by Arshad Ghurki of

Stakes were high for the

was

the beginning of 1990

was expected

that the by-election

indication of strength and popularity of each side.
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it

IJI

which was

considered as

would serve

as a

its

good

Given the high stakes

in the contest,

both the

force to beat the other side and claim victory.

development projects

for

set aside

Funds were spent

lavishly

Development

provide electricity, gas and roads.

to

Lahore

kept on asking for more civic

everyone’s surprise,

development projects

District Council

facilities,

in a matter

that

in the constituency.

The

IJI

was not

amounting

Moreover,

were thrown

While appearing non-committal,

area for additional projects.

federal

Special funds were sanctioned by the Punjab

government for a variety of public works
financial resources of the

The

on

a special grant of Rs. 100 million from the People’s

lagging behind in this respect.

To

the IJI deployed full

in the constituency to influence the voters.

government of Bhutto

Program

PPP and

to

years.

the voters shrewdly

over Rs. 300 million

“The

the

into the contested

of weeks, the areas comprising

would normally take

all

in total.

NA-99 saw

constituents of

NA-99

have become the envy of the people of the Punjab,’’ a resident of another

city

said. 9

On

PPP’s Arshad Ghurki defeated UI’s Mehr Zulfiqar

the polling day,

by a slender margin. The voter turnout was 60 percent
a bad weather condition.

The

who

the

No

Nawaz

PPP campaign. The

could understand the intricate

former Punjab

He

game of

had been engaged

in a

politics

was heard during

the campaign.

It

was evident

were influenced more by immediate material benefits and

incentives.

As one

institutions,

financial

analyst observed:

no doubt

and

war of nerve

that voters

is

to

Sharif, and given the by-election a personal color.

serious political debate

There

had

influential politicians in the province established

effectively counter the opposition’s moves.

with the UI leader,

PPP which

This by-election also gave a spotlight

Ghulam Mustafa Khar who masterminded

himself as a leader

better than expected in

victory boosted the morale of the

lost several by-elections in the past.

governor and one of the most

—

Ali

that the repeated emasculation of established

with carefully planned pervasion of the democratic

system, has weakened people’s

faith in the political process.
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Our

dismal political history has, thus, fostered a cynicism which allows

many people

to

imagine that

political principles are

of no great

consequence and success can come more easily through the misuse
of power, influence or money. 10

Demand
Having

for a Fresh Vote of Cofidenee

failed in the by-election, the opposition’s next

campaign against

Bhutto was focused on a date, namely, March 20, 1990, which the

IJI

claimed as

A

a date by which the president must act against the Bhutto government.
constitutional

amendment imposed by Zia had provided

that until this date the

The

president possessed the authority to appoint a prime minister.

opposition

argued that Bhutto had been appointed by the president under the said constitutional

The

provision.

senior

be prime minister
elected.

after

UI

leadership insisted that Bhutto would therefore cease to

March 20 and

would have

Alternatively, Bhutto

from the national assembly.
petition with the

supreme

prime minister, and

new prime

that a

An HI

minister would have to be

to obtain a fresh vote

legislator,

Chaudhry Amir Husain,

court, requesting that Bhutto

by her

that all orders given

of confidence
filed a

be stopped from acting

after the date

as

be considered

ineffective.

The UI
the

power

leaders hoped to have President Ishaq Khan’s cooperation.

to appoint the

prime minister, the president was also

Besides

entitled to dissolve

Parliament, although this provision had been interpreted by the courts as being
limited

by “certain objective

conditions.’’

The opposition wanted

the president to

use his powers either to ask Bhutto to seek a vote of confidence or dissolve the
national assembly and schedule fresh elections.

The PPP, of
that

course, rejected the opposition’s interpretation and contended

Benazir Bhutto was not required to secure a fresh vote of confidence

assembly.

Nevertheless, Bhutto

summoned
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in the

the national assembly to meet through

the key period while her party

opposition.

The High Court

worked hard

to engineer defections

UI was not

ruling that the

from the

a political party and,

therefore, not subject to the anti-defection clause of the Political Parties Act gave

advantage to the

PPP

over the

PPP and

defectors joined the

IJI in the struggle to increase its strength.

several opposition

openly defect promised to vote for Bhutto

wanted

to

complete

in

their terms of five years

for premature general elections.

members who were

any secret

ballot.

and did not wish

not ready to

Most

legislators

to create conditions

Bhutto had reportedly argued for holding a vote

of confidence but the party elders opposed the idea on the grounds that

mean conceding

this

would

to the opposition’s initiative.

As March 20 approached,
President Ishaq

Five

Khan

to

the IJI leaders intensified their pressure on

ask Bhutto to seek a fresh vote of confidence. The claims

and the counter-claims about the constitutional requirement for a fresh vote flooded

newspapers and there was confusion
the president declared that he

was

seek a fresh vote of confidence.

in

He

all

The argument

over.

no way bound

to

finally

ended when

ask the prime minister

said that the question of holding

new

to

elections

should be decided by politicians of both sides in accordance with the people’s wish.

He
in

added

that, if there

was any confusion about any provision of

anyone’s mind, they should take the matter

the constitution

to the superior courts.

This was a setback for the opposition which had expected the president
side with

them against Bhutto.

The

earlier reports of a

Bhutto and Ishaq Khan had encouraged the opposition

would lend a hand

to their

it

had to seek

clarification

judiciary

would

argued

would be

it

to think that the president

quasi-constitutional

in the political scene.

Now

from the courts, the opposition’s only hope was

interpret the constitution in

some momentum

widening gulf between

scheme of ousting Bhutto through

means. But March 20 passed without any change

unlikely.

its

to

that

that the

favor, though most legal experts

Bhutto, on the other hand, appeared to have gained

in her struggle against the opposition.
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Growing Tension

Kashmir

in

While constantly confronted with domestic problems, Bhutto
cope with an increasingly
border with

its

1949 after the

in

their
first

Kashmir where Pakistan shared

Kashmir had been

hostile neighbor, India.

two countries ever since

drawn

difficult situation in

also had to

independence from Britain

in dispute

in 1947.

A

between the

ceasefire line

one-third of the territory went under Pakistan’s control which Pakistanis call
(free)

Kashmir” and two-thirds was

Kashmir. However, the

left

line dividing

and the two countries vaguely agreed
soon they disagreed on
north-east to the

—

Indo-Pakistani war divided Kashmir into two areas

how

under Indian rule and named

Kashmir was
that

it

Jammu

and

drawn part of the way

actually

should run north to the glaciers.

the line went.

Karakoram pass

“Azad

Pakistan believed that

into China.

India said

it

But

ran roughly

ran slightly north-west

it

along Saltoro ridge which formed the western edge of the Siachen glacier.

This

gap between the two interpretations created the world’s highest battleground

in the

seven-mile-long and 18,000-foot-high Siachen glacier

in the

Himalayas over which

both claimed sovereignty.
In the Simla

Agreement

in

1972, prime ministers of the two countries,

Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had renounced the use of force to settle
disputes.

But the original poor demarcation caused a number of armed clashes

Siachen which India eventually seized

by Pakistan.

In early 1989,

some

in

in

1984 and then repelled repeated attacks

initiatives

were taken

to ease the tension in

Siachen without losing face. By May, the two countries were seriously considering
to pull

other.

been

back

their troops to positions

The aim was

from which they could no longer shoot

to turn the Siachen glacier into

as

it

each

had

until the 1960s.

Tension between Pakistan and India began
secessionist
rule.

“no-man’s land”

at

movement gained momentum

Majority of the population

in

in

to

Jammu and Kashmir against

both areas of Kashmir
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grow once again

is

as

a

the Indian

Muslim. Jammu and

Kashmir had been
to

from Delhi through

directly ruled

power by means of rigged

elections.

desire for self-determination, fueled by

They demanded

stronger.

least a plebiscite should

that if

be held

puppet regimes brought

local

After 40 years of indian “oppression,”

Muslim fundamentalism, had been growing

independence was not going
to decide

whether

to

be granted,

at

to stay with India or join

Pakistan.

Finally, a widespread rebellion against Indian rule broke out on January

20, 1990

when

police opened fire on a demonstration in the Kashmiri capital of

Srinagar.

The

crisis in the Indian side

of Kashmir raised the possibility of armed clash

between Pakistan and India with the former accusing the
along the border.
television that

Pakistani Foreign Minister

“Kashmir remained a disputed

want war with India but neither would

it

of a troop buildup

latter

Yakub Khan declared on
territory

be cowed by

and

national

that Pakistan did not

threats.

”n

In February, a

joint session of the national assembly and senate debated whether to declare a

nationwide state of emergency

in

General V.N. Sharma, promised

were

relations

India

at their

When

Pakistan.

to repulse

army commander,

India’s

any Pakistani drive, Indo-Pakistani

worst since the 1971 war.

was determined

keep

Jammu and Kashmir

under

rule,

and

Pakistan was equally insistent that the Kashmiris should be given the right of

self-

to

its

determination, hoping that the Muslim majority there would vote for joining
Pakistan.
for the

In

March Bhutto

visited

Azad Kashmir where she declared her support

“freedom fighters” and promised

The new

struggle for self-determination.

accused Pakistan of interfering

to set

up a $4 million fund

Indian prime minister, V.P. Singh,

in India’s internal affairs.

National Security Advisor Robert Gates, after his
fear of an all-out

war between India and

to help their

In

May Deputy

visit to the region,

Pakistan.

Under

U.S.

addressed the

international pressure,

particularly that of the United States and the Soviet Union, the two countries

agreed to return to negotiations for peaceful solutions and by mid-June high-level
discussions were scheduled to take place.

Dubey,

visited Islamabad to

sit at

India’s foreign secretary,

Muchkund

a negotiation table with his Pakistani counterpart.
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Bhutto also met with Dubey and urged

New

Delhi to withdraw troops from the

border, but no agreement was reached between the two sides.

Defiance of the Punjab

Following the defeats
elections,

the

in the

Punjab government of Nawaz Sharif was more

IJI-controlled

determined than ever to continue
federal government.

Development and

no-confidence motion and the February by-

its

confrontationist posture against Bhutto and her

In opposing the federal government’s People’s

in floating

its

federal government, the Punjab

Bank opened

its

open more. Under the

own

provincial

for

of the Punjab Bank, Sharif claimed to be protecting

provincial autonomy. Following

to

Program

establishment, despite strong objections by the
several branches and

was planning

constitution, each province reserves the right to establish

bank,

but

in

reality

all

Pakistani

banks had long been

nationalized and controlled by the federal government.

government’s sudden decision

to establish its

Therefore, the Punjab

own bank was

seen

more

as defiance

against Bhutto government than as a simple exercise of

its

rights.

attempt to discredit the Punjab Bank, publicly questioned

its

capability to honor

Bhutto, in an
its

obligations to depositors.

Encouraged by the success
attempted to

set

in

opening the Punjab Bank, Nawaz Sharif then

up a provincial television

station.

Television stations had also

been run by Islamabad although the constitution provided the provinces with the
right to

have

activities

their

were not

own.

As long

in violation

as they operate within provincial borders, the

of federal law.

was receiving more coverage on
Punjab government’s demand for

state
its

Bhutto argued that the opposition

media than any time

own

station

was

in the past

that the

yet another attempt to assert

a separate identity in order to undermine the federal authority.
implicitly accused the Punjab

and

PPP

leaders

Government of fanning secessionism, comparing

actions with those leading to Bangladesh’s separation from Pakistan in 1971.
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its

The Punjab government’s activities surrounding banks and

television stations

coincided with growing demands from the opposition in parliament to re-address
the issue of provincial rights and the division of federal and provincial roles
as

defined in the constitution.

The

discussion dates back to the era of Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto when a consensus on the 1973 constitution was reached regarding a division

of responsibilities.
in

was agreed

It

the federal jurisdiction

that,

beyond

certain subjects placed exclusively

and some placed concurrently

the

in

provincial jurisdiction, eight subjects including railways, mineral

gas would be placed under the over-all control of a Council of

(CCI).

The council was supposed

to

federal

oil

and

and natural

Common

Interests

have been formed of the four provincial chief

ministers and four federal ministers, but

it

was not formally convened during

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s rule and during that of Zia-ul Haq.

Now
demanded

that

the

CCI

to

be

Punjab’s demand for a

Kalabagh.

became

the constitution

to

One agenda

formed.

officially

dam

fully effective again,

be

built

the opposition

item in their mind was

on Indus River

in its

own

territory of

Punjabis had been dependent on the other three provinces for their

rapidly growing energy demands; they were getting gas from Sindh and Baluchistan

and hydroelectric power from the
Punjab increase

its

opposed by the

NWFP

NWFP. A new dam was

self-sufficiency in electric energy.

because

it

would

expected to help the

But the project was strongly

raise the possibility of inundation of

its

land and reduce the province’s relative importance as a supplier of hydroelectric

power. Sindh and Baluchistan also objected, fearing

that a

dam

at

Kalabagh would

reduce the river’s downstream on which they depended. The three provinces also

had

their

own

stakes in the CCI.

Under

the 1973 constitution, profits from

hydroelectric stations and natural gas wells were to be collected by the federal

government and then disbursed

to the

law regime had kept most revenues

producing provinces.
in federal

hands.

Zia-ul Haq’s martial

Those energy-producing

provinces hoped, through the CCI, to change the system back
originally designed to be and benefit from
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it.

In fact they

to

demanded

what

it

was

not only the

income from

entire

their gas

and

electricity outputs but control

over pricing.

Punjab, the net importer, did not like the idea.

Bhutto was reluctant to activate the CCI, given
provincial economic relations.
let

She feared

that

context of inter-

this

open discussion

CCI would

at the

ethnic chauvinism explode and threaten the PPP’s pre-eminence as the only

party with a credible legislative representation in

all

four provinces.

Moreover,

the constitution provided that the council’s decisions could be appealed to a joint
session of the both houses of parliament where, given the IJI-dominated senate, the

PPP had

only a minority status.

Meanwhile
Punjab.

In

running high between the center and the

political tensions kept

March, the PPP and the UI held separate

celebration of the 1940

Muslim League

India and the creation of Pakistan.
participate and address the

PPP

makers of Pakistan cannot

sit

resolution which

Bhutto invited

rallies for

demanded

all

Golden Jubilee
the partition of

four chief ministers to

rally but Sharif declined the invitation, saying

“the

with the breakers of Pakistan’’ and labeled Bhutto a

“traitor. ’’12 In April, the minister of state for parliamentary affairs, Sher Afghan,

sent a reference against the Punjab chief minister and his brother, Shahbaz Sharif,
to the

Punjab assembly speaker.

The

reference accused the Sharif brothers of

corrupt practice during the by-election in February and sought their disqualification

along with that of some other opposition legislators. The opposition,
also

made

a similar reference against Bhutto and her ministers on various grounds.

Bhutto was most incensed by

Nawaz Sharif s

which the constitution defined as a federal domain.

interference in foreign affairs
It

was

the clearest indication

of his open defiance of Bhutto’s federal authority. During his

and the United States
policies.

He

in

December 1989,

an

Saudi Arabia

Sharif publicly criticized Bhutto’s foreign

was

said to

have hired an American public relations firm for tens

of thousands of dollars per month to lobby

government.

visit to

allegedly had independent contacts with foreign governments and his

administration

issued

in retaliation,

in the

United States against the Bhutto

In January, 1990, in his capacity as Punjab chief minister, Sharif

advertisement

appealing

for
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a

country-wide

strike

against

the

developments

in

He

Kashmir.

urged that

all

business, industry and educational

institutions should close throughout the country to

Kashmir who had been struggling

condemned

Sharif

The advertisement

army and expressed

that Pakistan

was making arrangements

tribute to the people of

for their freedom.

the oppression by the Indian

Kashmiri mujahideen claiming

pay

to hold

was

solidarity with the

By

behind them.

fully

also

April,

an all-party conference on Kashmir issue,

which the PPP condemned as “in contradiction with

the federal government’s

policy” and as “supporting the government and rulers of India ”13
.

Another development

in the center-Punjab conflict

was

the confrontation

between Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the chief lieutenant of Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto

whose

ruthless effectiveness as the governor of Punjab in the 1970s had

earned him some notoricity.

During the Zia

era, disagreements

between Benazir Bhutto and Khar, who eventually joined the
on

its

tickets in the

Khar announced

November

polls.

In October 1989, after

his unconditional support for Bhutto

PPP. He contended

that supporting the

On

the

same day

that

months of speculation,

prime minister was

Khar expressed

and won two seats

and subsequently rejoined the

democratic process and stressed that he was not going back
a job.

IJI

had developed

in fact supporting the

PPP

to the

his support for the

in

quest for

PPP, Sharif took

Khar’s brother, Malik Noor Rabbani Khar, into his cabinet along with another

The

provincial legislator.

Sharif s attempt
It

government

had earlier said

new

ministers

to strengthen his position relative to that of

was widely expected

for the Bhutto

that

mouthful of Sharif.

that

was

interpreted as

Ghulam Mustafa Khar.

Ghulam Mustafa Khar would be

to effectively counter Sharif

and cut him

the

main agent

to size.

when he

returned to Punjab politics, Khar would

And

was what Khar wanted

Punjab chief minister
removal.

induction of the

that

to do.

He

Some

make one

had warned the

to adopt a policy of reconciliation with the center or face

“If the chief minister did not listen,” Khar

bring about a change in the province.”
election

from a provincial

election.

Questioned as

to

seat

14

He

said, “I’ll

be duty bound

claimed that he would contest

and topple the chief minister within 35 days of

what he meant by Sharif mending
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to

his ways,

Khar

his

said

that the chief minister should support the federal

threats
that

government

on the border and improve the law and order

in the

in light

of the Indian

Khar argued

Punjab.

what he was seeking was not the chief ministership but a way

province from misrule.

from the scene.

To

If Sharif

mended

his

ways, Khar

substantiate his warning

,

election in February he had the support of ten

in

number.

he would withdraw

Khar claimed

more

required to unseat the chief minister and that the

assembly had since increased

said,

to save the

that after the by-

provincial legislators than

PPP

supporters in the Punjab

The only reason he

did not

make an

attempt to oust Sharif was the border situation which had been unsettling due
strife in

to the

Kashmir.

Violence in Sindh and Conflicts with the Military

It

was

the escalating violence in Sindh that further undermined the Bhutto

government. Ethnic conflict between Sindhis and mohajirs had led
of law and order
rivalries

had

in the province, taking the lives

their roots in the history of

legitimate grievances.

The

to deterioration

of hundreds of people.

Sindh and both Sindhis and mohajirs had

mohajirs, immigrants from India at the partition of the

subcontinent in 1947, had been settled in urban areas of Sindh and

dominate commercial
gradually challenged

activities.
first

Their

come

to

Since then, their hard-earned dominance had been

by large numbers of Punjabis and Pathans who

also

came

to settle in Sindh

and eventually by the increasing number of educated young

who were

claiming their “share” of jobs in both the public services and

Sindhis

private enterprise.
outsiders; large

Sindhis

felt

also that their land had been

numbers of Pathans from

Zia’s time and so did the Punjabis

the

NWFP

whose prominence

increased, further alienating the Sindhis.

in

“invaded” by

migrated to Sindh during

government and business

They claimed

that they

had not been

given their due share in society even though they were the “native sons of the
soil.”
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Compounding
in rural Sindh.

problem of ethnic violence was the presence of bandits

Besides their usual engagement in abductions, bank robberies and

now

murders, they were

which wanted

the

add

to

hired as urban mercenaries by the various ethnic groups

to their forces.

During Zia’s time, the number of the outlaws

increased as traditional bandits were joined by

The

situation

was

further complicated

encouraged Sindhi feudal landlords

which resulted

in rural areas,

in a

to

many

politically alienated Sindhis.

by the divide-and-rule

tactics

form private military bands

of Zia

who

to assert control

complex mixture of ethnic antagonism and feudal

rivalries.

To have

their voice heard

and demands met, the

MQM resorted to various,

often violent, methods. In early February, 1990, after months of disorder, another
incident of ethnic violence erupted in Karachi
strike

get

to

more than

Husain embarked on a

ended

MQM-COP

was placed under army
fast

control.

killed or injured

In April

unto death, demanding the release

president of the People’s Student Federation.

after only

and

MQM chief Altaf
of MQM activists

arrested due to their alleged involvement in the

Ahmed, former
strike

MQM called for a general

About two hundred people were

in Sindh.

half the city

who had been

the

detained workers released and have the president to impose

its

governor’s rule

when

murder of Najib
Husain’s hunger

two days when compromise was reached between

team and Sindh Governor Fakhruddin Ebrahim.
be engaged

Meanwhile

In one instance

the

MQM

two young

workers continued

to

gunmen who were

shot and captured in action turned out to be policemen and were

also

members of

the

MQM.

in violent activities.

As one

analyst put

it,

“So

far has the rot

sunk into

Sindh’s polarized society. ”15

Following the violence
Sindh,

Qaim

ineffectiveness,

Ali

Shah,

in

February Bhutto dismissed the chief minister of

whose administration

had

and appointed Aftab Shaban Mirani

change, however, was only cosmetic.

The new

been
to

criticized

the position.

for

its

Such a

chief minister did not have any

apparent plan to restore peace nor did he take any initiative in reopening lines to
the

MQM.

The PPP was

criticized for its lack of capable administrators
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among

its

and

ranks

of clear

policy

government. Prevailing view was
situation

that

the

virtually

The PPP’s

problem but

it

critics

collapsed

provincial

ending the violence and turning around the

would require a strong hand and many believed

to the job.

the

revive

to

argued that

that the

had the powers

it

it

PPP was

needed

to

not up

cope with

lacked the competence to use them.

There were conflicting opinions among the Sindhi leaders
and anger of native Sindhis had

led to

Frustrations

also.

emergence of Sindhi nationalism and

formation of nationalist parties such as Sindh National Alliance (SNA) of Abdul

Hameed

Jatoi

and Sindh National Front (SNF) of Mumtaz Bhutto, Benazir’s uncle.

Despite their differences
leaders shared a

in

common

opinion and level of radicalism, Sindhi nationalist

view: the

PPP would

not be able to solve the complex

problem of Sindh and therefore people would ultimately desert

it.

By May

these

leaders were having talks with one another with a view to forming a united Sindh

party in anticipation of an eventual decline of the PPP’s popularity.

The PPP and

its

Sindhi leadership had consistently maintained a distance

from Sindhi nationalism and refused
demands.

to align itself with

This anti-communal position of the

governing role

at the federal level.

If

were

it

to

be

PPP was
in

power

not alienate the electorate in the Punjab without which
elections.

which was

any regionalist Sindhi

it

reasonable given
at the center,

it

its

could

could not win general

Supporting any Sindhi nationalistic cause would antagonize the Punjab
hostile to regionalist

The PPP could
claiming that

it

movements

that challenged Punjabi domination.

not afford this risk and therefore had kept out of Sindhi nationalists,

was a “national” party and could not

therefore support regional

causes.
In

late

May

another violent clash erupted in Karachi and Hyderabad

claiming the lives of over one hundred people. Instead of the previously deployed
paramilitary forces, the

army was brought

in to restore

law and order

Although the deployment of troops stemmed the immediate

members accused Bhutto and
country to the brink of a

the

civil

PPP,

war.

in the cities.

crisis, the

opposition

the ruling party in Sindh, of pushing the

The opposition
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also asked President Ishaq

Khan

to

suspend the provincial legislature, dismiss the cabinet and suspend

rights in Sindh until law
to take such

and order situation would improve.

measures saying

that situation

Ishaq Khan refused

would improve soon under a plan being

put into operation by the Sindh government and the military.

however,

that

civil

Many

feared,

even though the violence was controlled, permanent peace could not

be brought about unless a

was made.

political settlement

problem of Sindh, the PPP began

political solutions to the

These

parties in the province.

talks

were expected

Seeing the need for

to hold talks with other

to lay the

groundwork

for an

eventual all-party conference at the provincial level which Bhutto had suggested as
against the president’s proposal, backed by the opposition, for an all-Pakistan

conference on Sindh. After completion of a round of talks with Sindhi nationalist
parties, the

PPP

tried to

have a dialogue with the

MQM but

it

demanded

a public

apology from the ruling party before attending such a conference.

While
in

were displaying

the politicians

incompetence and

their

inflexibility

handling the Sindhi situation, the military was growing more frustrated and

patient.

1989

Chief of

that the

Army

army

Aslam Beg had

itself

when something went wrong.
he

to correct itself,”

said.

“Our

security to that system. ”16 Since then the
for over a half year until April.

Even

leader of the opposition, Qazi Hussain
to stage a

earlier stated in

fully supported the democratic process in

system should correct

mechanism

Staff General

comeback even

if

the

army chief maintained

Ahmed,

PPP and

its

responsibility and duty

as late as

the

political

own

built-in

provide

is to

silence on politics

March, deputy parliamentary

said that the

UI

September

which the

“It has

less

army was

jointly asked for

it.

in

no mood

Following

Altaf Husain’s hunger strike in early April, Beg broke his silence and stated that
the happenings in Karachi presented a “crisis situation” and the political climate

was “very depressing”

at

a time

when

the country

from across the border. 17 Even during Beg’s
unspoken fear among

was faced with a

silence, there

civilian leaders that a further

might convince the army

that

it

had no choice but
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to

serious threat

had been constant but

breakdown

in

law and order

impose martial law.

Beg’s statement added to such fears and caused a talk of Karachi being

handed over

to the

frustration as the

army.

Beg’s statements

army watched

in early July indicated

even more

the situation in Sindh further deteriorate.

While

addressing officers in Sukkur and Larkana, the army chief said, “Given the legal

army

authority, the

will restore

in the shortest possible time,’’

We

peace and harmony

and added,

“We do

in the entire

province of Sindh

not believe in chasing shadows.

believe in battering at the root cause of evil and eliminating

Beg had been

all. ’’18

dissatisfied with the use of his soldiers

acting only in support of the civilian police in cracking

While

once and for

it

who had been

down on

so far

ethnic violence.

did not ask for the imposition of martial law in the province, the army

it

sought legal changes which would allow

The PPP
nature of

leadership kept quiet on the
its

greater powers to control the situation.

army chiefs

problem was

to the

later President

Beg’s statement, said

essentially a political

He

statement, indicating the delicate

A week

relationship with the military.

Khan, without referring

political.

it

in

Ghulam

Ishaq

Karachi that the Sindh

problem and could have no solution other than

was no way

to solve

problems

widespread speculation of a drastic

political

change, senior

also said that the use of force

in a

democratic system.

Responding

to

military leaders reaffirmed their

commitment

to staying out of politics.

Fears of

a return to martial law were persistent due to the country’s long history of military

coups and were further intensified by the opposition’s

between Bhutto and the army.

efforts to exploit differences

The opposition had been

impression that Beg resented Bhutto’s rule.

For instance, some of

argued that Beg, whose retirement was approaching
extension of his tenure.

of Lieutenant General

and

that this

They claimed

that

Alam Jan Mahsud

in ten

its

spokesmen

months, wanted an

Bhutto had tried to extend the tenure

so that he could be the next

army

chief,

had worsened the relationship between Bhutto and Beg.

In an effort to calm the fears of a military coup,

on July 24

trying hard to create an

that the

army had no

political

Mahsud made

ambitions and warned that military

intervention could lead to disintegration of the country.
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a statement

But he also added

that

political leaders should not create a situation

which might give the army cause

to

intervene in politics and that political problems must be solved through the political

process and the army should be

left to

defend the borders.

Two

days

later

Beg

declared that the army was fully capable of providing security to the country
against both external and internal threats.
State for Defence, G.S.

Cheema,

On

the

same day Bhutto’s Minister of

told reporters that there

percent chance of army takeover.
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CHAPTER

6

THE FALL OF BENAZIR BHUTTO
Dissolution of the Assemblies

On August

6,

1990, late in the afternoon, troops which had already

surrounded the house of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, entered the building,

documents from her

seized

The

return.

secretariat

and ordered

troops also surrounded

all

radio and

the staff to leave and not to

television

stations,

telephone

exchange, the Federal Investigation Agency, the Directorate of Intelligence Bureau

and other important ministries.
had decided

to dismiss the

and incompetence.

He

A

few hours

later the president

announced

that

he

government of Benazir Bhutto on charges of corruption

also ordered dissolution of the national assembly as well as

NWFP,

the provincial assemblies of Sindh and the

Punjab and Baluchistan resign and

their

and

let

chief ministers of the

governors dissolve their assemblies.

The

president promised to hold a general election on October 24 and declared a nation-

wide

state

A

of emergency.

few hours

later in

a telecast, President

Ghulam Ishaq Khan

delivered a

long speech listing the “sins” of the dismissed government: corruption, nepotism,

misuse of

state

media and

failure to restore

law and order

in

Sindh.

under the deposed government constitutional and administrative

He

argued that

institutions

were

undermined, conscience was sold for cabinet posts, plots of land and unsecured
loans were granted, and the constitutional rights of the four provinces were violated

by the federal governments He

also accused the

PPP government

of setting free

convicted criminals on the pretext of releasing political prisoners to gain cheap
popularity and thereby making a mockery of justice.

Many

of these charges,

however, were merely a repetition of unproven allegations levelled against the PPP

by the opposition, some of which could as well be applied
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to the opposition itself.

The

horse-trading” of assembly

members was

the non-confidence motion against Bhutto in

was directed not

his action

unconstitutional

and

initiated

November

by the opposition during

1989. While declaring that

against any individual or political party but against

undemocratic

practices,

opportunism,

corruption

and

incompetence, President Ishaq Khan implicitly warned the public against returning
Bhutto and her associates to power.

‘‘I

have no doubt

the best interest of the country, the nation and democracy.

action will be supported by everyone
constitutional obligations

who

heart,

flourish.

who

my

that

I

am

decision

is

thus in

also sure that this

puts national integrity above politics and

above expediencies, who has the good of the country

wishes to see democracy

—

genuine and clean democracy

at

—

to

”2

While
regarded

it

his action

may have been

within the letter of the constitution,

What enabled

against the spirit of parliamentary democracy.

president to take this step

was

many

the General Zia-ul Haq’s eighth

amendment

the

to the

1973 constitution which enables the president to dissolve the national assembly

“a

situation has arisen in

on

in

which the government of the federation cannot be carried

accordance with the provisions of the constitution and an appeal

electorate

is

necessary. ”3

Throughout her 20 months

in

office,

amendment remained

as a bottleneck for Bhutto in her struggle for

a-vis the president.

Although

effort,

it

was

the president

it

appeared

who had

the

at

times as

if

government

fact, the

in

May

1988.

same charges had been

the eighth

more power

vis-

trump card. Bhutto argued

that the charges

same

as those Zia-ul

used earlier to dismiss Prime Minister

civilian

to the

she was gaining on her

the president had levelled against her government were the

Haq

if

Mohammad Khan

Junejo and his

“Just compare the speeches,” she said.

cited against all the

In

deposed civilian governments

of Pakistan when they were dismissed by the military.
Bhutto denounced the president’s action as “illegal” and “arbitrary” and
dismissed

all

accusations as spurious.

She also termed the action a “constitutional

coup d’etat” as President Ishaq Khan had carefully observed the
formalities and cited a

number of clauses from
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constitutional

the constitution to justify his action.

4

Despite his strong accusations of her government, Bhutto
attack on the president and shifted the
feel betrayed

blame elsewhere. She

by the president and pointed out

the charges

when

dissolution.

She argued

two held

the

their last

that the president

that

forced the president’s hands, she said,
did not take so

scene.

The

capital

was a

military.

‘‘I

much of imagination
army presence

high-profile

avoided a direct

said that she did not

he had not brought up any of

meeting only two days before the

had been forced into the move.

believe there were other elements that wanted

It

initially

me

out,” she said

will leave that to

“I

Asked who

.

your imagination. ”5

who had been behind

to figure out

the

at all the sensitive spots in the federal

clear indication that the president’s action had the solid backing of the

And

not too

many people

Beg declared, immediately before

army was only maintaining
never been involved in

accepted his speech

face value

when General

the caretakers’ swearing-in ceremony, that the

‘‘We are not involved

peace.

politics.

at

We

We

in politics.

have

are not going to get involved in politics,” he

added. 6

On August

8,

in

her

first

press conference after her government was

dismissed, Bhutto asserted that the president’s dissolution order was not a civilian

order but was prepared

at the general

headquarters of the army and claimed that

the military leaders told Ishaq Khan, ‘‘Either you do

it,

or

we

will

do

it.

”7 While

contending that the military was running the show Bhutto limited her criticism
the military

intelligence and avoided a direct attack on

including General Beg.

Still

hoping

to leave the

door open

the top

to

commanders

to the generals for

any

future reconciliation or compromise, she said that she had no complaint against the

army

chief or

directorate

was

army corps commanders and
to

blame.

that only the military intelligence

Bhutto argued that the military intelligence, having

acquired control of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) after

was

its

head,

Hamid

Gul,

replaced, had been engaged in subverting her government by leaking selective

information to journalists and by misreporting to the corps commanders.
returning to parliamentary democracy
military intelligence,” she said. 8

we must

‘‘Before

redefine the role and powers of the

Bhutto also asserted that the military intelligence
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9

agencies had been

attempting to destabilize her

beginning and cited three examples of
in late 1989, engineered riots in Sindh,

within the PPP.

its

government from the very

conspiracies: the no-confidence motion

and an attempt

to create a dissident

group

“It had been planned very well and for a very long time,” she

said.

Unlike General Zia’s move against the Junejo government
of the

dismissal

continuous

PPP government was
between

confrontation

the

not totally

unexpected.

and

center

in

the

1988, the

It

followed

opposition-controlled

provinces, prolonged violence in Sindh, reports of differences between Bhutto and
the president as well as the army, and a variety of corruption scandals.

dismissal

was preceded by a couple of days of

The

intense political developments and

Bhutto was reported to be in open conflict with both the president and the army
chief over
is

how

to handle the violence in Sindh.

A

Lahore-based newspaper, which

considered to be close to the UI, even carried detailed stories in

its

August 6

issue predicting the dissolution of the assemblies and Bhutto’s dismissal.

even named Ghulam Mustafa

Jatoi as

would-be caretaker prime minister.

They
Bhutto

admitted herself that when she had met with General Beg a few days earlier the

two had disagreements over

Among them was
in

several issues.

the disagreement over

how

to

handle the ethnic violence

Sindh which was extremely serious and probably one of the direct reasons for

Bhutto’s ouster.

The army had been

called to act in aid of civilian authority in

restoring order in Sindh from time to time.
to stop terrorism in the province,

After the local administration failed

which had been running for months, the army

asked for powers, superseding those of civilian authority,
Military

commanders

felt that,

law and order.

without adequate powers to control the violence,

army’s deployment served no useful purpose and
standing.

to restore

it

served merely to lower

its

Fearing that granting such powers to the army would damage her

support base in her

home

province and might even lead to a nation-wide martial

law, Bhutto refused the request and tried to maintain her authority over law

enforcement agencies. From the army’s point of view, given the tension with India
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over Kashmir, the

crisis in

Sindh posed a security dilemma.

General Beg was

convinced that his troops were much more needed on the Indian border and wanted
to quell the domestic strife as soon as possible in order to avoid having to fight

simultaneously on two fronts.

Having realized

that the

control the war-like situation in the province, the

he had

to clear

The

up Sindh

government was unable

army chief was convinced

that

fast.

decision to sack the Bhutto government was

made

not so

much because

of a few separate incidents as the strong perception the military developed
Bhutto was going back on the conditions under which she had agreed
she

first

came

president,

to

power

to

in late 1988.

non-interference

in

when

They included acceptance of Ishaq Khan

military

particularly that on Afghanistan,

to serve

that

affairs,

continuity

in

foreign

as

policy,

renouncement of vengeance on those from

the

previous regime as well as acceptance of the IMF’s conditional aid package which
Jatoi’s caretaker

government signed

just before the

PPP

Only when

took power.

these conditions were met, and pressures from the United States were exercised,
the country’s “establishment” (meaning the president and the military) reluctantly

allowed Bhutto to assume office and tolerated her.

Breaching these conditions

inevitably invited strong resentment and antagonism of the establishment, which

turned out to be politically

fatal to

Bhutto.

While Bhutto may have been caught by
military had been running out of patience for

surprise,

some

time.

it

had been evident

that the

While having been aware

of the restrictions implicitly imposed on her authority,

Bhutto nevertheless

attempted to pursue different policies from those of the military.

The

generals

resented Bhutto’s support for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan where they had

long assisted fundamentalist Muslim guerrillas, mujahideens, to defeat the Marxist

regime of Najibullah.

Within the framework of the Cold War,

coincided with American interests and worked smartly.

withdrawal from the region

in early 1989, the

this

policy

But since the Soviet

United States had shifted

its

policy

toward working with the Russians for establishment of a broad-based government
in

Kabul.

Bhutto supported

this policy, for
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her major concern was to return the

3.5 million Afghan refugees

provinces of Pakistan.

who had been

residing in the

NWFP

and Baluchistan

angered the generals to see Bhutto openly take such a

It

stance which they considered an interference with their domain of authority.
strife in

Kashmir and tensions

at the Indian

Bhutto differed from the military.

over Kashmir issue and hoped
of Kashmir

to

The

border provided another instance where

She preferred not

to get into a

war with India

use political and moral pressure to help the people

The army wanted

in their struggle for self-determination.

to take a

tough position on the issue and found Bhutto’s stance disturbing.

What

incensed the generals most, however, was Bhutto’s “meddling” in

their internal affairs, such as appointments, transfers

had

earlier agreed not to do.

and promotions, which she

Following the replacement of ISI head Hamid Gul

and Sirohi incident came another maneuvering surrounding the corps commander
at

Lahore, Lieutenant-General Alam Jan Mahsud.

Bhutto was said to have conveyed to the

promote him

as the deputy chief of

GHQ

army

promotion board had already chosen

own

its

his retirement nearing,

her wish to extend his tenure and

staff,

By

successor to the army chief.

potential

With

that

a position usually held by a

time,

however, the army’s

candidate for the position.

Bhutto’s

suggestion was seen as an attempt to interfere in the army’s internal affairs and to
create

extra-institutional

Mahsud

Since

loyalties.

was

known

for

his

professionalism as a soldier, the military also suspected that Bhutto wished to make

him

The

the next

army chief

in the expectation that

he would be more obedient

to her.

military leadership reportedly complained to the president about what

perceived as Bhutto’s attempt to create divisions in the ranks of the army.

army, which prided

itself

on

its

discipline and the unity in

possibly be expected to tolerate what

The army
Lahore.
in a

swiftly responded

it

Lt.

.

.

could not
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it.

’To
in

receiving a farewell gift appeared

few days he

village.

“The

General Ashraf to replace Mahsud

The next day a photograph of Mahsud
in a

ranks.

perceived to be an attempt to divide

by sending

number of newspapers and

its

it

left for

a vacation to his

home

The

dismissal of the Bhutto government

Iraqi invasion of

Kuwait on August

to the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

the

With her good connections

action

the world,

made

was quasi-military

after her dismissal:

democracy, inside and outside Pakistan,

it

is

clear in

up

was

my mind

to all

well-

that this

the friends of

realize that she could not expect the

that if

any coup attempt was made against her government, Pakistani

was no

It

secret

from the very beginning

one of the major reasons why the military establishment allowed Bhutto

come

to

power was

the pressure from the United States.

heavy dependence on foreign
military to keep

bowing

tried to

aid, both

to act.

It

and refrain from any act
it

that

might create

would
if

they

afraid of the subsequent aid cut, the generals
crisis drastically

Within a few hours of Bhutto’s dismissal, a U.S. State

Department spokesman

traditions.

military, Bhutto expected the

But the U.S. preoccupation with the Gulf

changed the scenario.

[the action] appears to

to

Because of Pakistan’s

the international controversy

remove her from power, and

had hesitated

economic and

to this pressure

Aware of

jeopardize the aid.

said:

“We have long

supported democracy in Pakistan and

be within the constitutional provisions regarding democratic

”13

was not merely

Middle East

that

reportedly decided
Iraq, a request
its

am

in this notion

She naively believed the brave statements by some

generals should “prepare to eat grass. ”12
that

Washington, and

relationship with the military as that enjoyed by the prime ministers

of other democratic countries.

U.S. senators

whole world

to insure that Pakistan does not deviate

from the democratic process. ”n She did not

same kind of

“I

now

intervention, and

in

The

Bhutto assumed her democratic

Her indulgence

safely stay in power.

reflected in her speech

carefully timed.

2, 1991 shifted the attention of the

wave of democracy sweeping

government could

was very

it

that the

United States was so busy with the

ignored Bhutto’s ouster.

when Bhutto

The timing

for the

crisis in the

move was

objected to the dispatch of Pakistani forces against

made by Saudi Arabia and

supported by the United States.

claim to be a neutral party in the whole event,

it

is

Despite

hard to believe that the

United States had no influence over the dismissal of Bhutto and her government.
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On

the

weekend preceding Bhutto’s

the three service chiefs, U.S.
staff

committee chairman

Ambassador Robert Oakley and

at the latter’s

States Information Services

who had

headquarters

spokesman denied

knowledge of Bhutto’s dismissal.
legislators

was reportedly held between

ouster, a meeting

in

that the

the Joint-chiefs-of-

Rawalpindi.

The United

ambassador had any prior

But Bhutto herself quoted one of the

PPP

defected on the eve of the dissolution of the assemblies as

saying that he had been told by the army that the United States would accept the
events in Pakistan.

There had been various plans

14

to

undermine the Bhutto

government, including yet another no-confidence motion against
assurance of acquiescence paved the
her, shedding

analyst put

it:

all

pretence of

“Can

either

its

way

for the military to

her.

move

But the U.S.

directly against

highly-acclaimed political neutrality.

Pakistan or the Americans,

jeopardize the comfortable relationship of the

last

or both,

As one

‘afford’

to

43 years for the sake of Benazir

Bhutto?” 15
Pakistan’s military leaders had other concerns in the face of the Gulf

With unstable conditions on
crisis in the Persian

security.
itself in

Muslim

in the region.

states in the

it

Muslim world which was moving toward

in the

The times

new

situation for Pakistan’s national

nation with close ties with the Gulf sheikhdoms,

an awkward position

balance of power

the borders with both Afghanistan and India, a

Gulf presented an alarming

As a Muslim

crisis.

found
a

new

called for close contacts with other

Middle East and the Pakistani generals simply did not believe

that they could leave such grave matters to a

with limited experience and capacity.

even humiliating to obey a

woman

young woman

whom

In fact, several generals

even

if

found

they credited
it

difficult or

she was the prime minister.

Although many considered her as a victim

in a military

backed conspiracy,

Bhutto and her government were not entirely blameless. While praised and popular

abroad as a democratic leader, Bhutto never had a firm grip on events

at

home.

Preoccupied with continuous confrontation with the opposition, Bhutto’s PPP

government was unable
another.

to

rule effectively and

During the 20 months

in

went through one

crisis

power, her cabinet could not pass any
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after

legislative

program besides budgets.

In the course of her struggle against the opposition,

Bhutto offered ministerships to buy

political support, letting the cabinet to

the absurd size of over 50 ministers.

opponents than

in getting

ineffective, her ministers also

They were

to

“Politics took precedence over policy,” one

observer noted, “with the government showing more interest
its

grow

outmaneuvering

in

on with the job of governing ”16

Besides being

.

proved

to

criticized for their arrogance

be serious
and failure

liabilities for

to

her and the PPP.

understand the real problems

of the country.

Even

if

the

PPP

was a conspiracy,

administration’s dismissal

could not have succeeded so easily

if

those

who went

government had realized what was involved
besides the perks of office.

They

in

to

it

form the

holding a portfolio

failed to maintain a relationship

with their voters and party workers. They thought that the ordinary

person was as mean as they were. If anyone went to see them, they

assumed

that

that they

had a formidable enemy;

he must be looking for a favor.

dissent; that they had a

that theirs

woman prime

—

did not realize

was a government of

minister in one of the most

chauvinistic societies; that what they thought

education

They

was merit

-

foreign

distanced them from the ordinary worker and even the

upper echelons of the bureaucracy.

Their feet were not on the

ground. They thought they were the best and were there because of
global changes and support for the democratic government in the

U.S. Senate. 17

Even
that

the

PPP workers were

resentful of these ministers and they shared the

Bhutto had to get rid of them before she would make a new move.

herself

was

also responsible for

failure of the attempt to oust

many of

Nawaz

view

Bhutto

the problems that confronted her.

The

Sharif from Punjab chief ministership put the

center-Punjab confrontation to a point of no-retum.
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She could not

clearly define

her authority as opposed to that of the president and indulged herself
struggle with him.

She

failed to control the civil war-like situation in her

province of Sindh which was claiming hundreds of
life

made

she had

power

in a

when coming

for the masses

The promise of

lives.

home
better

power, she could not deliver.

to

Bhutto’s 20 months of political miscalculation and mismanagement eventually gave

her enemies the grounds they needed to oust her.

The

caretaker government of

Ghulam Mustafa

interim prime minister by President Ishaq

Khan on August

well-equipped than the government of Bhutto
landlord of Sindh, had been

known

Although a big and old name
parliamentary seat from his

depend on a

replaced.

in Pakistani politics,

own

6,

appointed

appeared even
Jatoi,

less

the biggest

as the “perpetual prime minister-in-waiting.”

he could not even win a

constituency in the 1988 elections and had to

Ghulam Mustafa Khar vacated

seat

it

who was

Jatoi,

the 1989 by-election to return to Parliament.

for

him

in

a safe constituency in

Since then Jatoi had been fighting

against Bhutto as the opposition leader in parliament.

appointing Jatoi as caretaker prime minister,

said

President Ishaq Khan, in
that

he was not only an

experienced politician with a good reputation but was a true Pakistani, implying
that

Bhutto was not.

Along with

announcement of the assemblies’

Bux Soomro and

Bhutto, Illahi

Mustafa Khar.

The most

PPP

1980’ s.

Sartaj

He

He was

the

Aziz, both Zia’s ministers, and

PPP and

Ghulam

among them was Khar who took over

and Jatoi had been friends since

as the party’s founding

became estranged from

in shortly after the president’s

dissolution: Rafi Raza, former aid to Zulfikar Ali

controversial

ministry of water and power.
in the

were sworn

Jatoi four ministers

members with
the Bhutto

women

days

their early

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
in the early

the

Khar

and mid-

ambivalent during Benazir Bhutto’s term as prime minister.

He

publicly pledged loyalty to Benazir only a few weeks before he joined Jatoi ’s
cabinet.

At the end of August, 1990, however, he repeated President Ishaq Khan’s

corruption

charges against Bhutto and said that she should give the PPP’s

leadership to

him

in the larger interest of the party.

ill

He

claimed that he was the

true heir to the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s political legacy and that he
could lead the

PPP

to victory in the

upcoming

He

elections in October.

also charged Bhutto with

being involved in anti-Pakistan conspiracies and warned that her return to power

would be a national
workers and
party

he

is

that

said that he

he was ready to support the

by Ms. Bhutto,

led

Khar

disaster.

I

had

PPP

will collaborate with

all

PPP

the respect for the

“But

without Bhutto.

any power

to

if

the

block her way,’’

said. 18

Jatoi initially
efforts.

hoped

His colleagues

to

in

form a broad-based government but

the

COP

were displeased by the

accepted the premiership without consulting them in advance.

want

to

be openly associated with

called “tried and tainted’’

regimes. Even the

his

government because

members, some of

whom

fact that

Many
it

failed in his

he had

parties did not

included what they

had worked for martial law

MQM declined to join his caretaker government.

Despite their

claims to be a neutral party, the partisan character of the caretakers was evident
as the president apparently had carefully selected only the
to

form both federal and provincial governments:

Hyder Wyne of the UI

Humayun

as Punjab chief minister,

PPP’s

bitterest

enemies

Jatoi in the center,

Ghulam

Mir Afzal of the

IJI in the

NWFP,

Marri, Akbar Bugti’s son-in-law, in Baluchistan, and Jam Sadiq Ali

in

Sindh.
In his first press conference after he took office, Jatoi declared that the

president’s promise of elections on October 24 would be fulfilled in an impartial

manner and emphasized

that elections

were the

The

priority of his government.

impartiality of the caretaker prime minister, however, soon turned out to be pure
lip-service

when

particularly in

those

who had

of Nawabshah.
Jatoi’s family

his administration launched a ruthless drive against the

its

stronghold of Sindh.

He

ordered the arrest and detention of

defeated him and his sons in the 1988 elections in his

Those PPP workers who had contested

members were

Nawabshah and Jacobabad.
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home

all

district

local elections against the

also arrested and detained.

dividing Bhutto’s ancestral constituency, Rattodero,
separate districts of

PPP,

to

Jatoi

went as

be absorbed

Another measure

far as

into

that

two

he was

quick to take was to prohibit Bhutto, her family members, former
ministers,
legislators

and key figures

in finance

from leaving the country. Horse-trading,

which Bhutto’s government was condemned by
carrot and stick,

were carried out on a large

for

the president, and the policy of

PPP

scale.

leaders were offered

ministerial positions and other inducements such as industrial
permits, financial
credits,

and exemption from the accountability process

to desert the

hands with the caretakers. Those who resisted and remained loyal
threatened with accountability, victimized or arrested.

PPP workers from

the caretakers.

job of wrecking the
neutrality here.

to the

objective

join

PPP were

was

to deter

supporting the party and intimidate them to switch their loyalty.

Thus, ironically, the most corrupt of the

welcomed by

The

PPP and

It

PPP by

was

If President Ishaq

ministers were the

first

to

be

as though the caretakers had been assigned the

As one

means.

all

PPP

meant what he

analyst said:

said,

“There

is

no

he would not have brought

such people in.”i9

Le gal

When
and promised

the caretaker

Battles

government of Ghulam Mustafa

to hold elections

on October 24,

it

into the conduct of the previous government.
said,

“but the looting

unaccounted ”20
.

The

that

set

power

“Elections are our priority,’’ Jatoi
19 months cannot go

five

after the

special

The

coup

in

courts,

try

to

special tribunals,

from assuming any public

and punish the

which were originally

1977 and resurrected by the caretaker

government, could disqualify those convicted from taking part
office for seven years.

caretaker government could punish legislators

misdemeanor.

to

president set up six special tribunals, and the federal

in public office.

up by Zia-ul Haq

came

also emphasized the need to look

has gone on in the past

caretaker government established

misconduct of those

Jatoi

if

The

and

special courts of the

they were found guilty of any

All courts were headed by high court judges.
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in the elections

Partiality of the caretaker

announced

that the process of accountability

Those who had held

months.

government was clearly revealed when

would be confined

new

caretaker cabinet.

was brought against
Punjab and

NWFP

defected to the

Indeed,

UI notables who had been

some of them were now

in

power

during the previous 20 months.

of

was aimed only

accountability process

also

provinces of the

PPP members who had

showed

clearly

The
their

that

Bhutto and her loyal colleagues, and gave

at

even more credibility to Bhutto’s claim

in the

exempted from investigations.

government

caretaker

the

20

Moreover, not a single case of wrongdoing

new government were

approach

partisan

the

to the previous

office during the martial law regime, or under the

Junejo government, would not be touched.
serving in the

Jatoi

be a martyr for democracy.

to

Bhutto

in

response demanded that a high-powered commission comprising Supreme Court

judges be established to investigate the conduct of

presidents and prime

all

ministers since 1985. and refused to recognize the special tribunals.
It

was evident

accountability as part of
tarnish the

government had already decided

that the caretaker
its

election

campaign which was designed

image of Bhutto and other PPP

from contesting the upcoming
had always been carried out

in

elections.

leaders, and possibly disqualify

a partial manner in the past and only those

were subjected

to

been usually employed

to justify the dismissal of an elected

was no proof

had

principle

And

it

lost the

immune from

it.

them

politically defeat

who were considered

who had

Accountability had

government when there

confidence of parliament.

was simple: “If you cannot

those politicians

to systematically

In fact, accountability process in Pakistan

fallen out of favor with the establishment

that

to use

The underlying

them, disqualify them “22
.

acceptable to the establishment had been

accountability even if they were no less guilty of abuse of power.

Since corruption was allegedly one of the main reasons for dismissing
Bhutto, President

Ghulam Ishaq Khan came under

pressure to provide substantive

proof against her government and secure convictions from the special tribunals
order to justify his action on August
dismissed parliament

if

6.

His

critics

he did not have evidence
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in

were asking why he had
at

hand.

The

caretaker

government of

which also promised

Jatoi,

to present evidence of the previous

government’s misconduct, was frustrated with
as

Prime Minister would admit

one

point.

“Our

was caused by

own

its

been questioned

do

so.

done us no good,’’

that the delay has

credibility has

failure to

.

He

’’22

difficulties in gathering information

from

“Even

jatoi said at

insisted that the delay

officials

of the previous

government. Bhutto denied the allegations against her as baseless and argued
ethics required the president to resign if he could not produce any proof even

than a month after his action.

To

also filed a reference against

counter the president’s

him

in

move

which she argued

exercised undue influence to benefit his son-in-law.

I

that

more

against her, Bhutto

had

that the president

was alleged

It

that

the

president’s influence had granted his son-in-law the largest concession for selling

liquified-petroleum-gas, a write-off of the bank loans he owed, and release from

drug smuggling charges.

On September

10,

more than a month

two references against Bhutto

after her dismissal, the president filed

concerned the award of a contract for the sale of cotton
international market rate to a firm in Karachi.
illegal

One of them

in a special tribunal in Karachi.
at

a rate far below the

The other accusation

referred to the

use of an Asian Development Bank loan to hire a foreign consulting firm for

a Karachi power extension project.

Two weeks

on September 24, two more

later

references were filed in a special tribunal in Lahore and the court ordered Bhutto
to stand trial

on October

land to an international
allegedly granted at a

The

One

company

much lower

concerned the grant of
close friends.

9.

illegal

dealt with the grant of over

200 acres of prime

for a hotel project in Islamabad.
rate than the prevailing

market

The

rate.

land was

The

other

marketing rights for liquified petroleum gas to her

obligation to appear in court

carry out effective election campaign.

made

it

“I have come here

difficult for

to

show

Bhutto to

the people the

hollowness and maliciousness of the whole process,” Bhutto once said before
entering the courtroom.

“I have come here because

I

want

to

make

a point

the former prime minister and leader of Pakistan’s biggest political party
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is

-- that

being

dragged from court

to court.

.

.

.

This

is

aimed

keeping us from fighting the

at

election. ”23

Beyond

the special tribunals, there

to allegations that

were

trials in

the media. Stories relating

had not yet been brought before the court were circulated by the

government news agency implicating PPP members

in

One of

unproven charges.

the most talked-about stories concerned the unsecured loans from nationalized

banks and development finance

were reported

to

have more than doubled or

As much

office.

government

Loans from some of these

institutions.

one

as

billion rupees

tripled during Bhutto’s first year in

were

said to

22 entrepreneurs without adequate

to

were not expected

to

be paid back.

According

have been given by the PPP

collateral.

to an estimate

bad loans of Pakistani banks and development finance

Urban middle

nearly 7 billion rupees.

institutions

was

class

Most of

the loans

by the World Bank,

amounted

institutions

particularly offended

to

by these

stories.
It

may be worthwhile

corruption in Pakistan; one
financial deals.

is

The former

to

mention

—

called sifarish
is

patronage

to

--

and the other

constituents

when

who

they

is

shady

Many

basic to Pakistan’s society and politics.

Pakistan’s politicians are tribal or clan leaders

and other benefits

two types of

that there are basically

of

are expected to hand out jobs

come

to

positions

of power.

Therefore, sifarish tends to be accepted and not considered as real corruption.

However, under pressure

to provide benefits to her friends

had suffered persecution during Zia’s long
that

evoked severe

criticism.

rule,

lists

was

it

placed as

said to

first

The

fact that

many

up within

as 26,000 people.

400 persons on a Bhutto’s

Bhutto held high moral ground when she came to power as the

democratically elected prime minister in 11 years also

opponents to

set

have been removed from the

position allegedly because he refused to find jobs for
list.

who

of those to be employed to the heads of

nationalized banks and government offices,
nationalized bank

activists,

Bhutto practiced sifarish on a scale

For instance, a placement bureau was

Bhutto’s secretariat and, by sending

The head of one

and party

criticize her

made

it

easier for her

government’s misconduct and disappointed the public
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even more.

Although Bhutto’s personal popularity held up quite well, her

ministers and advisors were severely criticized even by

PPP

supporters.

The way

Bhutto interfered with the existing system and procedures angered the bureaucrats

and the generals. They were not pleased
and jump

to the

The

to see

new-comers skip the regular

steps

promotion ladder.

biggest target of the corruption charges turned out to be Bhutto’s

husband, Asif Ali Zardari,

who was

alleged to have used his wife’s official position

He was

to

add

in

both the prime minister’s house and in her secretariat even though he was not

to his already considerable fortune.

a cabinet

member. “All

pumps

petrol

in

accused of opening his offices

Islamabad were owned by Mr. Zardari’s

men,’’ his opponent said, “and the prime minister’s secretariat looked like a stock

market where business deals were struck. ’’24

It

was widely believed

charged certain proportion, said to be one-tenth, of contracts

that

and others obtain, giving him the famous nick-name,

“Mr.

Government-owned media accused him of involvement
vehicles and alleged that his servant

Karachi.

When

was involved

cases only to pressurize the PPP. ’’25
it

was widely believed

of the Zardaris

--

percent.’’

illegally

importing

who

(was) implicated in false

had made a number of shady deals,

term.

.

.

it

if the

PPP was thrown

would not be because of

Asif Ali and his father

Hakim

stream of scandal stories about the Zardaris and

how

ten

Despite Bhutto’s strong defence of her

that Zardari

consensus,’’ one observer noted, “that
full

he helped friends

a terrorist massacre in

taking advantage of his relationship with the prime minister.

completing a

he

asked about Zardari, Bhutto said that her husband was “an

honorable, dignified and dynamic young businessman

husband,

in

in

that

accurate they really were.

Some even

Ali.
it

“There was

virtual

out of office before

the Bhuttos but as a result

”26

There was

am

endless

did not seem to matter

much

said that Bhutto’s gravest mistake

was

agreeing to an arranged marriage in a wrong family.

Asif Zardari was formally arrested on October 10 and remanded
until

October 23, the

extortion

case.

It

last

to

custody

day of the election campaign, for complicity

was alleged

that

he,
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along with

in

an

Ghulam Hussain Unar,

kidnapped a Pakistani-bom British businessman
million rupees.

and robbed him of 17

in April

Zardari claimed that he was arrested just because he was

contesting elections against Murtaza Jatoi, the caretaker prime minister’s son,
and
that its sole

purpose was to prevent him from campaigning

which was home

weak

a

that her

to both Zardari

and

Murtaza

Jatoi clans.

position and the arrest of Asif Zardari

became

in the constituency

Jatoi

was

inevitable.

said to

be

in

Bhutto argued

husband had been used as leverage against her and claimed

had

that she

been offered a deal by the caretaker government whereby no cases would be
brought against her or her family

if

she would renounce politics and leave the

country. She declared that even Zardari ’s arrest would not intimidate her into such
a

compromise and

that she

The

through the back door.

would never surrender before those who had come
caretaker government denied offering such a deal to

Bhutto.

Another
legality

battle

between Bhutto and her opponents was fought over the

of the president’s dissolution of the assemblies.

action in courts.

The

first

on September 26 on the

The PPP challenged

major decision was given by the Peshawar High Court

petition filed

by the former

NWFP

chief minister, Aftab

Sherpao, which challenged the governor’s dismissal order by pointing out
did not even mention the grounds for dismissal.

throw out the

PPP government

in his province,

requirements for the order he issued. The

full

The governor,

had been invalid and ordered

Khan.

Within

its

less than half

it

in his haste to

bench of the Peshawar High Court,

NWFP provincial assembly

immediate restoration.

PPP and

that

had apparently neglected the legal

accepting the petition, declared that the dismissal of the

as a great victory for the

this

The

decision

was hailed

considered a slap in the face for President Ishaq

an hour of the Peshawar High Court’s decision, the

caretaker federal government, using powers under the national emergency in force,

obtained a “stay order” from the Supreme Court which suspended the verdict.

The

stay order

was obtained from a Supreme Court Judge, Usman

according to the caretaker government, happened to be present
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in

Ali,

who,

Peshawar

at the

time of the verdict. Later that day the Supreme Court

sitting in

Karachi formalized

the order.

Bhutto

another case on October 14

lost

when

Lahore High Court

the

dismissed other petitions by the PPP, which challenged the president’s action
of

August

and ruled

6,

National Assembly

that the president

if

had the legal prerogative

to dissolve the

he thought fresh elections had become necessary.

grounds for the ruling the court cited were: the government’s
substantive legislative work, failure to put

convene the Council of

Common

down

Among

the

inability to carry out

the violence in Sindh, failure to

Interests resulting in persistent confrontation

between the center and two provinces, and launching of a municipal development

program by the

government without proper

federal

legislation.

October Elections

Campaign
August

for the general elections in October had practically started on

the day of Bhutto’s dismissal.

6,

dismissal of Bhutto and appointment of

Minister were the beginning of
basically three areas that the

From

Ghulam Mustafa

campaign

its

UI campaign

to

and disrupt

their election

come

Jatoi as caretaker
to

strategy focused.

repeated the president’s accusation against the
credibility

the UI’s point of view,

PPP

campaign. Second

First,

it

to

Prime

There were

power.

leaders

the

it

vigorously

damage

their

spent massive amount of

funds for election campaign, particularly for development projects and welfare

programs

in constituencies, to influence voters.

so-called “one-against-one” tactic

against the

non-PPP

PPP

in

Third, the UI tried to employ a

where only one consensus candidate was

every constituency in order to avoid vote-splitting among the

parties as had

happened

in

1988 elections.

There were some disagreements among the caretakers as
should totally disqualify Bhutto and other prominent
the elections or let

fielded

them stand and hope
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PPP

to

whether they

leaders from contesting

for their defeat.

Short of substantial

evidence against the

PPP

elections, the caretaker
their election

of

government of

Jatoi

them

The

in special tribunals in time for

allowed Bhutto and others to carry on

campaign while making every

PPP workers were

ministers.

leaders to convict

effort to block their

way.

Hundreds

harassed, framed and arrested, including six former

accountability process kept the

PPP

PPP

leaders too busy defending

themselves in the courts to carry out effective campaign for elections.

The

court

hearings were also scheduled to match the busiest time of the campaign and Bhutto

had

to

appear

in courts in

Karachi or in Lahore almost everyday.

In addition to bad publicity

from accountability, the image of the PPP

candidates was also tarnished by a smear campaign through the governmentcontrolled media.

own
in

country.

the United

American

One

oft-repeated allegation

She was accused of having
States

which were

aid to Pakistan.

said

was

that Bhutto

was not

loyal to her

links with the Zionist and Indian lobbies
to

have engineered the suspension of

There had been some concern

in the

whether Pakistan was building nuclear weapon. Pakistan had long

United States
insisted that

its

nuclear program did not include weapons but this assertion had become less

convincing to the Americans. American law prohibited economic and military aid
as well as any delivery of military equipment to Pakistan unless the president could

give a written certificate confirming that Pakistan had no nuclear weapons.

1990 Pakistan was the

third largest recipient of

Egypt, getting over 500 million dollars.

from President George Bush

for the

timing,

made

1.

fiscal year, the

The UI

leaders, taking advantage of

and accused Bhutto of sending her mother, Nusrat Bhutto,

public relations expert,

Zionist.”

The

aid.

Mark

and

United States Congress

the loss of U.S. aid one of the major topics of

lobby for the suspension of

aid, after Israel

In the absence of the required certificate

new

suspended aid to Pakistan on October

American

In

its

election

to the

campaign

United States

Siegel,

whom

the

UI described

as a

“well-known

Abida Hussain, accused Bhutto of

paying Siegel nearly half a million dollars from the government treasury
in

to

Bhutto was also criticized for hiring an American

federal information minister,

improve her image

its

the United States.
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to

Bhutto’s criticism of the military

intelligence as being responsible for her ouster

was

by the

also exploited

which

IJI

painted her as a “foreign agent.’’

The

IJI

poured massive amounts of money into development projects and

welfare programs

important constituencies.

in

home

In Sindh, the

province of

caretaker Prime Minister Jatoi, thirty-five development projects were inaugurated
in

Nawabshah and Naushero

his three

Firoze, where he and his son were to contest, during

and a half months

away a grant of 420

The punjab

in office.

caretaker chief minister gave

The

million rupees to local bodies.

IJI

candidates were given

about 4 million rupees each to launch development projects

in their constituencies.

Greater emphasis was placed on districts where candidates of opposing camps had

roughly equal popularity.
electricity

and

Here the decisive

installation of

Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif

NA-95

the provision of

Asghar Khan, an opponent of

sewerage channels.
in

would be

factors

Lahore, condemned the

in

latter’s lavish

spending on his campaign as “an obscene display of money” and claimed

money had

come from Sharif s own

not

to the

UI candidates

earlier criticized the

considered the allocation of funds

as bribing of both candidates and voters.

PPP government

Development through

for

source but had been diverted from the

Many

government’s rural development funds.

its

own

that the

IJI,

which had

from People’s Program

for spending funds

legislators,

The

was now doing

same

virtually the

thing.

The one-against-one

nevertheless hard to implement.
in

many

was a

tactic

The UI learned

districts parties other than the

vote-splitting

PPP,

among themselves enabled

anti-PPP parties

PPP nominee

in

initially

each

planned to

district

and

potentially effective

the

field just

tried to

a bitter lesson in 1988 elections:

together,

PPP

to

won

win

came

the

to negotiations

on

COP parties whose leaders had

The UI

itself

was experiencing

seats.

make “the PPP

seat adjustments.

The

IJI

and other

v.s. the rest” scenario.

difficult in practice

Consensus was hard

begun publicly

to reach

when

among

criticizing the policies of the UI.

internal division and
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the majority votes, but

one consensus candidate against every

This much-acclaimed strategy, however, proved far more
it

method but was

its

main component, the

Pakistan

Muslim League, had

serious disagreement within

eventually led to the creation of a dissident group.

almost inevitable

in light

its

own

ranks, which

Infighting within the

of the strange mix of parties

COP

in the coalition.

was

Islamic

parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) found

Awami

difficult to cooperate with the

of

its

National Party

secularism and pro- Afghanistan policies.

it

(ANP) of Wali Khan because

Fazlur

Rehman

of the Jamiat-ul

Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) had never forgiven Akbar Bugti, who had just launched a new

Watan Party (JWP), because of

party, the Jamhoori

towards JUI’s ministers when they were

was eventually mitigated and

infighting

it

in

Bugti’s insulting attitude

the Balochistan

appeared that the

The

coalition.

COP

could enter the

elections as one united alliance even if consensus candidates could not be fielded
in all cases.

The
announced
nominees

turn

He added

be expelled from the

COP

did in 1988

when

it

the

UI

president,

UI candidates

whoever violated the

The UI had

alliance.

but the

that

won

convince the

MQM

it

alone as

But his decision meant
all his

MQM

against the

it

successfully

Sharif needed the

13 national assembly seats.

Sharif,

would

earlier attempted to

which had been supporting Sharif in

Nawaz

alliance’s discipline

MQM declined and decided to go

support for his bid for the premiership.
Islami,

when

his unilateral decision not to field

in Sindh.

to join the

new

situation took a

MQM’s

that the Jamaat-i-

actions, should

withdraw

its

half

a dozen candidates in Karachi and Hyderabad, including Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed,

Secretary-General

of the UI. The Jamaat,

a powerful

force within

threatened to pull out of the alliance unless Sharif changed his decision.

the
Its

UI,

strong

stance finally forced Sharif to yield.

The PPP
Istaqlal

also

formed an

Asghar Khan’s Tehrik-e-

and a Shia party, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiq’h-e-Jafariya (TNFJ) and named

the People’s Democratic Alliance

had secured any
its

electoral alliance with

seats in the

psychological isolation.

1988

(PDA). Although neither of
polls, the

PPP made

Asghar Khan was known

as a skilled morale booster.

In case of the
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PDA

its

it

alliance partners

the alliance mostly to offset
for his personal honesty and

victory, he

was expected

to

become

senior minister in the federal cabinet and possibly the
party’s next

The

presidential candidate.

number of
had

to

PPP

cost the

constituencies were to be awarded to

be careful with

members from
some

PDA

its

cabinet ministers

list

resulted in

who had

who were

more new candidates on
still

the

PPP’s

to her victory in 1988.

This process

than on that of the

UI although

a large proportion of their incumbents.
the

“sympathy
image

She drew huge crowds

appeared that public sympathy was with her.

factor’’, projecting

that

Bhutto

had greatly contributed

to her public meetings,

She

said that the

threatening her that she and her family would suffer

if

and

it

regime had been

she persisted in her political

Calling herself “the brave daughter of a brave father’’ Bhutto declared

would not be cowed down by

threats.

Public sympathy for her ordeal was

“She

reinforced by the arrest of her husband, Asif Ali Zardari.

now,”

The

expected to be arrested or those

list

as a victim of injustice and state oppression, an

that she

dropped almost 40

attracted public criticism for being corrupt.

The PPP’s campaign focused on

activity.

It

too high a price for staying loyal to the party.

both parties retained

The PPP

partners to contest.

its

of candidates for the national assembly, including

party tickets were not given to those

who demanded

since only a small

little

party ticket distribution this time.

previous

its

very

said a

woman

hour of need. ”27

in a village in

Okara

district,

“we

cannot

let

is

her

one of us

down

in her

In her speeches at various meetings, Bhutto admitted that she

and her party members might have made some mistakes and might not have paid
proper attention to the people’s needs.

She assured the public

tolerate such mistakes if she returned to

power, and

that she

that she

would not

would expel those

guilty of misconduct.

Having experienced

his outright partiality against the

her tactic in dealing with President Ishaq Khan.
direct criticism of the president, and

she

now began

blamed the

openly accusing him.

In a

PPP, Bhutto changed

While she had

earlier avoided

military intelligence for her ouster,

huge public meeting on October

11,

Bhutto said that Ghulam Ishaq Khan was no longer acting as President of Pakistan
but had

become

President of the UI, and that he had masterminded a plot to keep
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her out of the elections.

PPP and

She even declared

PPP and

the IJI but between the

The PPP’s

On

the one hand,

outgoing party; the public tended to be
other

hand,

could

it

enjoy

not

critical

the

were

to the UI.

said to be giving the

The

Mohammad Khan

its

performance

On

in office.

the

in

terms of

The government-controlled

television

less than

one tenth of the time they

where important

IJI

candidates, including

allotted

Nawaz

Junejo, were contesting so that they could have

supporters vote for them.

continued.

of

had the disadvantage of being an

caretaker government of the Punjab set up urgent identity card

services in several districts

and

PPP

it

from what some called

advantages of incumbency

administrative clout and media access. 29
stations

the

Ishaq Khan. 28

election campaign, however, suffered

the worst of both worlds.”

was not between

that the contest

Harassment and

As one observer

put

“The

it,

arrests of

dice

PPP

Sharif

all

their

candidates and activists

was heavily loaded

against Benazir

Bhutto before the elections. ”30

While

politicians

enthusiasm

among

reasons for

this.

would be held

kept themselves busy campaigning,

as promised.

was

Even

if

still

little

There were several

the electorate, particularly in Karachi.

First the public

was

there

not wholly convinced that the elections

they were held,

establishment would accept the voters’ verdict

if

many questioned whether

the

PPP won.

It

the

was widely

understood that the president did not dismiss Bhutto only to welcome her back
three months.
results

in

Many

expected the caretaker government to manipulate the election

order to ensure their ‘‘positiveness.”

caretakers were taking against the
results

were going

lack of enthusiasm

to

poor performance

be secured.

among

the former assembly

in

voters.

PPP

in office.

the

that

Both the

were partly responsible

PPP and

the IJI

lost the public’s

the

were

fielding

for the

many of

confidence due to their

Seeing the same old faces turned off the voters.

Election platforms of both alliances were produced only a
election day, indicating the

measures

strengthened the belief that the desired

Political parties

members who had

All

little

week or

so before the

importance issues or programs had

this time.

Besides both platforms were similar in contents and voters disregarded them.
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The

election for the national assembly on October 24 turned produced a

landslide victory for the

UI which won 145

majority and therefore the right to form

PPP won
to the

only 45 seats, sharply

MQM

its

down from

seats out of 207, securing a clear

own government
previous 93.

its

with 15 seats, adding two more to

The

went

third place

previous strength.

its

The

at the center.

The

result

surprised everyone because most observers and analysts were expecting a close call

between the PPP and the UI.
political watershed,

to

power

mandate

The

comparable

UI

unanticipated

to the

landslide

was considered a

1970 elections which had brought the

PPP

for the first time, in the sense that the electorate had given a massive

The

to a single political party or alliance.

most prominent

in the

Ill’s

overwhelming victory was

Punjab, the most populous and powerful province which

accounts for more than 60 percent of the country’s population and 115 national

assembly

seats.

The PPP, which had prided

was

national party with representation in every province,

Punjab.

It

home province

did better in Bhutto’s

more than a

half of

Out of the seven

its total

seats the

of 45

PPP

on being the country’s only

itself

virtually

of Sindh where

seats, but still less than

lost in Sindh, six

31

it

wiped out

in the

won 24

seats,

it

had taken

1988.

in

were won by members of the

caretaker government or their relatives and friends: caretaker Prime Minister

Ghulam Mustafa

Jatoi

and his son Murtaza, Sindh Caretaker Chief Minister Jam

Jam Mashrooq

Sadiq’s son,

CaretaJcer Minister

Muslim League President Junejo and Federal

Ali,

Mir Hazar Khan

Bijarani.

Bhutto suffered a personal set-back when she
she was contesting in Peshawar.
in Sindh, she

province.

while

still

wanted

to

show her

Her husband, Asif
in

While she

easily

won

national strength

Ali Zardari,

who

lost

by a large margin a

a seat in her

by winning a

home

seat

district

seat in another

also contested from

two

districts,

custody, was defeated in his native constituency but was elected from

a safe Bhutto constituency in Karachi that his wife had vacated for him.

Of

a

total

of 42 ministers of the former Bhutto cabinet 24 contested but only 11 were
returned to Parliament, showing the public’s disapproval of the former ministers.
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Provincial assembly polls that took place three days later on October
27 also

UI

resulted in the

s

victory.

It

Punjab assembly and secured

in

government
to

70

in the

sufficient seats in the

stronghold

its

an overwhelming 208 seats out of 234

The PPP, on

coalition governments.

majority

won

won

there.

It

1988

polls.

NWFP and Balochistan

in the

to

form

the other hand, failed to gain even a simple

of Sindh

was prevented from forming

and

the

only 42 seats in the Sindh assembly this time compared

Even seen

the country, the extent of the

PPP

in the context

of the party’s defeat throughout

was a shock

set-back in Sindh

to everyone.

Bhutto alleged that a massive rigging by the caretakers and the
place before and during the elections. She claimed that

many

IJI

took

polling stations were

targeted for electoral fraud under a centralized plan implemented at various levels

of the administration.

were

said to

Scores of them, particularly those

have had no

PDA

polling agents because they were either denied

The

access to or thrown out of the stations.

PDA

were switched around or otherwise tampered with
from the polling
prime

stations.

minister’s

home

A PPP polling agent
village,

Kalashnikovs, invaded the station.
boxes,’’ he said.3i

The

a

group

seats

after they

said that at

of Jatoi

New

had been collected
Jatoi, the caretaker

supporters,

lists,

gave some credibility

many

containing

The

fact that all the

to the

armed

with

the ballots and stuffed the

PDA also alleged that the UI had prepared,

bring additional votes to the UI candidates.

won

also alleged that ballot boxes

“They stamped

bogus identity cards and special voters’

candidates

in the Ill’s strongholds,

PPP’s

and distributed

ghost names, to

major anti-Bhutto

allegation of rigging.

mass

agitation to protest the fraud for fear of attracting

the imposition of martial law.

Caretaker Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi

Bhutto did not

dismissed the

call for a

PPP

allegations as baseless and

for her party’s failure in the contests.
results

the

He

blamed Bhutto for making excuses

maintained that manipulating election

on such a large scale would have been extremely

PPP had become

difficult

and argued

out of touch with the reality of the Pakistani public.

Sharif responded similarly saying that Bhutto was finding

from “her pedestal” and accept the popular
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verdict.

it

difficult to

that

Nawaz

come down

International observers had slightly different opinions about the elections.

The National Democratic
based organization

Institute

affiliated to the

(NDI) for International Affairs, a WashingtonDemocratic Party of the United

a preliminary statement on October 26 on the elections.

“open, orderly and well-administered.”

elections as

problems

that prevented the election

from being

of calling the elections “free and fair”, the phrase

It

based League of

argued

it

Although

that

stopped short

it

used for the 1988 polls, the

However, another team of foreign observers from

Human

“sophisticated fraud.”

the Paris-

Rights claimed that the UI victory was a result of

They argued

bogus votes were stuffed

that

into ballot

boxes

they were transferred from polling stations to election officials.

While the nation-wide rigging may not have taken place
there

number of

a

listed

statement was interpreted by international media as a certification of the

election results. 32

when

described the October

totally impartial but

those irregularities did not significantly alter the results.

ND’s

It

States, issued

were examples of

irregularities.

First,

as Bhutto alleged,

although most observers noticed a

small turnout on October 24, official figures showed a large increase in voter

This phenomenon

turnout.

voter

lists

which were

may have been caused by

said to

the fictitious

names on

the

have given extra votes to the UI. Second, there was

circumstantial evidence that suggested possibility of ballot box tampering by the

UI.

“Wherever a

PDA

candidate received a low percentage of votes, the overall

vote also remained low and wherever a

PDA

candidate showed strength the

total

vote also rose to record figures. ”33 However, even when these irregularities had

been corrected and numbers adjusted,

have been radically
districts

would

different.

where rigging was

still

statistics

According
said to

to

showed

some

have given

that the

outcome would not

analysts, even if
seats to

its

it

had

won

opponents, the

those

PPP

not have secured enough seats to defeat the UI. Therefore, “the party’s

defeat in 1990

was

real

even

if

rigging

made

it

look greater than

it

might otherwise

have been. ”34

The
in Pakistan.

elections in 1990 witnessed a fundamental change in political thinking

Voters’ concern had shifted from their ideological affiliation to local
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issues, particularly

improvement of the daily

life

through development projects and

welfare program. Ideological differences between the
level

had become almost meaningless.

“The whole

against the People’s Party because the road
referring to the

succeeded
in public

UI candidate

Ijaz-ul

as social workers

where the UI

to project

who would

chief,

Nawaz

Sharif,

UI on
I

was repaired by

Ijaz,’’

one voter

live decided

Candidates, having sensed this

themselves not so

done for

much

as party

their constituents.

had succeeded the most.

For

said

Haq, who

late Zia-ul

Punjab Chief Minister, Sharif had promoted economic development

A

the micro

where

Haq, the son of the

get the job

the

street

in his first bid to public office. 35

mind, attempted

PPP and

shift

members but

And

this

was

five years as

in his

province.

businessman himself, with humble origins, he received strong support from the

country’s growing urban middle class which had gradually distanced

itself

from the

traditional politics of landed aristocratic families such as the Bhuttos, the Jatois and

the Junejos.

Meanwhile, the PPP depended upon

past elections and expected their sympathy for

advantage. But this strategy failed.
those
felt

who had

failed to live

were on the

up

its

its

mass support as

it

did in the

ousted leader to work for

“The people of the Punjab thoroughly

to their

promises and voted for those

side of hope. ’’36
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rejected

whom

they
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CHAPTER

7

CONCLUSION

After her return to Pakistan from an exile in 1986, Benazir Bhutto greatly
contributed to the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, a country which had seen

a number of military regimes.

former Prime Minister

As

who was

the daughter of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,

ousted and later killed by the martial law regime

of General Zia-ul Haq, Benazir kept together her father’s Pakistan People’s Party,

and came

power

to

in

December 1988
more

minister of Pakistan in

government

in the

to a series of

as the first democratically elected prime

than a decade and as the

Muslim world. The

mounting problems

initial

first

female head of

euphoria, however, quickly gave

that confronted the

young prime

minister: conflict

with the provinces of the Punjab and Baluchistan, ethnic violence

economy

in dire straits, a civil

war

in

She also had

India over Kashmir.

way

in

Sindh,

neighboring Afghanistan, and tension with
to

deal with the “establishment” which

remained skeptical of her: a hostile president, suspicious army, and uncooperative
civil service.

When

she

which she would

came

to

power, Bhutto had

to agree to certain conditions

under

They included acceptance of Ghulam Ishaq Khan

serve.

as

President, continuation of the past foreign policy particularly with respect to

Afghanistan, and non-interference with the military’s internal

an attempt to exercise her
restrictions

their

them, reinforcing

come

independent authority, did not

strictly

Bhutto, in

observe these

and thus caused a great deal of disaffection among the generals.

Meddling with

Pakistani

own

affairs.

appointments and promotions of officers particularly annoyed

in their

army had run

to function as

its

mind a sense of deep-rooted suspicion about Bhutto. The

the country for 25 of

ultimate arbiter.

its

43 years since independence and

Bhutto was able
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to

remain

in

power only

so long as the military allowed her

to.

by the eighth amendment

1973 constitution which gave the president

to

the

Her power had been even more

discretionary authority to dismiss Parliament
It

was

was not just

rightfully

when he deemed

fit.

external forces that led to Bhutto’s ouster.

blamed

for

its

curtailed

Her government

conduct legislative work and solve the

inability to

problems the country faced. There were nearly 50 ministers

in

her cabinet, but the

vast majority of the ministers and advisors, as well as Bhutto herself, have had no

Some

previous experience of political office.

advisors had been bureaucrats or

generals but not successful politicians holding government positions. Bhutto herself

has had no job experience of any kind.

Preoccupied with her attempt to confront

and outmaneuver the opposition, Punjab Chief Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif
particular, Bhutto

committed a number of

political blunders,

in

which eroded her and

her party’s credibility.

Benazir Bhutto’s cabinet was criticized for being not only incompetent but
also corrupt.

The PPP had been

office.

workers

Its

deprivation.

It is,

types of relief

and

wilderness for

in political

had

officers

experienced

1

1

years

severe

when

she took

and

persecution

therefore, not surprising that the workers wanted jobs and other

when

their party

came

ministers were already wealthy.

to

power.

But many of those

They should have

who became

restrained themselves from

excessive indulgence in power and privileges of high office, but they did not.

Bhutto could not control them or did not want

to.

Many

of them did not seem to

have a clear idea of what the ends of power should be. Perhaps they thought
since their predecessors had profited from public office by plunder,
their turn.

forces

Given the

fact that the

PPP had

it

was now

only a plurality and the opposition

were large and determined, they should have been much more

their behavior so as not to give the opposition

that,

any ground

to criticize

careful in

them

in this

respect.

Bhutto was criticized for her political style as well; her haughtiness and
autocratic behavior, often

and other

PPP

compared

leaders leave her.

to those

Many
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of her father, made some of her

allies

considered her marriage to Asif Ali

Zardari a grave mistake and a political disaster because of the negative
reputation

of the Zardaris, both Asif Ali and his father Hakim Ali, which was
reinforced by
corruption stories surrounding them.
public perception of her as a

Her

them resulted

failure to restrain

weak woman who could

in a

not stand against her husband

and his family.

The

IJI’s landslide victory in the general elections

eye-opener for many.

There had been changes

of October 1990 were an

in Pakistani society

and

political

thinking of the public. People and their primary issues were quite different in 1990

from those
increased in
failed to

1970 when the

in
its

size

PPP

first

came

to such

changes of trend and carried out

on the sympathy factor largely accounted for

more

also needed to reconstruct

made,
step

its

power.

campaign

PPP would be

would present a dilemma

defeat in the October elections.

its

considerable mass support into

for Bhutto.

able to

move

She wants

forward.

nominees, they do not have their

own

But such a

to rule her party as a

therefore, does not wish to hold internal party elections.

officials are her

solely

Only when these changes and adjustments were successfully

Benazir Bhutto and the

monarch and,

its

its

organizational structure in order to have

effective machinery that could translate

real political

power; urban middle class had

and power. Local issues outweighed ideology. That the PPP

pay attention

The PPP

to

Since party

independent support

in their

constituencies, and, thus, are not able to mobilize the people in support of the party

and

own

its

top leadership.

But

if

they were elected to their positions, and had their

support, they would probably no longer tolerate Bhutto’s autocratic style. She

does not like to see that happen.

The

election results

some of

its

legacy.

She had

magic.

were also a strong indication

that

Bhutto

name had

lost

Benazir had both benefitted and suffered from her father’s

to try very hard to

would not follow her

father’s leftist

convince the business community

economic policy.

Yet she also had

that she
to hold

onto the basic principles of his populism to maintain the mass support which the

PPP had

only a plurality in 1988 because, while

many

cherished Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s populist stances and policies,

many

long relied on. Bhutto

Pakistanis

still

won
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disapproved of the same.
polarized.

He had

polarized Pakistani politics which

This legacy of her father made

to enlarge her support base.

it

still

remains

extremely difficult for Benazir Bhutto

If she identified with her father’s legacy forcefully,

those opposing that legacy would intensify their opposition to her.
dissociated from that legacy, those supporting
identified with

nor abandoned

it

and got nowhere.

She claimed

would leave

it

failed to say

She neither

she
fully

Consequently she made her stance ambivalent

it.

that her father

and her party were never

that she favored private enterprise, but that she

But she

her.

If

how and by what

was

policies she

still

socialist,

a champion of the poor.

would serve the underprivileged

people.

The

president, representing the bureaucracy, and the military had disliked

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto because he not only brought them under control but humiliated

Naturally they were unhappy with the idea of giving the office of prime

them.

minister to his offspring,

head of government
subordinated to a

let

alone a daughter.

in a traditional

Muslim

woman. Nonetheless,

not easy for a

It is

society

woman

where men do not

to

be

like to

be

they might have continued to tolerate her

had she and her team been honest and competent.

Faced with the

reality

being

otherwise, however, they were confirmed in their opinion against the Bhuttos and

prejudice against a

woman’s

rule.

The

military and the bureaucracy are, and have

always been, formidable centers of power
of politicians.
initially

They were forced

thus,

in office,

proved

to

dominated the

which

eralier

and have never thought much

submit to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto because he had

gathered mass support for himself.

Her youth and lack of experience
months

to

in Pakistan

also

That was not the case with Benazir.

worked against

her.

Benazir Bhutto’s twenty

had been hailed as a dawn of a new era

in Pakistan,

be merely a short recess for the country’s “establishment”
politics

of Pakistan.
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that

had
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